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Abstract
This thesis investigated the selected macro-monetary topics in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC). The thesis is presented in three distinct but re-
lated essays. The first essay (Chapter 2) examines the extent to which business cycles
are synchronised in the SADC area using a dynamic factor model which separates
idiosyncratic shocks from common shocks (regional common shocks). Countries are
said to be synchonised if regional common shocks explain a large variance of within-
country business cycles. Conversely, if a large variance of within-country business
cycles is accounted for by idiosyncratic shocks then countries are said not to be
synchronised. The study results have in-depth ramifications for the proposed SADC
monetary union. If business cycles are synchronised, it implies that provided that
other conditions for establishing a monetary union are satisfied, the use of a single
monetary policy may be optimal. Put differently, if business cycles are driven by
common shocks then the use of a mutual monetary policy is warranted. The results
of the study show that the regional common factor is important for some coun-
tries, and not for others. More precisely, it was discovered that regional common
shocks significantly explain most within-country business cycles in Botswana, South
Africa, Malawi, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, and Swaziland,
suggesting that a shared monetary policy could be considered among these coun-
tries. In addition, the study demonstrated that idiosyncratic shocks play little or
no significant role in explaining within-country business cycles for most countries
considered in the sample. Idiosyncratic factors are found to be significant only in
Malawi, and Seychelles. The important finding emerging from the study results is
that, based only on the business cycles synchronisation condition, a monetary union
encompassing all SADC member countries would not be optimal.
The second essay (Chapter 3) examines the endogeneity hypothesis in the con-
text of the SADC area. In particular, a Generalised Method of Moments is used to
investigate the role of trade intensity, financial integration, macroeconomic policy
viii
similarity, and exogenous factors on the extent to which SADC member states are
synchronised. Panel data covering the period 2000 to 2016 is used to conduct the
analysis. The study results show that trade integration positively affects business
cycles synchronisation, suggesting that promoting/or stimulating intra-SADC trade
could possibly result to intensified business cycles comovement in the bloc. In ad-
dition, the study results show that macroeconomic policies’ similarity (that is both
monetary and fiscal policies) exerts sanguine and statistically significant effect on
business cycles synchronisation. It was found that oil price changes have a decou-
plinf effect on regional business cyles. This could be explained by the fact that,
in the SADC region, some countries are net oil importers while other are net oil
exporters. Thus, the effect of oil movements depends on whether a country is a net
importer, or net exporter of oil.
While a monetary union entails benefits to member states, it comes at the ’ex-
pense’ of the independence to alter monetary policy tools in order to deal with
country-specific business cycles. Hence, for union members, fiscal policy becomes
the only policy recourse available to deal with idiosyncratic macroeconomic distur-
bances/or to mitigate conflicts over a preferred monetary policy. Therefore, fiscal
policy sustainability is crucial for the functioning of a monetary union. Unsustain-
able fiscal policies may neither be a mechanism, nor effective tool for dealing with
country-specific disturbances, thus threatening the stability of a monetary union.
Hence, the third essay (Chapter 4) of this thesis examines the sustainability of fiscal
policies in the SADC region using Bohn’s (1998) fiscal policy reactiom function.
In particular, we employ dynamic panel models (that is, panel mean group, mean
group, and dynamic fixed effects) to evaluate the response of government revenues
to changes in public expenditures. Using data covering the period 1990-2016, the
findings of the study reveal that public revenues positively react to changes in gov-
ernment expenditures. Thus, fiscal policies, in the SADC area, are found to be
sustainable. However, the reaction coefficients are less than a unity, implying that
ix
fiscal policies are ’weakly’ sustainable. Therefore, we argue that SADC governments
may face difficulties in marketing their debt in the future.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.0.1 Background
Long before the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963,
African leaders had acknowledged that cooperation, and integration in various ar-
eas, such as economic and social fields, were requisite to enhanced transformation
and sustainable development on the continent. Since the early 1960s, OAU mem-
ber countries were encouraged to merge their economies into sub-regional markets
that would eventually translate into a single African market Kemegue and Seck
(2014). In pursuit of this objective, a Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Fi-
nal Act of Lagos (FAL) were adopted in 1980. In 1994, the Abuja Treaty put the
commitments of the LPA, and the FAL into action by establishing the African Eco-
nomic Community (AEC), whose aim is to institute grounds for collective economic
development among African countries through steady process by coordination and
cooperation, synchronization and liberal integration of policies (and other undertak-
ings) of the already existing regional economic communities (RECs). These RECs
are the East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and South-
ern Africa (COMESA), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Community of
Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and Southern African Development Community
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(SADC). Interests to further integrate Africa, particularly SADC, were reinvigorated
by the successful establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999,
with the Euro replacing national currencies of the European Union (EU) member
countries. A single market in SADC will not only afford the region a bargaining
power, but it will also entail other benefits (See for example, Goodhart, 2007). For
example, P. R. Krugman (1993) argues that economic integration encourages spe-
cialisation along the lines of comparative advantage. In a single market, the most
efficient SADC producer will expand its production base, and supply nearly the
whole market (that is, the whole region). Consequently, production costs will de-
cline on the average, which will translate into lower consumer prices, consequently
improving consumer welfare in the region – especially if trade creation outweighs
trade diversion effects (Eichengreen, 1990). Furthermore, it is generally argued that
the extent of intra-SADC trade is disappointingly low (Masson, 2008; Cobham &
Robson, 1994; Yayo & Asefa, 2016; Gibb, 2016). This could be explained by the
existence of ‘too many currencies’ in the region (See, Rose & Van Wincoop, 2001).
Hence, the elimination of national currencies could potentially boost the scope of
trade among member states in the region. In support of this thesis, Glick and Rose
(2002) demonstrate that countries that leave a currency union tend to experience
drastic declines in their bilateral trade. For example, trade fell by approximately
100% when a currency union between Djibouti and Gabon was disbanded in 1949
(Glick, 2017). In addition, R. Mundell (1961) asserts that the efficiency of money
as a medium of exchange, and a unit of account is undermined by the existence of
several sovereign national currencies, because it implies higher transaction costs (as
a medium of exchange), and information costs (as a unit of account) (Tavlas, 2009b).
Whilst the debate of monetary unions has attracted considerable attention in
Africa, SADC, which is the largest trading bloc, in terms of GDP per capita, on the
continent, is often overlooked in many studies (See for example, Debrun, Masson,
& Pattillo, 2005; Carmignani, 2009; Buigut & Valev, 2009). This thesis, therefore,
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endeavors to explore the feasibility of establishing a monetary union in SADC. More
precisely, the thesis will analyse two essential considerations for a monetary union,
namely, business cycles synchronisation, and fiscal policies. To achieve this objec-
tive, the thesis is divided into three main objectives. First, the study will investigate
the extent to which business cycles are synchronised in the SADC; second, we will
identify and examine factors driving business cycles’ co-movement in the region (the
endogeneity hypothesis); and third, the thesis will evaluate the sustainability of fis-
cal policies in the SADC bloc.
1.0.2 The degree of business cycles’ synchronisation in SADC
In Africa, there are concerns that a deeper economic integration may not yield the
perceived benefits. In fact, it is argued that economic integration could result in
macroeconomic disasters across the continent (Zerihun, Breitenbach, & Kemegue,
2014).This is because virtually all the existing economic communities are borne out
of political agendas, and in most cases, are founded on colonial roots (Cobham &
Robson, 1994), rather thhn economic merits (Tavlas, 2009a). Put differently, it is
argued that these communities do not confine to the conditions set out in the theory
of optimum currency areas(See for example, Buigut & Valev, 2009; Tavlas, 2009a;
Cobham & Robson, 1994; Kabundi & Loots, 2007; Khamfula & Huizinga, 2004).
In so far as business cycles asymmetry or symmetry is concerned in SADC, empir-
ical studies often document contradictory findings. The mixed evidence documented
in these studies could be due to the use of different methodologies (See, Agbeyegbe,
2008; Zerihun et al., 2014; Zerihun & Breitenbach, 2016; Khamfula & Huizinga,
2004). In addition, the generally applied approaches suffer from several deficien-
cies. For example, basic correlation and Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR)
models are unable to juxtapose common from idiosyncratic shocks. In Chapter 2 of
this study, we employ a dynamic factor model to Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin
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(2005), a technique that is argued to be robust for business cycles’ synchronisation
(He & Liao, 2012). The model is able to isolate common from idiosyncratic shocks,
thus, allowing us to make inferences about the practicality of a common monetary
policy in SADC. If business cycles are significantly driven by a common or regional
component then country-specific policies may be less useful, and consequently, re-
gional policy coordinationation may be warranted (Kabundi & Loots, 2007). This
approach has not been used in the SADC region to gauge the feasibility of a mone-
tary union. An exception is an article by Kabundi and Loots (2007), which utilised
this approach to explore business cycles co-movement between SADC member states
and South Africa’s business cycles. However, in their study they only consider 12
SADC member countries for the period of 1980-2002. In this study, we include all
15 SADC member states, and we use updated data to examine the extent to which
business cycles are synchronised in the region.
Cognisant that the co-movement of business cycles is not static (i.e. it varies
overtime), the use of updated data could yield different results. The proposed ap-
proach concurs with Allegret and Essaadi (2011). The authors use a time-varying
coherence function, and find that business cycles’ co-movement tends to improve
with increased integration overtime. In line with this, Berdiev and Chang (2015)
demonstrate that business cycles’ co-movement varies overtime, thereby stressing
the importance of using a time-varying framework when assessing business cycles
synchronisation.
In line with existing studies (Asongu, Nwachukwu, & Tchamyou, 2017; Cobham
& Robson, 1994), this chapter finds that business cycles’ synchronisation in SADC
is not sufficient to justify a monetary union in the region. Precisely, we find that
regional common shocks are significant drivers of business cycles in some countries,
and not in others. In particular, we demonstrate that regional common components
are only significant drivers of business cycles in Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho,
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Swaziland, Malawi, Tanzania, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Thus, we con-
clude that a monetary union subsuming all SADC member states would not be
optimal and can results to macroeconomic instabilities across the region.
1.0.3 The endogeneity hypothesis: Factors influencing busi-
ness cycles synchronisation in SADC
In the late 1990s, a new view which denounces business cycles’ synchronisation as
an ex ante condition for establishing a monetary union emerged (Frankel, Rose, et
al., 1997; Abbott, Easaw, & Xing, 2008; Alesina & Barro, 2002; Arestis & Phelps,
2016). According to this view, business cycles’ synchronisation is not irrevocably
fixed, and is contingent on economic fundamentals, such as the degree to which
countries trade with each other, and the extent to which countries are financially
integrated, among others (Alesina, Barro, & Tenreyro, 2002; Frankel & Rose, 1998;
Rose & Van Wincoop, 2001; Rose & Engel, 2002). If this hypothesis holds, then
business cycles’ synchronicity could be an ex-post phenomena.
This hypothesis is generally referred to as the endogeneity hypothesis. The ra-
toinale behind this proposition is that trade between countries, through demand
linkages, facilitates the transmission process of a shock, hence synchronising busi-
ness cycles (Rose & Engel, 2002; J. Ahmed, Chaudhry, & Straetmans, 2018).This
owes to the notion that establishing a monetary or currency union tends to miti-
gate transaction costs and exchange rate risks, and consequently resulting intensified
trade between member states (Rose & Engel, 2002), thereby enhancing business cy-
cles’ synchronisation (Rose & Van Wincoop, 2001).
This hypothesis has in-depth policy implications regarding the decision on whether
to establish a monetary or not; and which countries are to join a monetary union.
G. H. Lee and Azali (2010), contend that if indeed the endogeneity hypothesis is cor-
rect, then policy-makers need not to be concerned about the extent to which business
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are synchronised. This is because, if business cycles are endogenous then synchroni-
sation need not to be achieved prior to establishing a monetary union since it can be
achieved after a union has been formed (Miles & Vijverberg, 2018). Parallel to this,
(Vieira & Vieira, 2012) postulate that entry could be fast-tracked if the endogeneity
hypothesis holds, with the expectation that convergence would be justified ex-post.
This chapter attempts answer the question, is the SADC monetary justifiable ex
post rather than ex-ante? We use Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to in-
vestigate the role trade integration/or intensity, financial integration/or intensity,
fiscal policy convergence, monetary policy similarity, and exogenous factors proxied
by oil prices, on the business cycles’ synchonisation in SADC. To the best of our
knowledge, no study has attempted to examine the endogeneity hypothesis in the
SADC region. Thus, this is one of the contributions of this thesis to the literature.
The result of this study are expected to have far-reaching policy ramifications for
the proposed SADC monetary union. Consistent with the endogeneity hypothesis
of Frankel et al. (1997), chapter 3 of this study reveals that indeed the properties of
a monetary union are not exogenous and irrevocably fixed. In particular, this study
finds that trade integration, and macroeconomic policy similarity (that is, both fis-
cal and monetary policies) significantly bolster the extent to which business cycles
are co-moving in the SADC region. Moreover, it is found that financial integration,
as predicted by Obstfeld (1994), has an adverse effect on business cycles’ synchroni-
sation. The study further finds that global common shocks proxied by real oil prices
have a decoupling effect on business cycles synchronicity in the SADC region.
1.0.4 Fiscal Policy Sustainability in SADC
In most cases, studies about the practicality of a monetary union are concerned more
about monetary policy than about fiscal policy. Feasibility of SADC monetary union
without fiscal policy sustainability considerations are incomplete. This is because
countries in a monetary union would automatically relinquish their monetary policy
control. Thus, the only policy re-course available to deal with idiosyncratic distur-
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bances is fiscal policy. It is crucial, therefore, that fiscal policies are sustainable
for prospective members of a monetary union. Schick (2005), contends that an un-
sustainable fiscal policy may neither be a mechanism nor effective for stabilising a
macroeconomy. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, therefore, we assess fiscal policy sustain-
ability in the SADC region. This is the first study of this kind in the region. Hence,
this constitutes the contribution of this thesis.
We find that government revenues tend to increase following an increase in gov-
ernment expenditures. This, according to Bohn (1998), is sufficient to infer fiscal
policy sustainability. Hence, we conclude that fiscal policies in SADC are sustain-
able. The reaction coefficient is less than a unity implying that fiscal policies are
weakly sustainable (Quintos, 1995; Kalyoncu, 2005). However, we argue that a
reaction coefficient that is less (greater) than a unity does not necessarily mean
that policies are weakly (or strongly) sustainable. However, it reflects asset market
conditions. Given that the probability of defaulting is higher in developing coun-
tries due to riskier economic environment agents would require a strong reaction
(or significant increase) in government revenues following an increase in government
expenditure. In all, fiscal policies are sustainabile in the SADC region.
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Chapter 2
The degree of business cycles’
synchronisation in SADC
2.0.1 Introduction
Formal arrangements to endorse economic cooperation in Southern Africa started
in the 1960s with the Frontline States, namely, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique,
Tanzania, Zambia and later Zimbabwe. The primary objective was to politically lib-
erate Southern Africa by ending apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa
and Southern Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe) (Rossouw, 2006). The initiative
was later extended to support member states (Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and
Mozambique) that were targets of military incursions by the then apartheid South
Africa.
One of the main problems facing the Front-line States was their economic de-
pendence on South Africa. Against a background of numerous challenges, such as
economic backwardness and poverty, these countries saw the promotion of economic
and social development through economic cooperation and integration as the only
logical option (Rossouw, 2006). This led to the formation of the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in April 1980, which was followed
by a commitment to pursue economic freedom policies. In August 1992, SADCC
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was renamed SADC (Southern African Development Community) and the Frontline
States disbanded in 1994 following the end of apartheid in South Africa (Rossouw,
2006).
The idea of economic cooperation and integration in SADC is backed by (Debrun
& Masson, 2013). They argue that integration would assist Southern African coun-
tries expand their market size, and thus take advantage of the resulting economies
of scale. Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) also support the idea of monetary integra-
tion in Africa. They maintain that African countries are unable to credibly commit
to financial stability in the conduct of monetary policy. Accordingly, they point
out that a monetary union can provide an alternative means to conducting a sound
monetary policy.
In light of these arguments, a number of initiatives have been put in place to
advance the agenda of economic cooperation and integration in SADC (Rossouw,
2006; Zerihun & Breitenbach, 2016). SADC Treaties 21 and 22 lay out areas of
cooperation, and emphasize the need for cooperation in all areas. The protocol on
finance and investment was signed in 2006, in an attempt to financially integrate the
region. In order to ensure free movement of people, a protocol on the facilitation of
movement of persons was signed in 2005; and a protocol on trade was signed in 1996
and effected in 2001 to expand intra-regional trade. In line with these protocols,
a SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) was established in 2008. The trading bloc is still
working to establish a SADC Customs Union, which was initially set to be launched
in 2010. Successful establishment of a customs union was set to be followed by the
establishment of a SADC common market in 2015. A common market is the final
phase towards the establishment of the SADC monetary union, which was initially
planned to be functional by 2016.
While a lot of progress has been made towards the establishment of a monetary
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union in SADC, the political (rather than economic) intentions that dominated the
establishment of the union have not been followed by parallel empirical studies to
investigate the suitability and merits of the envisaged monetary union. P. Krugman
(2013) argues that the benefits of a monetary union come at a very high cost; and
the theory of Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) remains the only device to weigh the
balance between the potential costs and benefits of a monetary union. The major
cost of a common monetary area is the loss of independent monetary policy to a
supranational bank, which suggests that synchronisation of business cycles is neces-
sary in order to establish a workable union (Soares et al., 2011).
Establishing a common monetary policy area with asynchronous business cycles
could result in dysfunctional monetary policy, and eventually a collapse of a mone-
tary union. With asynchronous business cycles, a single monetary policy will not be
optimal for all member countries (Gogas, 2013; Soares et al., 2011). Issues associ-
ated with joining a union with asynchronous business cycles have been evident in the
European Union (EU) (Zerihun et al., 2014). Therefore, for a workable monetary
union in SADC, it is important to take lessons from the already existing unions to
avoid repeating the same mistakes. The primary objective of this chapter, therefore,
is to examine factors that mitigate the costs of adopting a common monetary policy
by investigating the degree of business cycle synchronisation as a key prerequisite
for adopting common monetary policy. This study investigates which members of
the region have the characteristics to successfully adopt a common monetary policy
without running the risk of destabilizing the union as it happened in the EU (H.-
H. Lee, Huh, & Harris, 2003).
This study commences by evaluating pairwise correlation between the cyclical
component of GDP in each of the SADC member countries and South Africa’s
cyclical component of GDP. The study reveals little, and in most cases insignificant
correlations. Correlation anaylses have received large criticism in the literature.
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Therefore, its analysis cannot be treated as a conclusive evidence for business cycles’
synchronisation or lack thereof. In order to work around the issues associated with
correlation analysis, the study employs a dynamic factor model. Previous studies,
which employed a dynamic factor model, have predominantly focused on developed
economies, and a combination of developing and developed economies (Alesina et al.,
2002; Kabundi & Loots, 2007; Calderon, Chong, & Stein, 2007). Moreover, the only
study conducted in the SADC region using the dynamic factor model was limited to
12 countries of the 15 SADC member states (Kabundi & Loots, 2007). This study,
therefore, is somewhat an extension to the study conducted by Kabundi and Loots
(2007). The study includes all SADC member countries and data is extended to
cover the period of 1967-2015 whereas Kabundi and Loots (2007) cover until 2002.
Furthermore, unlike Kabundi and Loots (2007) who only considered regional factors,
we consider both regional factors and idiosyncratic factors. Studying idiosyncratic
factors allows us to understand the impact of country-specific features in driving
business cycles across the region, thus enabling us to come up with relevant policy
recommendations.
Asongu et al. (2017) argue that studies often present conflicting results on the
issue of establishing monetary unions in Africa. This, therefore, implies that the
issue of the feasibility of monetary unions in Africa remains an unsettled matter.
The failure to take into account regional factors, such as economic integration, polit-
ical histories and institutional arrangements could be behind the conflicting results
often found in African studies Asongu et al. (2017). By considering both the re-
gional shocks and individual specific shocks, we are closing the gap or eliminating
the failure to account for regional factors, thus resolving, to some extent, the exist-
ing conflict in the literature.
The findings of the study reveal that, given that other conditions of a monetary
union are fulfilled, a monetary union which subsumes all SADC member states would
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not be optimum. Put differently, it is shown that, for some countries, business cycles
are driven by regional common shocks whilst in other countries they are explained
by idiosyncratic factors. Therefore, a preferred conduct of monetary policy for the
countries whose business cycles are driven by regional shocks may be different from
those whose business cycles are driven by idiosyncratic shocks. The conflicting
preferences about the conduct of monetary policy would threaten the stability of a
monetary
2.0.2 SADC Macroeconomic Overview
SADC consists of fifteen sovereign member countries which are at different levels
of development. South Africa is the most economically advanced country in the
bloc. The levels of economic growth across SADC member states are highly het-
erogeneous, with other countries attaining high growth levels, and others achieving
low levels of growth (See Figure 2.0.2). Notwithstanding, the imbalances and the
relatively small individual market sizes, SADC’s aggregate GDP is more than half
of the Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) aggregate GDP, thereby making it the largest
regional economic community (REC) in Africa in terms of GDP.
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Figure 2.1: SADC GDP Growth Rates: 2015-2017
SADC income as measured by GDP per capita has remained low, and is declining.
In the year 2002, SADC average GDP per capita stood at US$876, peaking between
2003 and 2011 to an average of US$2587 and declining in the subsequent periods
2012-2014 to US$2374. In the year 2014, Seychelles’ GDP per capita was highest
in the SADC region at US$16922, followed by Mauritius at US$10017, Botswana
(US$7365), South Africa (US$6485), Angola (US$6060), Namibia (US$5309), and
Swaziland (US$4112) in that order. Low-income countries in the region consist
of Zimbabwe with an income per capita of US$1056, Madagascar (US$453), and
Malawi (US$379), amongst others. If these countries were to close the gap and
reduce poverty, formulation of appropriate policies to induce per capita growth is
warranted. The primary contributors to the observed low levels of income per per-
son include amongst others, distorted and underdeveloped production structures,
meagre economic performance, macroeconomic management challenges, unfavorable
international economic environment and lower representation to international mar-
ket.
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Given the heterogeneousness amongst SADC member countries, and the above-
mentioned challenges, SADC made it her objective to ensure a balanced and equi-
table development amongst its member countries. Thus, it is believed that deeper
integration would result to economic convergence as opposed to divergence of mem-
ber states. This is supported by Hudson and Jones (2002) who demonstrates that
economic integration in West Africa, ECOWAS to be precise, is associated with
convergence in per capita income.
2.0.3 Literature Review
Prior to Mundell’s (1961) seminal work, areas in which it is optimal to abandon flex-
ible exchange rates in favor of fixed exchange rates (or single currency) were defined
by the ”existing national confines (McKinnon, 1963). Therefore, ”existing national
confine” constituted a country, each country had its own currency, and currency
unions were very sporadic (Alesina & Barro, 2002). Defining countries as optimal
currency areas, there was an exponential increase in the number of currencies used
around the globe. Alesina and Barro (2002) argue that there were 76 countries in the
world in 1947, and the number of countries today has more than doubled, reaching
195 in 2018, with few exceptions, each country has its own currency1.
However, with the increasing number of currencies, and level of financial market
integration, defining optimal currency areas with national confines has come under
great scrutiny. As a result, some countries have stopped using their ’own currencies’
and thus, deciding to share a single currency, while others have opted for dollar-
ization and/ or currency boards. For example, in 1999 eleven European countries2
adopted the ”Euro”, while countries in the CFA franc zone3 fixed their curren-
1John Stuart Mill describes the use of multiple (different) currencies as ”babaric”
2Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Por-
tugal and Spain.
3The CAF franc is the name of two currencies utilised in parts of West and Central African
states. The West African states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali,
Niger, Senegal, Togo; and Central African states are: Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad,
Gabon, Republic of Congo, and Equatoral Guinea.
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cies against the Euro (formerly to the French Franc). Given these developments,
the question is how to determine the size of an optimal currency area, i.e. which
countries are eligible to adopt and/ or join a common currency? Lerner (1947);
McKinnon (1963); R. Mundell (1961) argue that economic fundamentals ought to
be asked to determine the size of an optimal currency area. In line with the view
that economic characteristics are in a better position to determine the optimal size of
a monetary area, Christodoulakis, Dimelis, and Kollintzas (1995) postulate that the
design of institutions and policies associated with a currency union is endogenous to
the uniformity of some central economic traits for the economies in question4.In line
with this, Alesina and Grilli (1993) show that incentives to join a monetary union
depend on a number of fact ors such as output and infla tion co-movement across
the countries in question.
The theory of optimal currency areas5 by R. A. Mundell (1961) prescribes op-
timal conditions for the adoption of a single currency, and consequently employ-
ment of common monetary policy (McKinnon, 1963). It has been argued that
countries intending to share a common monetary policy should share some traits
(Eickmeier & Breitung, 2006), which include an adequate degree of business cycle
co-movement (R. A. Mundell, 1961; Fidrmuc & Korhonen, 2003). If business cycles
are not matched, probably due to structural differences among countries, the use
of a common monetary policy may be counterproductive (Correia, Gouveia, et al.,
2013). This is because by being part of a monetary union , countries automatically
surrender their monetary policy to a supranational bank (Buigut & Valev, 2009).
Therefore, a common monetary policy designed to tackle union-wide disturbances
in the presence of asymmetric and/ or asynchronous business cycles may not be
optimal for all member count ries and conflicts on the preferred conduct of mon-
4The delicate question in this regard is whether or not countries are homogenous and have
symmetric responses to shocks.
5The theory of optimum currency areas define a geographic domain under which abandonment of
flexible in favor of fixed exchange rates would be beneficial (favorable)(see Lerner, 1947; Friedman,
1953, and Mundell, 1961 among others for further discussion.)
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etary policy would arise (Seymen, 2012). For instance, countries that are on an
expansionary phase of their business cycles would prefer a contractionary monetary
policy in order to deal with the resulting inflation pressures, whereas countries ex-
periencing recessions would prefer an expansionary monetary policy in order to fuel
growth (Gogas, 2013). In line with this, Hallett and Piscitelli (2002) argue that if
substantial differences among countries wanting to establish a monetary union exist,
it is inevitable that common policies, and specifically common monetary policy, will
have diverse effects in different economies. Accordingly, business cycles synchronic-
ity is an inevitable requirement for monetary union. Similar sentiments are shared
by Hallett and Piscitelli (1999).
Because perfect correlation of business cycles is hardly observed in the real-world
Correia et al. (2013) and Eickmeier and Breitung (2006) argue that other adjustment
mechanisms such as the use of fiscal policy, mobility of fact ors of production, and
other nominal flexibilities could resolve the potential conflict on the preferred con-
duct of monetary policy. However, in the absence of these adjustment mechanisms,
they argue that establishment of a monetary union would be impulsive (Chaplygin,
Hallett, & Richter, 2006). Thence, business cycles’ synchronisation becomes an
essential precondition for the establishment of a monetary union and hence employ-
ment of common monetary policy (Correia et al., 2013).
There is a large strand of the literature examining the degree of business cycles’
synchronisation (See for example, Altavilla, 2004; Bagliano & Morana, 2009; Cor-
reia et al., 2013). However, most of the a ttention has been placed on the United
States, Europe, and East Asia (Moneta & Rüffer, 2009; G. H. Lee & Azali, 2010;
Filipovski, Trpeski, & Bogoev, 2018). Empirical studies assessing business cycle cor-
relation in developing countries are still scant (Calderon et al., 2007). He and Liao
(2012) assess business cycles’ synchronisation in Asia, and conclude that although
global common factors have deepened overtime, business cycle co-movement has
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not followed suit. However, regional factors have become significantly important in
explaining business cycle co-movements in Asia. Their findings suggest that Asian
economies (except for China, whose business cycles appear to be significantly driven
by country-specific factors) can consider employing a region-wide monetary policy
to tackle disturbances.
H.-H. Lee et al. (2003) support the aforementioned studies. They find that the
regional common component plays a significant role in explaining business cycles for
East Asian countries. Thus, they support the establishment of a monetary union,
and argue that synchronisation will be further bolstered by trade integration. These
findings are consistent with Bagliano and Morana (2009), who observed that in Eu-
rope, business cycles arc driven by both common global shocks, and idiosyncratic
factors.
Giannone and Reichlin (2006) document the importance of regional (Euro area)
common shocks in explaining individual country business cycles. In contrast to these
studies, Seymen (2012) stresses on the importance of global shocks and country-
specific shocks in explaining business cycles’ co-movements as opposed to regional
(Euro area) common shocks (Canova, Ciccarelli, & Ortega, 2007). Canova et al.
(2007) find that business cycles in G-7 countries are largely driven by world cy-
cles, while country-specific shocks play a very little role. In addition, they found
no evidence of the importance of regional shocks. The importance of global shocks
in explaining Emopean business cycles has far-reaching policy implications for the
European Central Bank (ECB). With global shocks, the European Union policy
makers ought to set their policies in tandem with major players in the world econ-
omy (Seymen, 2012). Overall, there seems to be consensus that business cycles’
synchronisation in the Euro area has intensified, and global common shocks have
played a major role in driving business cycles across Europe and Asia.
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It is clear that more attention has been paid to developed and Asian countries;
and African countries have been neglected in empirical analyses. Among the few
studies that have been carried out on the SADC, the findings have been contradic-
tory. Zerihun and Breitenbach (2016) investigate purchasing power parity in SADC,
and find that it holds. Therefore, they conclude that SADC could consider adopting
a common monetary policy. Tipoy (2015) and Debrun and Masson (2013) on the
other hand, find that only some SADC member states are ready to adopt a mon-
etary union. Precisely, Tipoy (2015) finds that conditional convergence was more
pronounced among SACU member states. Tipoy (2015) argues that the lack of
convergence in economic growth for these countries may hamper the optimality of
a region-wide monetary policy. Buigut (2006) also find that not all SADC member
countries should take part in the adoption of a common monetary policy in the re-
gion. They observe that business cycles in member states of the Common Monetary
Area (CMA) am synchronised, and thus may consider adopting a common mone-
tary policy. On the other hand, Agbeyegbe (2008), Vieira and Vieira (2013) and
Asongu et al. (2017) argue that SADC member countries are too heterogeneous,
and therefore adopting a common monetary policy would not be optimal for the
trading bloc. Jefferis (2007) assesses the degree to which the fundamental mone-
tary indicators are converging m the SADC region, and he finds that the converging
group comprises of the CMA member countries, Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritius
and Tanzania. Karras (2006) evaluates the costs and benefits of establishing a cur-
rency union in Africa. He finds that countries that are more likely to benefit more,
also stand to lose more while countries that have little to gain, also have little to lose.
Kabundi and Loots (2007) employ a generalized dynamic factor model to as-
sess the nature, and extent of business cycle synchronisation between SADC and
South Africa. They demonstrate that there is significant business cycle synchro-
nisation between South Africa and Botswana, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Angola, Mozambique, Mauritius, and Namibia. They also
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show that in SADC countries, business cycles are largely driven by idiosyncratic
and global factors. The small impact of regional common factors on SADC business
cycles implies that adoption of a regional common monetary policy would not be
optimal. These findings are in line with Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) who argued
that a monetary union that comprises of all SADC member countries would accrue
large costs relative to its gains. Contrary to the aforementioned views, Rossouw
(2006) argues that convergence should rather be a continuous objective rather than
a precondition. This view supports the ”cndogcncity” hypothesis of Frankel and
Rose (1998), which suggests that a monetary union is a self-validating process.
Thus, business cycle comovement is an ex-post rather than an ex ante phenomenon.
Assessing the degree of business cycles’ concordance in Central African Economic
and Monetary Community (CAEMC) Carmignani (2009) reveals that the union is
characterized by a low degree of business cycle synchronisation. However, overtime
synchronisation has tended to increase. Thus, he provides evidence of the endogene-
ity of business cycles concordance.
Overall, the optimality of the proposed monetary union in SADC has received
little attention, and the existing scant literature often present conflicting results
about the size and the optimality of the envisaged SADC monetary union. Further-
more, the question of what drives business cycles, that is, whether they are driven
by common shocks or idiosyncratic shocks, has not been properly attended to in the
SADC region.
2.1 Data and Methodology
2.1.1 Data
Industrial Production (IP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are two variables
that are commonly used in the business cycles literature (Camacho, Perez-Quiros, &
Saiz, 2006; Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2005; Clark & Van Wincoop, 2001). Often, quar-
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terly or monthly frequency data is preferred to annual data to enable researchers
capture high frequency oscillations, which is difficult with annual data. Unfortu-
nately, high frequency data in SADC is rarely available. We, therefore, resort to
annual data covering the period 1967-2015. The study period (1967-2015) is selected
based on the availability of data, which were collected from the World Development
Indicators (WDI).
2.1.2 Business Cycles Definition
In the literature, there are two alternative defmitions of business cycles namely, the
classical business cycles due to Burns and Mitchell (1946), and the growth or devi-
ation business cycles. The classical definition of business cycles states that business
cycles are type of fluctuations found in the aggregate economic activity of nations
that organize their work mainly in business enterprises. A cycle consists of expan-
sions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, followed by
similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which emerge into the expan-
sion phase of the next cycle. This sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic.
Durations of business cycles vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years;
and they are not divisible into shorter cycles of similar characters with amplitudes
approximating their own” (See, Burns and Mitchell, 1946, p.3).
Classical recessions are very rare. In the late 1960s scholars hcgan to think
that business cycles were something of the past. Put differently, they believed that
business cycles had vanished (Matthews, 1968). Mintz (1970) argues that business
cycles did not demise in the 1960s, but prior to World War II. He argues that pe-
riods classified as recessions were not characterized by declines in overall output,
which contradict the definition of Burns and Mitchell (1946). Rather they were
periods of retardation in the growth rate of the economy. The reason for suspecting
the end of business cycles is the mildness of [classical] business cycles recessions in
many economies. According to De Haan, Inklaar, and Jong-A-Pin (2008), classical
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recessions rarely happen because economies tend to grow overtime, thus rendering
the classical definition of business cycles obsolete. Consequently, business cycle the-
orists came up with a new definition of business cycles, the deviation cycles. The
deviation definition of business cycles’ considers fluctuations of growth around their
potential. In this sense, periods of low growth are considered as recessions, whereas
periods of high growth are considered as expansions.
In line with recent studies, this study adopts the deviation cycle definition of
business cycles (Carmignani, 2009). The choice of the deviation cycle definition
owes to two considerations. Firstly, most economies are advancing, hence classi-
cal recessions are less frequent relative to recessions implied by deviation cycles
(De Haan et al., 2008). Secondly, most econometric (i.e. parametric) approaches
necessitate time series to be stationary which is often the case in growth cycles.
A study of business cycles does not end with the definition of business cycles.
After defining business cycles, the central question is how to isolate a ”deviation”
or the cyclical component of the series from the permanent component of the series
(Baxter & King, 1999)? To achieve this, several approaches have been used in the
literature such as the first differenciation and the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Prior to discussing a detrending technique employed in this study, it is essential
to point out the main challenge facing researchers when choosing detrending tools.
There are two sets of detrending techniques, namely, the statistically inclined ap-
proaches and the economic theory based approaches (Canova, 1994). The former set
of approaches presume that the trend and the cyclical component are not observed,
but employ heterogeneous suppositions to identify the trend and cyclical parts of the
series; and in the latter, the trend is determined by the preferences of the researcher,
economic theory and/or the question asked by the researcher (See, Canova, 1994).
This issue is highly critical because empirical findings tend to be contingent on the
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adopted approach and/ or the filtering technique (Canova, 1994).
However, in most recent business cycles literature, the commonly adopted ap-
proach is the statistical approach, precisely, the Hodrick-Prescott fillter (Ravn &
Uhlig, 2002; Baxter & King, 1999). Below we concisely discuss the Hodrick-Prescott
filter and its weaknesses.
A. C. Harvey and Jaeger (1993) argue tha.t structural time-series models are set up
directly in terms of components that have explicit interpretation. In the context of
this section, the appropriate model is as follows:
yt = εt + µt t = 1, 2..., T (2.1)
where yt is the observed series, εt and µt is the trend component and the cyclical
component of the observed series, in that order. The Hodrick-Prescott filter assumes
that the circular trend is difference stationary I(1), whereas the cyclical component
is stationary I(0).
An estimate of the trend is obtained by minimising the following
min
[ε]Tt
T∑
t=1
(yt − εt)2 + λ
T∑
t=1
((εt+1 − εt)(εt−1 − εt))2 (2.2)
where λ is a smoothing parameter, which penalizes changes in the growth of the
circular component. The larger the value of λ, the greater is the penalty imposed,
and the smoother the resulting circular component. While the Hodrick-Prescott
filter is the most popular filter in macroeconomics literature, it is associated with
major concerns and has received great criticism (Ravn & Uhlig, 2002; Baxter &
King, 1999; King & Rebelo, 1993). The main problem with the Hodrick-Prescott
filter is on the selection of the appropriate smoothing parameter. While there seems
to be consensus that for quarterly data, the smoothing parameter should be set to
1600, some data are hardly available at this frequency. The appropriate value of λ
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for annual data, however, remains an unsettled matter. Backus and Kehoe (1992)
set the smoothing parameter to 100, while Baxter and King (1999) suggest that it
should be set to 10 for annual data. On the other hand, Ravn and Uhlig (2002)
suggests that λ should be set to 6.25 for annual data. The second problem with the
Hodrick-Prescott filter was pointed out by A. C. Harvey and Jaeger (1993), Cogley
and Nason (1995) and King and Rebelo (1993) amongst others. They argue that
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is a two-sided symmetric moving average filter, and
when applied to a trend stationary series the filter works like a high pass filter6.
However, when applied to integrated series, the filter does not work like a high
pass filter. In this case, the filter is comparable to a two-step linear filter, which
differentiates the data to render them stationary, and thereafter smoothens the dif-
ferentiated data with asymmetric moving averages (Cogley & Nason, 1995). The
smoothing operation amplifies growth cycles at business cycle frequencies (Cogley &
Nason, 1995), consequently, resulting to spurious cycles (Canova, 1994, 1998; Baxter
& King, 1999; King & Rebelo, 1993; A. Harvey & Trimbur, 2008).
As a consequence, Baxter and King (1999) developed a band-pass filter which
avoids limitations of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Moreover, Baxter and King (1999)
argue that filtering techniques, including the Hodrick-Prescott filter, tend to overlook
the matter which Burns and Mitchell (1946) regarded as fundamental definition of a
business cycle. According to Burns and Mitchell (1946) business cycles are cyclical
components of no less than one and half years, and which typically last fewer than
eight years. The Baxter-King filter applies these limits as a definition of business
cycles. Baxter and King (1999) propose a bandpass filter of definite order q. The
Baxter-King filter is defined as a finite-moving average:
ypt =
Q∑
j=−q
αjL
jyy (2.3)
where αj, L denotes symmetric weights and a backshift operator (L
nyt = yt−n,
6For full details see Singleton (1988)
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respectively. The symmetric weights are obtained as a solution to the subsequent
minimization problem:
min
αj
Z =
∫ π
−π
(β(ω)− α(ω))2dω subject to α(0) = 0 (2.4)
where β(ω) is the best filter gain with cut-off frequencies ω1 and ω2. Similarly to
Hodrick-Prescott filter, the cyclical component is obtained as yct = yt − y
p
t .
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Figure 2.2: Business Cycles: Baxter and King v. Hodrick-Prescott Filter25
In figure 2.1.2, we present business cycles obtained from the Baxter and King
(1999) and the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filtering techniques. In line with
other previous studies, the figure reveals that there exist resemblances between the
Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter and Baxter-King filter (Canova, 1994). However, when
the Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied, turning points tend to be severe relative to
Baxter-King filtered business cycles. Moreover, in contrast to H-P filtered cycles,
B-K filtered cycles tend to be smooth (Buti, Franco, & Ongena, 1998; Baxter &
King, 1999). Another point worth mentioning is that the order of turning points
and periods suggest that business cycles are not synchronised.
As pointed out earlier, there are two mam issues associated with the application
of the Hodrick-Prescott filter in business cycle analysis: poor approximation near
the endpoints, and spurious or artificial” business cycles (Baxter & King, 1999;
Buti et al., 1998; Cogley, 1990; Canova, 1994; A. C. Harvey & Jaeger, 1993). These
limitations make the Baxter-King band pass filter to be more attractive than the
Hodrick-Prescott filter (Christiano & Fitzgerald, 2003). Hence, this study uses the
Baxter-King filtering approach.
2.1.3 Econometric Framework
The existence of common shocks, which drive business cycles for different economies
intending to adopt a common monetary policy, is imperative. if common shocks exist
and account for large variance of business cycles for individual economies, adopting
a common policy should not be costly (Camacho et al., 2006). Although a consensus
on the importance of business cycles synchronisation (measured by the existence of
common shocks) has been reached, there has been no consensus on how to success-
fully measure business cycles co-movements. Consequently, a number of different
approaches to evaluate business cycles’ synchronicity have been employed. Baxter
and Stockman (1989) and Backus and Kehoe (1992) apply basic correlation to anal-
yse the degree of business cycles’ synchronisation. Basic correlation has, however,
received significant criticism by Moneta and Rüffer (2009), amongst others. They
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argue that basic correlation fails to isolate idiosyncratic shocks from structural com-
mon shocks, and also fails to capture the tenacity of common shocks. In addition,
H.-H. Lee et al. (2003) criticise correlation on the grounds that it measures bilat-
eral co-movements between two countries, rather than region-wide business cycles
co-movements. Therefore, the approach is silent about the effects of adopting a
common monetary policy.
Other approaches such as structural vector autoregressive models (SVARs) have
been utilized in the literature (Seymen, 2012). However, these models are not with-
out imitations. One of the limitations is the inability to distinguish between idiosyn-
cratic and structural common shocks (Forni, Giannone, Lippi, & Reichlin, 2009). ln
addition, orthodox vector autoregressive models are incapable of incorporating a
large information set, unlike dynamic factor models. The large information set
complicates the identification of the model since the number of parameters to be
estimated increases as well (Forni et al., 2009; Kutu, Akinola, & Nzimande, 2016).
Amongst others, it is for these reasons that this study employs a dynamic factor
model, which owes its origins to the work of Geweke (1977). These models have been
widely used to predict the behavior of macroeconomic variables (Stock & Watson,
2002; Forni et al., 2009, 2005). Our model assumes that an N dimensional sta-
tionary processes Yt can be expressed as a sum of two independent components: the
individual specific component, and the common component, which captures the part
of the series that moves together with the rest of the region (Forni et al., 2009). The
premise of the model is that time series (i.e. business cycles in our case) are driven
by a small number (q) of common shocks, which in turn generates co-movements
(H.-H. Lee et al., 2003). Quah and Sargent (1993) provide evidence that indeed a
smaller number, which is two, of common shocks explain approximately 80% of the
dynamics in microeconomic data.
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Our model is therefore specified as follows:
Yit = Φ(L)ft + εt (2.5)
ft = χ(L)ft−1 + ζt (2.6)
where there are N series such that Yt and εt are (N×1); there are q dynamic factors,
so ft and zetat are (q × 1); L is a lag operator; and the lag polynomial matrices
Φ(L) and χ(L) are (N × q) and (q× q) accordingly. Φ(L)ft is a common component
of the series, and the jth lag polynomial Φ(L) are factor loadings for the jth series.
The influence of the idiosyncratic component is embedded in the error term as in
Stock and Watson (2011). In addition, we assume that εt ∼ ℵ(0, Qt) where Qt is
an (N × N) diagonal covariance matrix, and ζt ∼ ℵ(0, $) where $ is a (K × K)
covariance matrix. We assume that there is no correlation between the idiosyncratic
shocks and the error term of the factors at all leads and lags, that is, Eεtζt−k = 0
for all k. In classical ( or exact) dynamic factor models, country-specific compo-
nents are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other, which limits their usefuh1ess
(Stock & Watson, 2011). Forni and Lippi (2001) argue that while the assumption of
orthogonality of idiosyncratic factors is essential for indentification purposes, it is a
restrictive assumption. Indeed, in the context of this study, the assumption would
not be appropriate, because SADC economies are open. As such, the business cycles
of country X may well be related to business cycles of country Y in a way that is
closely ”cross-regressive”, so that a country-specific shock originated in country Y
transmits, with a lag, to country X (See, Forni and Lippi, 2001) Therefore, our ap-
proach permits country specific factors to be weakly and cross-sectionally correlated
to some degree (Croux, Forni, & Reichlin, 2001; Forni & Lippi, 2001).
To estimate our model, we follow the work of Watson and Engle (1983) and
Quah and Sargent (1993). We utilise the Kalman Filter to generate the Gaussian
likelihood, estimate the parameters using the maximum likelihood, and thereafter
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use Kalman Filter to get efficient estimates of the factors.
The first step to executing the approach is to cast the dynamic factor model into
a linear state space model (Stock and Watson, 2010). Let Ft = (f
′
t , f
′
t−1, ..., f
′
t−p)
′
represent (r × 1) vector, let p be the extent of lag polynomial matrix Φ(L), and let
Ω = (Φ0,Φ1, ...,Φp), where Phii is the (N×q) matrix of coefficients on the ith lag in
Φ(L). Also, let Ψ(L) be the matrix of 1′s and 0′s, and the components of χ(L) such
that the VAR in equation 2.6 is rewritten in terms Ft. Given this representation
equations 2.5 and 2.6 can be rewritten as follows:
Yit = ΩFt + εt (2.7)
Ψ(L)Ft = Gνt (2.8)
where G is a matrix of l’s and 0’s selected so that equation 2.6 and equation 2.8 are
comparable. We complete our new representation by specifying the law of motion
for εt. Thus, εt is assumed to follow a univariate autoregressive process:
di(L)εt = ηit, i = 1, ..., N (2.9)
Furthermore, it is assumed that ηit is identically, and independently distributed,
(i.i.d.) N(0, σ2ηi), νt is i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
νj
) with j = 1, ..., q and εt and νt are orthogonal.
Thus equations 2.7 to 2.9 constitute a comprehensive linear state space model.
Given the parameters, we exploit the Kalman filter to generate the likelihood and
estimate filtered values of Ft and therefore of ft.
2.2 Results and Discussion
For comparison purposes, this section assesses the correlation between business cy-
cles in the SADC region, and further examines the correlation between the cyclical
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components of aggregate demand. Whilst the findings obtained from this exercise
do not allow us to draw conclusions, they serve as a benchmark against which we
can compare our empirical findings. Moreover, they allow us to relate/or compare
this work with other studies which relied on correlation analysis only.
2.2.1 Correlation of Cyclical Components of GDP
To investigate the extent to which business cycles arc synchronised in SADC, equa-
tion 2.10 is employed to compute the correlation coefficients between the cyclical
component of real output in country k, and the cyclical component of the South
African real GDP.
syncksa = corr(Csa, Ck) (2.10)
Ideally the correlation coefficient would be measured between country k′s cyclical
component and the cyclical component of SADCs real GDP. However, aggregated
SADC real GDP data is hardly available. Consequently, we use South Africa’s real
GDP as a proxy for the SADC GDP. The use of South Africa,s real GDP is mo-
tivated by the fact that South Africa contributes more than 60% towards SADCs
total GDP. For example, in 2002, South Africa contributed 76% towards the SADC
GDP (Kabundi & Loots, 2007). To disentangle between the cyclical component and
permanent component of real GDP, we use a filter proposed by Baxter and King
(1999). Generally, a higher correlation coefficient signifies a higher degree of busi-
ness cycles’ synchronisation (Buigut, 2006).
Business cycles’ synchronisation of the Southern African Development Commu-
nity (SADC) member states is compared to that of the member countries of the
Common Monetary Area (CMA). The reason for comparing SADC business cycles
synchronisation, against the business cycles’ synchronisation of the member states
of the CMA is simply because the CMA is the only bloc in Southern Africa which
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closely resembles other fully-fledged monetary unions such as the Eurozone. The
difference between the Eurozone and the CMA is that the Eurozone has a common
central bank, whereas the CMA does not.
In addition to business cycle synchronisation using aggregate real GDP, we fur-
ther investigate which aggregate demand component i for each country k is primarily
responsible for the aggregate real GDP business cycle synchronisation. To this end,
we construct the country’s aggregate demand cyclical components, cik , and there-
after, compute the correlation between SADC real GDP cyclical component, and
respective aggregate demand components.
The second and the third column of table 2.1 report results for business cycle
synchronisation in the CMA and SADC. The second column of table 2.1, shows
that correlation between South Africa’s business cycles’ and business cycles of other
CMA member states is low and is statistically insignificant. We observe thath the
correlation coefficients between South Africa’s business cycles (a proxy for SADC)
and Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, are 0.218, -0.074 and 0.147, respectively. The
observed correlations in the CMA contradict our expectations, and what is observed
in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe. Frankel and Rose (1998) sug-
gest that countries with strong trade ties tend to be significantly correlated than
countries which do not share strong trade ties.Hence, given that member states
of the CMA share strong trade ties, it is expected that member states of the CMA
would be strongly correlated with South Africa (Kabundi & Loots, 2007). Moreover,
countries which are geographically proximate are expected to be strongly correlated
with each other, therefore, the observed low and statistically insignificant correla-
tion with South Africa is puzzling. Except for Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, and
Democratic Republic of Congo, in the third column of table 2.1., we observe low
and statistically insignificant correlations between South Africa’s business cycles and
the business cycles for the rest of SADC member states. Moreover, column three
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of table 2.1 reveals that while Angola, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo
and Botswana have positive and statistically significant correlation coefficients, the
correlation coefficients are below average, i.e. 0.5, except for Botswana whose corre-
lation coefficient is 0.602. Overall, our findings agree with the existing studies that
the business cycles’ correlation is still limited, and in most cases, it is statistically
insignificant (Zerihun et al., 2014; Zerihun & Breitenbach, 2016). The lack of busi-
ness cycles’ cohesion casts doubts on the feasibility of the proposed monetary union
in the SADC region. This finding, the lack of business cycles synchronisation, could
be consistent with the argument that political agendas, rather than economic merits
arc the very important impetus for the envisaged SADC monetary union.
Table 2.1: Business Cycles Correlation
Business Cycles’ Synchronisation Volatility of the Cyclical Component
Countries CMA SADC CMA SADC
Botswana 0.602*** 0.026
Lesotho 0.218 0.011 0.011
Namibia -0.074 0.017 0.017
Swaziland 0.147 0.215 0.215
Angola 0.478** 0.058
Congo Demo. 0.447** 0.058
Malawi 0.068 0.030
Madagascar 0.341* 0.027
Mauritius -0.014 0.012
Mozambique 0.358* 0.035
Seychelles 0.225 0.035
Tanzania 0.37* 0.008
Zambia 0.166 0.018
Zimbabwe 0.129 0.044
Finally, columns four and five of table 2.1 report the volatility of the cyclical
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component of real GDP in the CMA and SADC, respectively. The results reveal
small differences in business cycles’ volatility across all member states of the CMA
and SADC region, except for Swaziland whose estimated output volatility is 0.215.
Moreover, Swaziland’s output volatility is about two and half times larger than the
average volatility of the CMA, which is estimated at 0.081. In addition, Swaziland’s
output volatility is five times greater than the average volatility of the SADC region,
which is estimated at 0.040. Overall, our findings suggest that business cycles in the
SADC region are not highly volatile. This is in contrast with Gerlach (1988) who
suggested that small countries tend to be characterized by high volatile business cy-
cles. A possible explanation is that larger countries are more diversified, while small,
more open countries arc more susceptible to global shocks (Darvas & Szapáry, 2008;
Kose, 2002). The SADC region, however, is dominated by small, open economies.
2.2.1.1 Correlation of Cyclical Components of GDP
In this section, we present the correlation between the cyclical component of South
Africa’s real GDP and the cyclical components of respective aggregate demand com-
ponents for the CMA and SADC member states. As pointed out earlier, the purpose
of this task is to investigate which components of aggregate demand are mainly re-
sponsible for business cycle synchronisation or lack, thereof. Disaggregating the
aggregate demand component is essential because aggregate demand components
differently contribute towards overall GDP. It is, therefore, possible that the impact
of components with the least contribution toward GDP is outweighed by the effect
of components that have a large share in overall GDP.
33
Table 2.2: Correlation: Private Consumption’s Cyclical Component v. SA’s GDP
Cyclical Component
Countries CMA SADC Share in GDP(% GDP)
Botswana 0.296 40.37
Lesotho
Namibia -0.238 -0.238 62.23
Swaziland 0.215 0.215 77.09
Angola 0.237 48.21
Congo Dem. 0.034 81.53
Malawi 0.061 81.60
Madagascar -0.185 85.54
Mauritius 0.389* 66.59
Mozambique 0.323 82.50
Seychelles -0.353 60.39
Tanzania 0.096 71.48
Zambia
Zimbabwe -0.364 80.17
Minimum 0.238 -0.185 40.37
Maximum 0.215 0.389* 85.54
Average -0.012 -0.049 69.81
Table 2.2 presents the correlation between the cyclical component of household
consumption and the cyclical component of South Africa’s real GDP. Column two
of table 2.2 reports correlation between the cyclical component of household con-
sumption between South Africa and that of the CMA members, whereas, column
two of table 2.2 reports correlation between the cyclical component of the household
consumption for the rest of SADC member states and South Africa’s business cy-
cle. Furthermore, column three of table 2.2 reports a percentage share of household
consumption in GDP for respective members of the SADC region. It is noteworthy
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that private consumption contributes more than half to GDP in almost all South-
ern African countries, except for Botswana where private consumption contributed
about 40% to GDP on average. Household consumption accounts for more than
60% of GDP in respective member states of the SADC. Column one of table 2.2
reveals low and statistically insignificant correlation between the cyclical compo-
nent of consumption and South Africa’s business cycle. More precisely, a negative,
-0.238, correlation coefficient is estimated between South Africa’s business cycle and
the cyclical component of household consumption in Namibia.
For the rest of the SADC member states, column three of table 2.2 shows mostly
low, and even negative and a statistically insignificant correlation between the cycli-
cal component of household consumption and the cyclical component of South
Africa’s real GDP. For instance, the estimated correlation coefficients of 0.296, -
0.185, -0.353 and 0.296, arc observed in Botswana, Madagascar, Seychelles and
Tanzania, in that order. Overall, Table 2.2 shows that there exists no correlation
between the household consumption cycles and the overall output cycles in SADC,
except for Mauritius whose household consumption cycles appear to be sanguinely
correlated with business cycles, and the correlation coefficient, 0.389, is statistically
significant at 10%.
The significant positive correlation between household consumption cycles and
GDP cycles has serious implications for economic theory. This finding is not in
tandem with the permanent income hypothesis and is in line with the Keynesian
thesis that consumption is proportionate to income (Zeldes, 1989). The permanent
income hypothesis suggests that households smoothen their lifetime consumption,
by saving when they have surpluses and borrowing or decummulating their assets
when they have shortages; whereas; Keynesian consumers neither borrow nor save to
smoothen their lifetime consumption. In the Keynesian hypothesis, consumers arc
viewed as passive agents, such that changes in income are ’ quickly and fully’ prop-
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agated to changes in consumption (Lusardi, 1996). Campbell and Mankiw (1990)
also rejected the neoclassical life cycle, arguing that consumption does respond to
transitory income changes, as in the case of Mauritius.
Moreover, we argue that the observed statistically insignificant correlation be
tween GDP cycles and consumption cycles is consistent with the permanent income
hypothesis (PIH). According to PIH, transitory income changes should not lead to
large changes in the current consumption. This resonates with what we find in the
case of SADC (Shea, 1995).
The observation that business cycles and household consumption are not corre-
lated, and consumption accounts for a large share of GDP could possibly explain the
observed marginal and insignificant correlation in business cycles across the region.
From this, it is clear that assessment of correlation between GDP cycles and cycles
of other components of GDP is warranted. It is possible that some components of
GDP are strongly correlated with business cycles, however, they are ovenvhelmed
by the effect of consumption. Thus, in the subsequent section, we assess the cor-
relation amongst business cycles, and cyclical components of other elements of GDP.
In table 2.3, we show that general government consumption 111 Southern Africa
contributes a small percentage to GDP relative to private consumption. On the
average, government consumption accounted for almost 19% of GDP for the period
under consideration. Madagascar had the smallest share (8%) of government con-
sumption in GDP, while Seychelles had the largest share of government consumption
(32,3%) in GDP. Again, we evaluate the correlation between the final government
consmnption cycles and business cycles. On the average, synchronisation of public
expenditure with business cycles in the CMA, and SADC as a whole is negative
and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Surprisingly, we find that public ex-
penditures in Swaziland and Malawi are negatively correlated with business cycles
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and the correlation coefficients are statistically different from zero at 10% level of
significance. Although, we cannot confirm without further scntinizing the observed
relationship between business cycles and public expenditure in both Swaziland and
Malawi, we argue that this could imply that fiscal policy in both Malawi and Swazi-
land are countercyclical as opposed to being procyclical. Thus, when the region as
a whole experiences booms, government cuts back on its expenditure, and spends
more during recessions which is in line with the proponents of the Keynesian or
demand management policies.
Table 2.3: Correlation: Government Expenditure’s Cyclical Component v. SA’s
GDP Cyclical Component
Countries CMA SADC Share in GDP(% GDP)
Botswana -0.19 22.97
Lesotho
Namibia -0.027 -0.027 23.72
Swaziland -0.370 -0.370 16.94
Angola 0.356 30.27
Congo Dem. 0.641*** 9.43
Malawi -0.741 14.89
Madagascar -0.190 8.84
Mauritius 0.013 13.58
Seychelles 0.042 32.30
Tanzania -0.171 16.99
Zambia
Zimbabwe -0.658 17.64
Minimum -0.370 -0.741 8.84
Maximum -0.027 641*** 32.30
Average -0.012 -.0128 18.75
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In addition, table 2.3 shows a strong positive correlation between the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) public expenditure and business cycles. Contrary to what
we argued about the case of Malawi and Swaziland, we argue that the observed san-
guine relationship between DRC expenditure and business cycles could mean that
DRC authorities engage in procyclical fiscal policy. That is, they spend more during
expansions, and less during recessions. Ellery Jr, Gomes, and Sachsida (2002) ob-
served a similar relationship in the case of Brazil, and they argue that the Brazilian
government will consume whenever it has a chance, and will only reduce expendi-
ture when compelled by a decline in total receipts, that is, during recessions. There
are a plethora of reasons why countries, especially developing countries, tend to use
procyclical policies. These include pressure from voters and other political parties,
and borrowing constraints during hard times, amongst other reasons (Alesina, Cam-
pante, & Tabellini, 2008).
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Table 2.4: Correlation: Gross Fixed Capital Formation’s Cyclical Component v.
SA’s GDP Cyclical Component
Countries CMA SADC Share in GDP(% GDP)
Botswana 0.525*** 49.92
Lesotho
Namibia -0.092 46.58
Swaziland -0.008 65.00
Angola
Congo Dem. 0.388** 21.84
Malawi 0.173 24.52
Madagascar 0.350* 24.51
Mauritius 0.218 55.61
Mozambique 0.055 17.57
Seychelles 0.392 42.80
Tanzania 0.213 17.44
Zambia -0.049 31.62
Zimbabwe 0.092 29.11
Minimum -0.092 -0.008 17.44
Maximum -0.008 0.525*** 65.00
Average -0.050 0.019 35.19
In table 2.4 we show that gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) on contributes
approximately 21% to GDP in Southern African countries. For the period under
consideration, DRC is the country in which the GFCF’s share in GDP is the lowest
(12.09%) while Seychelles had the highest (30.33%). Assessing the correlation be-
tween private investment cycles and business cycles, we uncover low and insignificant
correlation in most cases; with the exception of DRC, and Madagascar whose corre-
lation between investment and business cycles is positive and statistically significant
at 10% level. Although, DRC and Madagascar show positive correlation with GDP’s
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deviation from trend, the correlation coefficients arc below average. The observed
positive correlation between private investment and business cycles accords with
what one expects in theory (Ellery Jr, Gomes and Sachsida, 2002). In theory, one
expects investment to go up in an expansionary phase of business cycle, and vice
versa.
In table 2.5 we show synchronisation of exports and business cycles. Prior to
correlation results, it is worthy to commence by looking at the average share of ex-
ports to GDP across the region. We document that on the average, exports account
for 35% of GDP; and Swaziland is the country in which the share of exports to GDP
is the highest (more than 60%) whereas, Tanzania is the country in which the share
of exports to GDP is the lowest (17.44%). everall, the average correlation between
export cycles and real GDP’s cyclical component is 0,019 for Southern Africa as a
whole. In the CMA, we observe a negative and statistically insignificant correla-
tion and Botswana is the only country whose exports are positively correlated with
South African business cycles in the SACU region. Lastly, for SADC as a whole, we
show that correlation between exports and GDP’s cyclical component is poor and
insignificant, except for the case of Botswana, DRC and Madagascar.
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Table 2.5: Correlation: Export’s Cyclical Component v. SA’s GDP Cyclical Com-
ponent
Countries CMA SADC Share in GDP(% GDP)
Botswana 0.295*** 28.82
Lesotho
Namibia -0.080 21.66
Swaziland -0.049 18.30
Angola 0.056 16.35
Congo Dem. 0.488* 12.09
Malawi -0.169 14.96
Madagascar 0.338* 18.10
Mauritius 0.096 24.08
Mozambique 0.005 19.07
Seychelles -0.054 30.33
Tanzania -.0069 24.73
Zambia 0.425 20.04
Zimbabwe -0.664 14.03
Minimum -0.080 -0.049 12.09
Maximum -0.049 0.488* 30.33
Average -0.065 -0.087 20.89
Regarding imports, we show that (sec Table 2.6) imports arc important to GDP
more than exports. Imports contributed more than 45% on average for the period
considered. As far as imports-business cycle synchronicity is concerned, we show
that there is poor correlation, especially in the CMA. Turning to SADC as a whole,
we find positive correlation in the case of Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo
and Mauritius.
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Table 2.6: Correlation: Import’s Cyclical Component v. SA’s GDP Cyclical Com-
ponent
Countries CMA SADC Share in GDP(% GDP)
Angola 0.351* 52.31
Lesotho
Namibia -0.033 52.59
Swaziland -0.113 52.59
Congo Dem. 0.369** 24.16
Madagascar 0.153 29.80
Seychelles -0.134 74.06
Tanzania 0.310 30.01
Zambia 0.038 35.22
Zimbabwe 0.092 29.11
Mauritius 0.452** 62.25
Malawi 0.088 36.08
Mozambique -0.015 42.83
Minimum -0.113 -0.113 24.16
Maximum -0.033 0.453** 75.55
Average -0.073 0.018 45.85
The observed lmv degree of correlation between trade and South Africa could be
possibly explained by several factors. Most of Southern African countries arc ,vell
endowed with natural resources, such as Diamond, and Platinum, and therefore,
intra-SADC intra-trade is scant vis-a-vis inter-trade, Europe being the favourite
destination for Southern African exports.
It is difficult to conclude whether a monetary union would be possible in SADC
only from correlation analysis. As pointed out earlier, correlation is associated with
several limitations. For instance, correlation does not reflect the dynamics of co-
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movements overtime (Kishor & Ssozi, 2011). Therefore, to overcome the limitations
linked with correlation analysis, we estimate a dynamic factor model.
2.2.2 Empirical Findings
A dynamic factor model is used to assess the degree of business cycle synchronisation
in SADC. Thus, this section presents and discusses the findings from the dynamic
factor model. We commence by plotting the regional common component against
business cycles for respective SADC member states. Using the eyeball inspection,
Figure 2.2.2 demonstrates that while there is little cohesion between business cycles
for most of SADC member countries and the regional common component, in other
member states business cycles appear to be in harmony with the regional common
component. For instance, in Malawi and Lesotho, business cycles appear to be
moving in opposite directions with the regional common component in the 1970s
up to the early 2000s. This is consistent with Blonigen, Piger, and Sly (2014) who
argue that countries experienced strong co-movement around 2000s owing to global
recession. Botswana’s business cycles show strong co-movement with the regional
common component, while in Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, figure 2.2.2 shows
that the relationship between the regional common component and business cycles
is not clear-cut. In Mozambique and Seychelles, the figure shows that there is no
consistency between business cycles and the regional common component.
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Figure 2.3: Regional Common Component and SADC Member States’ Business
Cycles
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The observed comovemcnts or absence of comovements, is only based on visual
inspection. As pointed out, the relationship between the regional common compo-
nent and business cycles depicted on the diagram is not conclusive. Therefore, there
is a need for a formal assessment of the relationships. Consequently, a dynamic
factor model is estimated, and the findings are reported in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7: Dynamic Factor Estimates
Country Idiosyncratic Component Regional Common Component
Botswana -0.3324 0.0255***
(0.6435) (0.0032)
Democratic Rep. Congo 0.0920 0.0209***
(0.8650) (0.0049)
Lesotho 0.2344 0.0173*
(0.1658) (0.0098)
Madagascar -0.0509 -0.0012
(0.2133) (0.0053)
Malawi 0.3956* 0.0112**
(0.2069) (0.0047)
Mauritius 0.2228 -0.0013
(0.1835) (0.0020)
Mozambique -0.0915 0.0080
(0.2135) (0.0058)
Namibia 0.1573 0.0032
(0.1808) (0.0030)
Seychelles 0.3086 0.0061
(0.1838) (0.0056)
South Africa -0.2361 0.0072***
(0.2068) (0.0021)
Swaziland 0.1411 0.0256**
((1.1794) (0.0256)
Tanzania -0.0710 0.0045***
(0.2367) (0.0453)
Table 2.7 show estimates from a dynamic factor model. More precisely, column
one and two of Table 2.7 shows the influence of the idiosyncratic component and
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regional common component, respectively, on individual SADC members’ business
cycles, accordingly. In contrast with the limited synchronisation of business cycles
reported in table 2.7, the dynamic factor model reveals moderate evidence of busi-
ness cycles comovement in SADC. We find that the regional common component
exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on business cycles for 7 out of
14 SADC member states considered in this study. Column two of Table 2.7 further
shows that in Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Namibia, Zimbabwe
and Zambia, the influence of the regional common component is statistically in-
significant.
While the regional common component has a positive influence on business cycles
for Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, and
Tanzania, the effect is very small. For example, Table 2.7 shows that a 1% change in
regional common component results in a 2% change in business cycles for Botswana,
and 0.45% variation in Tanzania’s business cycles. In addition, a 1% change in the
regional common component explains 2.09%, 1.7%, 0.72%, 1.1% and 2.5% varia-
tions in business cycles for Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, South Africa,
Malawi and Swaziland, respectively.The observed synchronicity between Botswana,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania may
be explained by the notion of contagion effect. The knowledge of a crisis in another
county raises the probability of a crisis in other countrics, consequently resulting in
business cycles co-movements (See, Male, 2011).
In addition, Column one of table 2.7 shows the influence of the country-specific
component on business cycles for respective SADC member states. The results
suggest that the country-specific component does not significantly affect business
cycles for SADC member states, except for Seychelles and Malawi. We find that a
1 % change in the country-specific component accounts for 30% changes in business
cycles for Seychelles, whereas in Malawi, a percentage change in country-spccific
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factors can explain approximately 40% variations in business cycles. Our findings
are at odds with those of Gregory and Head (1999) who suggested that business
cycles arc driven by country-specific factors.
Moreover, while our results concur with Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003a)
that there is little cohesion between business cycles in Africa, they also contradict
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003b) and Male (2011) that business cycles are pre-
dominantly explained by country-specific shocks. Kabundi and Loots (2007) suspect
that business cycles in the SADC region are explained by either the global or country
specific factors or both. They argue this on the grounds that the regional common
component seems to be failing to significantly explain variations in business cycles.
In contrast with the suspicion of Kabundi and Loots (2007), our results suggest that
country specific factors do not explain business cycles for most of SADC member
countries. Moreover, we also suspect that indeed global factors could be dominant in
explaining growth patterns in SADC. Our suspicion is in line with Michaelides, Pa-
pageorgiou, and Vouldis (2013). They find that global shocks a play a primary role
in explaining countries’ business cycles. Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) and Camacho
et al. (2006) also support the importance of global shocks in explaining business cy-
cles. They document that European business cycles arc largely driven by the world
factors, rather than regional factors. Camacho, Perez-Quiros, and Saiz (2008) assert
that over the past twenty-years, co-movement amongst European countries did not
necessarily soar but rather globalisation has increased. Consequently, strengthen-
ing business cycle co-movement. Gregory, Head, and Raynauld (1997) argue that if
business cycles are a global phenomenon, then country-specific policies may prove
not to be useful. Therefore, if business cycles arc driven by global shocks, it implies
that country-specific policies/or regional policies must be set such that they arc in
line with those of important global actors such as the European Central Bank (ECB)
and the Federal Reserve (Seymen, 2012).
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The findings of the study arc somewhat similar of early European studies such as,
Von Hagen and Neumann (1994) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992). These stud-
ies found that in the European Community, there is a ”core” and the ”periphery”
of countries (Ahlborn & Wortmann, 2018). Similarly in SADC, from our findings,
it appears that there exists a ’core’ and a periphery of countries. A ’core’ consists
of Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Tanzania, and all members of the CMA
except for Namibia; and is characterised by correlated business cycles. It is in this
spirit that these studies had suggested a ’two-speed’ approach to a European mon-
etary Union. Hence, in this study, assuming that all other factors necessary for the
establishment of a monetary union are fulfilled, we suggest a two-speed” approach to
a SADC monetary union. A two-speed’ approach which is sometimes referred to as
the dual approach implies that the ’core’ should speed up the process of integration
while the peripheral works on harmonizing their policies and institutions with those
of the core.
2.3 What Could Possibly Explain the Underlying
Low Levels of Synchronisation in SADC?
Low levels of synchronisation in SADC have been attributed to overlapping mem-
berships (Buigut, 2006; Tavlas, 2009a). There arc a number of regional groupings
in Africa, and some cotmtries in the continent belong to more than one group with
diverse objectives, consequently leading to asynchronous business cycles (Buigut,
2006). Southern Africa is considered as a region with many regional economic com-
munities. Although SADC is the largest regional economic community in Southern
Africa, there are other trading blocs in the region such as Southern African Customs
Union (SACU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and
the East African Community (EAC), among others.
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All SACU7 members are members of the SADC, and all SACU members, ex-
cept for Botswana, arc also members of the Common Monetary Area (CMA); eight
SADC member countries also belong to the Common Market for Eastern and South-
ern Africa8 (COMESA) ; and Tanzania belongs to both SADC and East African
Community (EAC) (See Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.4: Membership Overlay
Harmonization of policies is often argued to be amongst the drivers of business
cycle synchronisation. Given the overlapping membership, monetary policy harmo-
nization would be hard to achieve in SADC. This is because although the regional
economic communities have similar goals, their road maps to achieve them are het-
erogeneous. For instance, the process of establishing a customs union was set to be
completed by 2008 in COMESA; whereas in SADC, it was set to be completed by
2010. This imposes a challenge to countries belonging to both SADC and COMESA.
7Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa
8Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia
and Zimbabwe
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This is because a country cannot belong to more than one customs union, countries
such as Seychelles and Swaziland will have to choose which customs union they
want to belong to, which may be dependent on which customs union is achieved
first (Meyn, 2004). This has serious ramifications as SADC endeavors to harmonize
economic policies.
Southern African development community member states are characterized by
heterogeneous economic structures, and in the literatme, it has been pointed out that
coutries with different economic structures arc faced with asymmetric shocks thus
diverging business cycles (Clark & Van Wincoop, 2001). We, therefore, suspect
that the other potential culprit for the observed low levels of business cycle har-
mony could be the heterogeneity of economic structures (Claasen, Loots, Kabundi,
& Viviers, 2017). For instance, Business cycles in Angola, and Democratic Republic
of Congo arc highly contingent on the behavior of the oil market. An estimated
97% of Angolan exports come from oil exports, whereas Botswana heavily relies on
diamonds, and the subdued demand for minerals has put significant strain on the
Botswana economy. On the one hand, countries like Seychelles are heavily depen-
dent on tourism, which makes their economies more vulnerable to global shocks,
while South Africa, which is deemed as the most developed country in Africa, heav-
ily relies on commodities such as gold, platinum and diamonds. Countries such as
Malawi, whose economies largely depend on agricultural produce, continue to be
more susceptible to adverse weather conditions, climatic shocks and declining de-
mand for agricultural produce. With this, there is a strong reason to believe that
these heterogeneities play a significant role in driving/or decoupling business cycles
in the region.
Moreover, the asymmetric shocks in Africa have been a result of ”political
shocks”. Most countries have been characterized by civil wars and political in-
stabilities. Angola’s civil war ended in 2002, while in countries like Mozambique
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and Zimbabwe, political instabilities continue to have a detrimental impact on their
economies. In South Africa, policy uncertainties continue to be a major challenge.
2.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we evaluated business cycle co-movements in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC). To this end, we analyzed the correlation between
individual member states’ business cycles and South African business cycles which
is used as a proxy for SADC business cycles. In addition, correlation between South
Africa’s business cycles and cyclical components of the respective aggregate demand
components are evaluated in order to reveal which aggregate demand components
arc responsible for synchronisation in the region. Finally, we employ the dynamic
factor model to assess synchronisation of business cycles across the region. The
dynamic factor model decomposes a series into two orthogonal components, that is,
the regional common component and the idiosyncratic component. For the purpose
of this study, if a large component of business cycles variation is explained by a
regional common component vis-a-vis an idiosyncratic component, it 1s interpreted
as evidence for synchronisation of business cycles.
In order to verify to what extent business cycles arc correlated 111 the SADC
region, we computed correlation coefficients between business cycles of SADC mcm
ber states using South African business cycles as a representative of the regional
business cycles. This is justified by the fact that South Africa contributes over 61%
towards SADC GDP. Our analysis revealed low and even negative correlation be-
tween business cycles in the SADC region. Breaking down GDP into its aggregate
demand components in order to check which components of aggregate demand ac-
count for business cycle synchronisation in SADC reveals that imports and exports
may be behind the observed business synchronisation in SADC, particularly, be-
tween Botswana and South Africa, and Democratic Republic of Congo and South
Africa.
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Having examined the correlation coefficients, we estimated a dynamic factor
model. Contrary to existing literature which suggests that business cycles in devel-
oping countries arc mainly driven by country-specific shocks. Our results suggest
that business cycles have a very small and statistically insignificant influence on
business cycles, except for Seychelles and Malawi. In line with previous studies, the
dynamic factor model further reveals that due to lack of business cycles cohesion, a
region-wide monetary policy would not be optimal in the SADC region. Our findings
reveal that the SADC regional common component has a limited effect on member
states’ business cycles. This is shown by the statistically insignificant regional com-
mon component across member states.
In line with existing studies (Kabundi & Loots, 2007; Zerihun et al., 2014), our
analysis suggest that although a region-wide policy would not be optimal, some
member states have the characteristics to proceed and establish a successful mone-
tary union. We find Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozam-
bique, Tanzania, and Congo Democratic Republic to be potential candidates to
adopt a common monetary policy. This is merely because their business cycles ap-
pear to be significantly driven by a regional common component.
Our findings concur with previous studies which suggested that business cycles
are largely explained by the global shocks as opposed to the regional or country--
specific shocks (See, Kose et al., 2003b).
The lack of synchronicity could, amongst other things, be attributed to multiple
memberships. All member countries of the SADC region except for Mozambiquc,
belong to more than one regional grouping. Moreover, the lack of synchronicity
suggests that structural reforms and policy coordination are warranted. Overall,
we suggest that a common monetary policy area consisting of Botswana, South
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Africa, Tanzania, Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, and
Mozambique could be considered as a fast-track project.
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Chapter 3
The Endogeneity of Business
Cycles’ Synchronisation in SADC
3.1 Introduction
The establishment of a monetary union entails a loss of monetary policy control, to
deal with economic disturbances at a country-level. Therefore, for countries whose
business cycles arc significantly driven by idiosyncratic factors, using a common
monetary policy or establishing a monetary union may be costly and not optimal
for all member countries. Accordingly, to alleviate the costs associated with the
loss of monetary policy independence, the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA),
amongst other things, makes business cycles synchronicity a necessary requirement
for establishing a monetary union. Consequently, in a monetary union environment,
business cycles synchronisation has been extensively studied (See for example, Mon-
toya & de Haan, 2008; Soares et al., 2011; Barrios & De Lucio, 2003). In addition,
business cycle synchronicity has been applied as an instrument to gauge the suit-
ability of a monetary union in the Euro Area, East Asia, East Africa and West
Africa, and most importantly, in Southern Africa (see, Correia et al., 2013; Anton-
akakis, Gogas, Papadimitriou, & Sarantitis, 2016; Sethapramote, 2015; Kishor &
Ssozi, 2011; Berdiev & Chang, 2015).
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Relying on historical data, an enormous number of studies suggest that the adop-
tion of a common monetary policy in the Southern African Development Commu-
nity1 (SADC) would be disastrous, and would lead to macroeconomic instabilities
across the region (Kabundi & Loots, 2007; Khamfula & Huizinga, 2004; Zerihun
et al., 2014). This view is because historical data uncover insufficient degrees of
business cycles co-movements in SADC, and alternative adjustment mechanisms
suggested by an OCA, such as labour mobility and nominal flexibilities, arc absent
(Moneta & Rüffer, 2009).
Drawing from the famous Lucas critique, Frankel and Rose ( 1997) critique the
vieťhat business cycles’ synchronisation is a precondition for adopting a common
monetary policy. They argue that historical data may be misleading, and business
cycles synchronicity is not irrevocably fixed, and may not be exogenous (Frankel
et al., 1997). If this thesis holds, business cycles synchronisation could be an ex
post rather than an ex-ante phenomenon (Frankel & Rose, 1998). This notion owes
to the view that introducing a single currency reduces transaction costs and ex-
change rate uncertainty (Rose & Van Wincoop, 2001), and therefore, stimulates
trade, which in turn reinforce business cycles comovement (Correia et al., 2013).
Consistent with this view, Rose and Engel (2002) demonstrate that countries shar-
ing a single currency tend to trade more with each other, and are more synchronised
vis-a-vis countries not sharing the same currency. Likewise, R. Barro and Tenreyro
(2007) reveal that adopting a single currency tends to fuel trade. Moreover, Rose
and Van Wincoop (2001) argue that, indeed, using a single currency tends to boost
trade. Therefore, multiple national currencies appear to be a significant impediment
to trade, and hence business cycles synchronicity.
1SADC consists of fifteen sovereign member countries, Angola, Botswana, Congo Democratic
Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South
Africa, Kingdom of Eswatini (formerly known as Swaziland), Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
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As pointed out earlier, the literature on the degree of business cycles synchroni-
sation in SADC often concludes that based on weaker business cycle alignment, a
common monetary policy in SADC would not be optimal (see, Tipoy, 2015; Zeri-
hun et al., 2014; Kabundi & Loots, 2007). However, these studies neither attempt
to uncover factors, which could explain the underlying levels of synchronisation,
nor suggest solutions to the observed low levels of synchronisation. This chapter,
therefore, sets out to investigate factors influencing business cycles’ co-movements
in SADC.
Identification of factors explaining business cycles co-movement in SADC is es-
sential for several reasons. Firstly, it equips policy makers with crucial knowledge
to develop structural policies that will improve cffecicncy, and allow the application
of a common monetary policy. Secondly, if business cycles arc driven by periph-
eral factors such as trade, internal policies intended to stabilise the economy would
have a small impact on output growth, thus necessitating economic policy coordi-
nation. Therefore, deeper knowledge about factors through which business cycles
arc transmitted is warranted, and will have far-reaching policy implications. More-
over, knowledge of the factors influencing business cycle co-movements would assist
SADC monetary union aspirants in determining the best timing to adopt a sin-
gle currency, and whether such a move would fast-track their convergence process
(Vieira & Vieira, 2012).
This chapter tests the cndogcncity hypothesis in the Southern African Develop-
ment Community. The results show that trade intensity positively and significantly
influence the extent to which business cycles arc synchronised, suggesting that in-
creased trade/or liberalisation of trade in SADC could potentially bring SADC mem-
ber countries closer to being a monetary union. In addition, the study results show
that macroeconomic policy similarity has a positive and statistically significant ef-
fect on business cycles’ synchronisation in SADC. Furthermore, it is shown that
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financial integration and oil prices (a proxy for external factors) has an adverse ef-
fect on business cycles’ co-movement. Overall, the study findings lend support to
the endogeneity hypothesis of Frankel et al. (1997); Frankel and Rose (1998).
The rest of the chapter is organized in four sections. The next section reviews
the literature on factors explaining business cycle co-movements. Section 3 describes
data and the empirical framework applied to conduct the analysis. Results and a
discussion of the study findings are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the
chapter and identifies areas for further research.
3.2 Economic Development and Convergence in
SADC
In what follows, we concisely review SADC performance against the backdrop of the
set macroccononuc convergence criteria. In pursuit of a deeper regional integration,
SADC encourage macroeconomic convergence among its member states. The goal
of macroeconomic convergence is to stabilise the regional economy, and cushion it
against excessive fluctiuations due to external shocks. Amongst others, it aims for
a low and stable inflation (between 3 and 7%), sustainable economic growth (not
below 7%), sustainable public debts (not exceeding 60% of GDP) and deficits (not
greater than 3% of GDP). In order to enforce these convergence criteria, a Memoran-
dum of Understanding was signed in 2002, and was subsequently annexed into the
Protocal on Finance and Investment in 2006. In what follows, we consicely review
the SADC performance against the backdrop of the set macroeconomic convergence
criteria.
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3.2.1 Economic Growth (7% Target)
Southern Africa’s GDP growth in 2016 was estimated at 2.74 percent, with economic
performance amongst countries differing (see Figure 3.2.1): South Africa grew by
0.6 percent, Tanzania by 7 percent, Mozambique by 4.2 percent, Mauritius by 4.2
percent, Madagascar by 4.17, and Botswana by 4.1 percent. The oil-dependent An-
golan economy contracted by 0.7 percent in 2016, from 3 percent and 4.8 percent in
2015 and 2014, respectively.
Figure 3.1: SADC Growth (Target 7% Growth)
Growth in DRC dropped to 2.4 percent in 2016 from 6.8 percent and 9.5 percent
in 2015, and 2014, in that order; Lesotho’s growth remained steady above 2 percent
in 2016 and 2015 (more precisely, it was estimated at 2.51 percent in 2015 and 2.39
in 2016).
Overall, we show that while most countries have positive growth, all except for
Tanzania are below the convergence target of 7 percent (Refer to Figure 3.2.1). As
a consequence, the SADC average growth is still far short from the targeted level.
59
3.2.2 Inflation (between 3 to 7% by 2018)
Over the past three years, inflation generally continued to drop in Southern Africa,
mirroring prudent monetary policies, declining oil prices, and other commodities,
and good harvests, albeit some countries experienced a sharp increase due to exces-
sive currency depreciation. Moreover, whilst declining oil prices had a positive effect
in some countries, in Angola, which is oil dependent, declining oil prices resulted
in a sharp rise in the inflation rate (see Figure 3.2.2). The average inflation for
the SADC bloc was registered at 9 percent in 2016, up from 6 percent recorded in
2014. This rate remains high relative to the convergence criterion of 3 percent by
2018. On country-by-country basis, only Mauritius recorded an inflation rate that
is within the 3 percent target, while Zimbabwe and Seychelles recorded a negative
inflation rate in the period 2016. Assessing SADC inflation against the band of 3
to 7 percent, in figure 2 we show that the 2016 inflation performance did not meet
the convergence target range. However, on a country-by-country basis, all coun-
tries with the exception of Angola, Malawi, Swaziland, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, and
Zambia, had managed to remain within the current band (refer to Figure 3.2.2).
Figure 3.2: Inflation rates in SADC (3% to 7% )
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This, failure to achieve a 3 percent inflation target and to remain within the
3%-7% hand suggests that inflation remains a challenge in the SADC region. The
Committee of Central Bank Governors (CoCBG) in SADC attributes the observed
high inflation in Malawi to the adoption of free floating exchange rate in May 2012
which led to large pass-through effects into local prices. Following the adoption
of a free floating exchange rate in Malawi, the Malawian Kwacha depreciated by
approximately 72 percent against the US dollar (USD) from 2012 to 2013. The de-
preciation of currencies could also be a culprit to the observed inflation challenges in
other SADC member states. The CoCBG contends that nearly all SADC currencies
depreciated by almost 5 percent against the USO, while the South African Rand
(ZAR) depreciated by approximately 19 percent.
3.2.3 Budget Deficits (3% of GDP)
The sluggish economic growth, soaring government outlays, and slumping commod-
ity prices (and hence lower export revenues) in the SADC region resulted in a sig-
nificant widening of government deficits. In nearly all SADC member states, budget
deficits are well above the targeted 3 percent (See Figure 3.2.3).
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Figure 3.3: Fiscal Balance (% GDP) in SADC
In Angola, budget deficit rose to approximately 7 percent in 2017 relative to 5
percent in 2016. On the other hand, budget deficits in Tanzania and Zimbabwe
exceeded 8 percent in 2017. The SADC average budget surplus reached 5 percent
in 2017 compared to 3.8 percent in 2016 (see Figure 3.2.3). Overall, it appears that
SADC is performing poorly in meeting the set 3% of GDP deficit. Put differently,
SADC seems to be struggling to achieve the set target of 3 percent.
3.2.4 Public Debt (less than 60% of GDP)
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), public debt to GDP has
significantly increased since 2013, and is now in excess of 50 percent of income in
nearly half of the African countries. In addition, from 2013 to 2016, the number
of low-income countries facing high risk of debt distress increased from 7 to 12;
and all of the region’s frontline markets/or nations with credit ratings have been
downgraded to a junk status (that is, below investment grade) with the exception
of Namibia. The increasing public debt could be attributed to broadening deficits,
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currency depreciations, declining commodity prices, and sluggish economic growth
(Auerbach, 2016).
Figure 3.4: Public Debt (less than 60% of GDP)
The SADC average government debt remained well below 60 percent of GDP at
49.60 percent in 2017, down from 52.21 percent in 2016 (See Figure 3.2.4). A major-
ity of the SADC member countries, particularly Botswana, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Swaziland, Madagascar, and Tanzania, had public debt of less than 40 per-
cent of GDP. Public debt surpassed the target level of 60 percent in some countries
such as, Angola, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe. Oil revenues contribute
significantly towards Angola’s government revenue. Thus a decline in oil prices could
be a culprit for the observed higher government debt. The substantial worsening of
Mozambique’s public debt from 53 percent in 2013 to 113 percent in 2016 is primar-
ily due to the impact of critical depreciation of its currency on the external debt
portion of its total debt.
3.3 Literature Review
Why are some countries’ business cycles synchronised, and others are not? What
could possibly explain the observed low levels of business cycles’ synchronisation
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in SADC? Answers to these questions will contribute towards the formulation of
policies that may mitigate the adverse impact associated with the use of a single
monetary policy in the SADC region. This section reviews the literature on the
determinants of business cycles’ co-movement.
Potential determinants of business cycles’ synchronisation, such as trade, cur-
rency union membership and industrial similarity, amongst others, have been iden-
tified in the literature (Artis, 2003). Industrial similarity and currency union mem-
bership arc generally found to be weak estimators of synchronisation, and hence they
arc excluded from our analysis (Cerqueira & Martins, 2009; Baxter & Kouparitsas,
2005; Clark & Van Wincoop, 2001; De Haan et al., 2008; Furceri & Karras, 2008). In
addition, required data to compute industrial similarity is hardly available in SADC.
It is generally argued that trade plays an integral role in explaining business
cycles synchronicity, specifically by increasing the speed of propagation of shocks
across countries (R. Barro & Tenreyro, 2007; Choe, 2001; Frankel et al., 1997;
Correia et al., 2013; Faia, 2007). However, both theoretical models and empirical
evidence suggest an ambiguous link between trade and business cycle synchronicity
(Abbott et al., 2008; Alesina & Barro, 2002; R. Barro & Tenreyro, 2007; Clark &
Van Wincoop, 2001; Frankel & Rose, 1998).
There is a conviction that trade intensification could result to asynchronous
business cycles. Orthodox models of trade demonstrate that intensification of trade
would result in product specialisation as conntries attempt to exploit their com-
parative advantages (P. Krugman & Venables, 1996). Countries which specialize in
certain products will be hit by sector-specific shocks, which in turn will translate
into country-specific shocks, thus resulting in divergent business cycles. Consistent
with this prediction, Crosby (2003) finds that trade has adverse effects on busi-
ness cycle synchronicity in Asia-Pacific countries. In the case of ASEAN economies,
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trade integration allows countries to exploit comparative advantages, consequently
resulting to industry-specific shocks which in turn constitute country-specific shocks
(since countries are specialised); thereby resulting in asynchronous business cycles.
On the one hand, Backus and Kehoe (1992) argue that trade results in strength-
ened business cycles co-movements. A shock hitting a particular economy will be
transmitted through demand linkages to its trading partners (Kose & Yi, 2006). Ac-
cordingly, countries that trade more with each other tend to be more synchronised
than countries that trade less with each other (Di Giovanni & Levchenko, 2010). In
line with this view, Frankel and Rose (1997) find that trade has a sanguine impact
on business cycle synchronisation. In addition, they conclude that prorpeties of the
OCA are not exogenous, and a lack of business cycles synchronisation should not
deter countries from establishing a monetary union. This is because establishing a
monetary union would result in a reduction in transaction costs, thus stimulating
trade, which in turn synchronises business cycles (Lin & Ye, 2010). Choe (2001)
also demonstrates that trade interdependence has a sanguine impact on business cy-
cles comovement. Palaşcă, Enea, Jaba, and Ţigănaş (2014) support the thesis that
business cycles synchronisation is endogenous to trade. They find that indeed trade
is a vehicle which transmits demand shocks, and thus synchronise business cycles.
Rose and Engel (2002) demonstrate that countries in a currency union tend to trade
more with each other than countries that are not in a currency union. Meissner
et al. (2003) also find that countries that are in a monetary union trade with each
other twice as much as they do with countries that are not in a union.Bergman and
Jonung (2011), concur with this strand of the literature. They argue that increased
trade feeds into intensified business cycles’ synchronisation. In line with this strand
of the literature, Hallett and Piscitelli (1999) demonstrate that the establishment of
monetary union could enforce business cycles’ comovemcnt, however, only if, ade-
quate symmetry in the monetary transmission subsists.Ehrmann (2000) shows that
in the European Union, monetary transmissions are not symmetrically, both in the
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intensity and the timing, thus casting doubt on the ability of monetary union to
bolster business cycles’ synchronicity. Demertzis, Hallett, and Rummel (2000) at-
test that whilst asymmetries do exist in Europe, these have been managed through
policies, and they could be eased through policies; and eventually, EMU may evolve
to an optimal currency area. Similarly, Silvestre and Mendonça (2007) demonstrate
that there exists a positive relationship between trade intensity, and business cy-
cles’ comovement. Thereby, surmise that the endogeneity hypothesis does hold.
There is a large strand of the literature showing a positive relationship between
trade and business cycles’ co-movements (Clark & Van Wincoop, 2001; Fidrmuc,
Ikeda, & Iwatsubo, 2012; Shin & Wang, 2003; Montinari & Stracca, 2016). In
contrast to both views about the impact of trade on business cycles’ synchronisa-
tion, Otto, Voss, and Willard (2001) question the importance of trade in explaining
business cycle co-movements. They argue that Australia trades. more with .Japan
than with the United States, yet, its business cycle is strongly correlated with that
of the United States more than the .Japanese business cycle. This is consistent
with Dellas (1986) wvho demonstrates that trade linkages play a negligible role in
explaining business cycle co-movements. He further argues that business cycle in-
terdependencies arc best explained by common shocks. Canova and Dellas (1993)
failed to obtain a robust significance of bilateral imports on business cycles’ syn-
chronisation for 10 main industrial economics. Consistent with this strand of the
literature, Doyle and Faust (2005) argue that while integration has intensified in the
G-7, output co-movement has not followed suit. The findings of Doyle and Faust
(2005) correspond with Alesina et al. (2002) who argue that currency unions do
not necessarily intensify business cycles’ co-movement. Consequently, it not clear
whether the observed business cycles’ co-movement in the Eurozone stems from the
increased levels of economic integration (Schiavo, 2008). In line with this, Montinari
and Stracca (2016) find no evidence that exchange rate regime influences business
cycles synchronisation.
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The other channel which is argued to have a positive impact on business cycles’
co-movement is monetary policy similarity (see Frankel & Rose, 1998 for discussion).
Although a plethora of studies have found monetary policy similarity to have a posi-
tive impact on business cycle synchronicity, its impact on business cycles remains an
unsettled matter (Hsu, Wu, & Yau, 2011; Sethapramote, 2015). Otto et al. (2001)
reveal that great volatility in the interest rate differential has a negative impact
on business cycle synchronicity, whereas, Clark and Van Wincoop (2001) find that
monetary policy similarity has no signicant impact on business cycle co-movement.
Schiavo (2008) finds that monetary policy similarity has an indirect impact on busi-
ness cycle comovement. Thus, the endogeneity of business cycle synchronisation does
not suggest that by joining a monetary union, countries will automatically become
more synchronised. Rather, the prospective increase in trade and financial linkages
induced by using a common currency will have a positive influence on business cy-
cle co-movement. On the constrary, Zervoyianni and Anastasiou (2009) reveal that
monetary policy similarity (that is, the circulation of a single currency, the Euro) has
a positive effect on business cycles correlation. Using M2 growth rates as a proxy for
monetary policy similarity, Shin and Wang (2005), could no detect significant effect
of monetary policy similarity on business cycles synchronicity. However, when they
use correlation of short-term interest rates, they show that indeed monetary policy
similarity tends to stimulate business cycles co-movement. Contrary to these stud-
ies, Bergman (2004) finds that monetary policy similarity negatively affects business
cycles synchronicity, thereby casting doubts on the widely celebrated positive effect
of a monetary union on business cycles. In line with this, Camacho et al. (2006) find
no significant relationship between business cycles correlation and monetary policy
similarity. This 1s inconsistent with De Haan et al. (2008). They find a positive link
between cross-country business cycles’ co-movement and monetary policy similarity.
Following the establishment of the European Union, the impact of financial inte-
gration received enormous interest from both scholars and policy makers around the
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globe. There are, however, only a few studies in Southern Africa on financial integra-
tion. Financial integration is expected to promptly increase in Southern Africa due
to the envisaged economic integration, and the proposed introduction of a Southern
African single currency in 2018. Hence, understanding economic consequences of
deeper financial integration is warranted.
Given the lack of an independent monetary policy response m a monetary union,
asymmetric disturbances may induce welfare losses, and threaten the stability of the
union, unless, risk sharing mechanisms arc in place. One of the mechanisms through
which risks arc shared is financial integration.
Financial integration is central in the functioning of a monetary union because
it allows agents to exploit ’ risk sharing’ mechanisms, thus resulting in synchronisa-
tion of business cycles (Cerqueira & Martins, 2009). For example, monetary policy
in a monetary union may fail to deal with asymmetric disturbances. So, financial
integration permits consumers to borrow from countries experiencing booms, and
therefore synchronise business cycles (Schiavo, 2008). Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman
(2008) argue that stronger financial linkages could reinforce business cycle synchro-
nisation through demand linkages. Similar conclusions arc reached by Imbs (2006).
Consistent with these studies, Jansen and Stokman (2004) demonstrate that finan-
cial integration results into stronger business cycle co-movement across countries.
Moreover, Kose et al. (2008) show that financial linkages stimulate business cycle
synchronisation.
Risk sharing theory suggests that financial integration encourages industrial spe-
cialisation, thus resulting in asymmetric shocks, which in turn leads to asynchronous
business cycles. This has been demonstrated, amongst others, by Heathcote and
Perri (2003), Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2003) and Obstfeld (1994). Fur-
thermore, Backus et al. (1992) argue that the behaviour of financial flows is pro-
68
cyclical. For example, if there are two countries in the world, X and Y; and country
X experiences a positive technological shock, agents will pull their capital from coun-
try Y to country X where the marginal product of capital and labour has increased.
Therefore, the procyclical behaviour of financial flows will result in diverging busi-
ness cycles. In line with these studies, Herrero and Ruiz (2008) show that intensified
fmancial integration leads to asymmetric business cycles. Faia (2007) and Heathcote
and Perri ( 2004) reach similar conclusions that financial integration leads to diverg-
ing business cycles.Montinari and Stracca (2016) find mixed evidence regarding the
effect of financial integration. They find that financial links are either insignificant
or have negative signs. Using a capital account restrictions often referred to as the
de jure measure of financial integration, Kose et al. (2003) find that business cycles
for countries with restricted capital flows tend to be less synchronised with world
business cycles. This is because financial linkages are crucial, in terms of business
cycles propagation, for countries that are open to capital flows (Kose ct al., 2003).
However, the actual gross financial flows, that is, the de facto measure of finan-
cial integration, fails to reflect this. Consistent with this, lmbs (2006) shows that
there exists a positive relationship between financial integration and business cy-
cles. He argues that the observed relationship between business cycles and financial
integration is puzzling. Generally, financial flows follow return differentials, which
subsequently result to asynchronous business cycles.
Fiscal policy discipline or convergence is identied as another important channel
through which business cycles are synchronised. However, a plethora of economists
treat seal policy convergence with cynicism, because it has little or nothing to do
with the traditional theory of optimal currency areas. In addition, there is no
exist-ing theory linking fiscal policy convergence with business cycle co-movements
(Darvas & Szapáry, 2008). Despite the lack of a theoretical connection between
business cycle comovements and fiscal policy convergence, it is relatively easy to
build an instinctive link between the two. Countries that are ill-disciplined in their
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fiscal policy conduct, that is countries that run high budget deficits, generate indi-
vidual fiscal policy shocks that lead to diverging business cycles. Thus, in envisaged
and/or already established unions, fiscal policy should be countercyclical as op-
posed to procyclical (Gavin & Perotti, 1997; Brender & Drazen, 2005). Simply
put, in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, which would otherwise lead to divergent
business cycles, the use of fiscal policy would be unnecessary and counterproduc-
tive. Zervoyianni and Anastasiou (2009) concur with this strand of the literature,
they demonstrate that fiscal policy convergence, in the case of Europe, has strong
positive effects on the correlation of shocks. Likewise, Bergman (2004) shows that
fiscal policy convergence has sanguine impact on the business cycles synchronicity.
On the contrary to this strand of the literature,Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and
Shin and Wang (2005), fail to detect evidence linking fiscal policy synchronisation
to intensified business cycles synchrony. This is in contrast to De Haan et al. (2008)
and Camacho et al. (2006), they demonstrate that fiscal policy has positive effects
on cross-country business cycles’ comovement.
Consistent with the view that fiscal policy should be countercyclical, Fatas and
Mihov (2003) argue that aggressive use of fiscal policy is associated with macroeco-
nomic instabilities, and impedes economic growth. Similarly, Badinger (2009) shows
that discretionary use of fiscal policy results in significant and ample output volatil-
ity. Rodden and Wibbels (2010) agree with the view that fiscal policy should rather
be countercyclical. In addition, fiscal policy in a monetary union ought to be cen-
tralised; and centralised fiscal policy provides insurance (in terms of fiscal transfers)
against adverse shocks hitting a particular economy in a union (See, Hemming &
Spahn, 1997). Furthermore, Fatás and Mihov (2001) argue that fiscal policy restric-
tions would lower macroeconomic volatilities. However, fiscal policy restrictions are
said to limit fiscal policy action when it is needed the most (i.e. in the presence of
shocks that would otherwise lead to diverging business cycles). In addition, fiscal
policy restrictions may exacerbate economic fluctuations since they disregard cycli-
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cal conditions (Levinson, 1998). For example, in the case of Europe, it is argued
that rules will worsen recessions, since countries will be tempted to apply procycli-
cal fiscal policy when cyclical downturns increase deficits towards the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) cap (Alt & Lowry, 1994; Lane, 2003).
In summary, whilst the determinants of business cycles synchronisation have
been extensively examined, the findings documented often contradict each other
(Lin and Ye, 2010). Moreover, these studies predominantly focus on developed and
Asian countries, and hence, neglecting Africa, particularly, SADC.
3.4 Data and Methodology
3.4.1 Econometric Framework
Longitudinal data methods have become increasingly popular in recent years and are
now the most used tools in contemporary econometrics, both in microeconomics and
macroeconomics(Nickell, 1981; Hsiao, 2005; Okui, 2009). The increasing popularity
of panel data techniques owes to many factors, predominantly because they allow
practitioners to exploit two dimensions of the data: a cross-sectional dimension and
a time series dimension (Hsiao, 2005; Hsiao & Zhang, 2015).
Consider the following basic linear dynamic model:
yit = α1yit−1 +X
′
itβ + εit (3.1)
εit = µi + εit (3.2)
where i = 1, 2..., N is a vector of countries, t = 1, 2, ..., T is a time index, X ′ is
a (1xK) vector of regressors, β is a (K x 1) vector of coefficients to be estimated,
µi represents individual time-invariant effects capturing individual differences, and
epsilonit denotes individual error terms. It is assumed that µi and εit are indepen-
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dently and identically distributed terms with mean zero and constant variance (σ2),
that is, iid(0, σ2). Moreover, µi and εit are assumed to be exogenous to each other.
Therefore:
E[µi] = [εit] = [µi, εit] = 0 (3.3)
Following Ahn and Schmidt (1997), we impose an additional assumption about
the initial conditions, that E(yi1, εit) = 0 for all i = 1, 2...N ; t = 2, ..., T . Together
these assumptions are adequate to indentify and estimate α for T ≥ 3 (Blundell &
Bond, 1998; Ahn & Schmidt, 1995).
The introduction of the lagged endogenous variable, yit−1 introduces a dynamic
panel bias because µ1 and yit−l are correlated. Since yit is a function of µi, which is
time-invariant, it must also be true that yit− 1 is a function of µi. Therefore, one
of the regressors is correlated with one component of the error term, thus giving rise
to the problem of endogeneity.
Accordingly, application of the ordinary least square, (OLS) approach to equa-
tion 3.1 will yield inconsistent and upward biased estimates; and since E[yit−1, εit] >
0, then β1 will be overestimated (Blundell & Bond, 1998, 2000). To tackle endogene-
ity bias, the literature suggests two remedies, which could be applied simultaneously
or successively. First, one can eliminate time-invariant effects through data trans-
formation such as first differencing (Nickell, 1981; Holtz-Eakin, Newey, & Rosen,
1988; Ahn & Schmidt, 1997). Han and Phillips (2013) commends the first differ-
encing approach on the grounds that not only does it eliminate fixed cffects, but it
also, in the presence of unit roots, transforms the data to stationary series. Second,
the endogeneity problem can also be tackled by employing valid instruments of the
lagged endogenous variable.
For illustration, we reduce equation 3.1 to include only one explanatory variable:
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yit = αiyit−1 + εit (3.4)
lagging equation 3.4 once, we obtain:
yit−1 = αiyit−12 + εit−1 (3.5)
To remove the time-invariant component of the error term which is correlated
with the explanatory variable, equation 3.5 is subtracted from equation 3.4 resulting
to equation 3.6 (See, Hsiao and Zhang, 2015 ).
4yit = αi4yit−1 +4εi (3.6)
where 4 = (1 − L) is a first difference operator. In other words, we obtain the
transformation by multiplying equation 3.4 by IN ⊗ D, where IN is an identity
matrix of dimension N , and D is a (T − 1)× T matrix:

−1 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 −1 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 −1 0

(3.7)
Although first differencing takes care of the individual time-invariant effect, it results
to a loss of the degrees of freedom, since it drops T initial observations, which could
have severe ramifications for an unbalanced panel. Following the transformation,
the first difference estimator is the OLS estimator of equation 3.6. That is:
α =
{ N∑
i=1
(DXi)
′DXi
}−1 N∑
i=1
(DXi)
′Dyi (3.8)
Owing to the assumption that ε ∼ i.i.d (0, σ2), the first difference estimator is incon-
sistent since the transformation (i.e. first differencing) prompts a moving average
of order one, that is, MA(1) process for the 4εit. This calls for a generalised least
squares (GLS) approach ¡See,¿(M. Arellano, 2003). Moreover, as shown in Arellano
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(2003) the optimal GLS estimator is the within-group estimator, which takes the
following form:
αWG =
{ N∑
i=1
X ′iD
′(DD′i)
−1DXi
}−1 N∑
i=1
X ′iD
′(DD′i)
−1Dyi (3.9)
In line with Arellano (2003), the Q matrix is defined as the ”deviations-from-time
means” because it alters yit series into deviations from time averages ȳi = Qyi,
whose elements are ȳit = yit − ȳi. The Q matrix is shown to be:
Q ≡ D′(DD′)−1D (3.10)
Again, the within-group estimator successfully gets rid of the individual fixed effect.
However, it fails to fix the dynamic panel bias. Therefore, it yields inconsistent
estimates (Nickell, 1981).
Given the failure of pooled OLS, the first difference estimator and within-group
estimator to resolve the issue of dynamic panel bias, an alternative tool to deal with
the challenge is warranted.
Instrumental variable estimators are amongst alternative models used to deal
with the issue of dynamic panel hias (T. W. Anderson & Hsiao, 1982). The instru-
mental variable approach is usually preferred over the maximum likelihood method
of Hsiao (2003), on the grounds that maximum likelihood (ML) require, that as-
sumptions about initial conditions be made, and that they must be correctly speci-
fied, otherwise the ML estimator would be inconsistent. Although the estimators of
T. W. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) successfully identify the model, they arc not nec-
essarily efficient because they do not exploit all instruments available (Okui, 2009).
The panel data Generalised Method of moments (GMM) circumvent most, if not
all issues faced by other estimators. Through the exploitation of a set of meaningful
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instruments, for each instrument, GMM permits the use of all available instruments
(Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991). Arellano and Bond (1991)
suggest the use of all available lags for each period in time as instruments for the
first-differenced lagged endogenous variable in equation (5). The Arellano and Bond
(1991) estimator is known as the difference GMM estimator. The Arellano and Bond
(1991) first difference estimator is given by:
αGMMdiff =
((
4y′−1Zd
)
WN
(
Z ′d4y−1
)−1(4y′−1Zd)WN(Z ′d4y)) (3.11)
where 4yi = (4yi3,4yi4, ...,4yiT , 4y−1 is the vector that comprises the first lag of
4yi, Z ′4y =
∑N
i=1 Zdi, yi,WN is an optimal weighting matrix and Zd is an instru-
ment matrix for the ith individual, which has T −2 rows with non-negative elements
and (T−2)(T−1)/2 columns. The difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond
(1991) is consistent for T →∞ and also for fixed T .
Although, the first difference GMM estimator performs better than other panel
techniques (Blundell & Bond, 1998), it is not without hitches. More precisely, when
the lags of the dependent variable are weakly correlated with the first difference
of the dependent variable in the following period, first difference GMM (FDGMM)
is argued to suffer from finite sample bias and it bas poor accuracy in simulation
studies (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
The drawbacks of the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator gave birth to the sys-
tems GMM (Blundell & Bond, 2000; Blundell, Bond, & Windmeijer, 2001; Blundell
& Bond, 1998). The systems GMM formulates supplementary orthogonality con-
ditions that make more valid instruments accessible and achieve efficiency gains. In
addition to the use of lagged levels of yit as instruments for the first differences equa-
tion, the systems GMM estimator (SGMM) uses the lagged first-difference 4yit− 1
of yit as instruments for equation 3.4 in levels. Therefore, the resulting SGMM
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estimator is given by:
αGMM = (q
′
−1ZsWNZ
′
sq−1)
−1(q′−1ZsWNZsqi) (3.12)
where qi = (4y′i, y′i) and Zs is a full instrument matrix. The systems GMM is proven
to be efficient relative to the first difference GMM estimator, especially when α→ 1.
In light of the issues associated with dynamic panel data and other dynamic
panel data estimators such as FD and the within-group estimator, this study employs
systems GMM to estimate factors influencing business cycle comovements in SADC.
A plethora of studies have used similar equations to estimate factors influencing
business cycle synchronisation. Variables employed in this study, therefore, are
adopted from some of these studies (See, Cerqueira and Martins, 2009; Clark and
van Wincoop,2001; Darvas and Szapary, 2008; Lee and Azali, 2010). The empirical
model, therefore, is given by:
Yikt = φ0 + αYikt + θTIikt + ϕFIikt + δMPSikt + ωFPikt + ρOPt + εikt (3.13)
where Yikt measures business cycles’ synchronisation between countries i and k
at time t = 1, 2..., T , TIikt, F Iikt,MPSikt, FPikt and OPt represents trade integra-
tion/or intensity, financial integration, monetary policy similarity, fiscal policy con-
vergence/or similarity, in that order, and lastly εikt denotes the error term.
3.4.2 Data Sources
We use panel data covering the period 1994-2014, which are collected from various
sources. Nominal oil prices are collected from the International Monetary Fund’s
(IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO), and converted into real oil prices using
the world GDP deflator collected from the same source. Data on financial flows, in-
flation rates, and govermnent deficit/surplus were collected from the World Bank’s
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World Development Indicators, and data on bilateral trade were collected from the
Centre d’Entudes Prospectives et d’Informations International (CEPII) database.
While high frequency data would have been preferable, such data is hardly avail-
able in Southern Africa. Accordingly, we employ annual data. Thus, the scope of
the data is dictated by its availability. Data were collected for all SADC member
countries except for Namibia and Democratic Republic of Congo, where data were
not available.
3.4.3 Definition of Variables
Real Oil Prices: In line with existing studies, we use real crude oil prices as a
measure of global exogenous shocks (See, Kutu et al., 2016; Moneta & Rüffer, 2009).
Business Cycles Synchronisation Index: Business cycles synchronisation/
or co-movement is generally measured using correlation coefficients (See, Massmann
& Mitchell, 2005), such that the higher the correlation coefficient the higher is the
degree of business cycles co-movement (Croux et al., 2001). Correlation bctween
variables, however, docs not imply co-movement or synchronisation (Sec, Croux ct
al., 2001), and correlation based measures tend to reflect volatility of output growth,
therefore, limiting their usefulness (Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, & Peydro, 2013).
Hence, throughout this section, and in line with recent studies (Duval, Li, Saraf, &
Seneviratne, 2016), we employ an alternative measure of business cycles synchroni-
sation which can be calculated at any given period, rather than at a specific interval.
Precisely, we follow Kalemli-Ozcan et al. ( 2013) by constructing a business cycles’
synchronisation index. Assume Yikt represents negative absolute differences of real
GDP between countries i and k (See equation 3.14). The index measures the dis-
tance between business cycles. If they are closer to each other it implies a higher
degree of synchronisation. Thence, the higher the values of Yikt , the more synchro-
nised are business cycles between a pair of countries. We, therefore, end up with a
total of N(N − 1)/2, bilateral correlations.
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Yikt = −|lnGDPit − lnGDPit−1 − (lnGDPkt − lnGDPkt−1) (3.14)
Our preferred measure of business cycles synchronisation has several advantages
over competing measurers. As pointed out earlier, we acknowledge that the degree
of economic integration is changing overtime, and thus, our measure is constructed
for each point in time, rather than for a given time interval. In addition, previous
studies on the endogeneity of business cycles co-movement use the correlation co-
efficient of detrended series of GDP or Industrial Production to measure business
cycles synchronisation.
Figure 3.5: Kernel density estimate of business cycles’ synchronisation index
Because the correlation coefficient (Pearson) is confined between−1and1, the dis-
turbance term in a regression model is more likely not to be normally distributed(De
Haan et al., 2008). This results in unreliable inferences. Our approach do not suffer
from this problem since it does not confine the correlation between −1and1, and
thereby ensures that the error terms in a regression model are normally distributed
(See, De Haan et al., 2008; David, 1949). De Haan et al. (2008) address this problem
78
by employing Fisher’s z-transofrmation of correlation coefficients. This approach,
however, does not render correlation coefficients normally distributed, but it brings
them closer to being normally distributed (See, De Haan et al., 2008). In figure 3.5
we show that our approach is normally distributed, and thus somewhat addresses
concerns flagged in previous studies.
Fiscal Policy Convergence: As pointed out in section 2, fiscal policy diver-
gence and/or convergence may play a significant role in determining the extent to
which business cycles are synchronised. It is often argued that divergent fiscal poli-
cies may decouple business cycles whereas, convergent business cycles will tend to
strengthen business cycles’ co-movement. With respect to monetary policy there
seems to be a consensus that it should be taken away from the political arena, and
assigned to an independent central bank. While the debate on fiscal policy has
recently gained interest, there has been no consensus on the instruments or institu-
tional amendments intended to improve policy results. Several measures have been
proposed ranging from balanced budget to restraintson budget decits. With the
latter, restrictions on budget decits, being the most popular procedure to guide the
fiscal policy direction. For example, in the EMU, the Maastricht Treaty and the Sta-
bility Growth Path (SGP) stipulates acceptable levels of government budget deficits
(3 percent) and tolerable levels of government debt (60 percent) as a ratio of GDP.
In SADC, there is a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which resembles the
Maastricht Treaty. Given that all SADC member countries should achieve budget
deficit not more than 3 percent of GDP as an indication of fiscal policy prudence,
this study takes advantage of this fact by constructing fiscal policy convergence or
similarity as the absolute differences in government budget surplus/deficits as:
FCikt = |
GDEF/SURit
GDPit
− GDEF/SURkt
GDPkt
| (3.15)
where GDEF/SUR represent general government deficit/surplus as a percentage of
GDP. A similar procedure has been used by Darvas, Rose, and Szapáry (2005), to
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measure fiscal policy convergence in Europe. A lower value of fiscal policy conver-
gence index, FCikt implies higher convergence between the countries in question.
Monetary Policy Similarity: To measure monetary policy similarity, ideally,
one would opt to use nominal interest rates which is a direct monetary policy tool.
However, sufficient interest rates data for a significant portion of SADC member
states is not available. Consequently, inflation differentials are used to measure
monetary policy similarity.
Virtually all central banks share an analogous mandate. They all aim to keep
inflation as low as possible (Cukierman, 2009). Therefore, in the absence of a com-
prehensive measure for monetary policy similarity, inflation differentials can serve
as a good indication of whether monetary policies are similar across countries, given
that all central banks’ monetary policies are aimed at keeping inflation low. Thus,
for the purpose of this study, a monetary policy similarity index is constructed as
absolute differences inflation rates between countries i and k, as:
MPSikt = |πit − πkt| (3.16)
where πit and πkt are inflation rates in countries i and k, in that order, and M
PSikt denotes monetary policy similarity. If MPSikt is closer to zero, it signifies
that monetary policies between countries i and k are comparable. The choice to
employ inflation rates instead of interest rate is further justified both on theoretical
and empirical grounds. On theoretical grounds, the ’Fisher effect’, which implies
a one-to-one relationship between inflation and nominal rate of interest (Koustas
& Serletis, 1999), allows, in the absence of interest rate data, to use inflation. On
empirical grounds, the existence of a plethora evidence supporting the Fisher effect
further exonerates our index (Everaert, 2014; Panopoulou & Pantelidis, 2016), and
inflation as a measure of monetary policy similarity has been used in several studies
(Asongu, 2014).
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Financial Integration/Intensity: A plethora of instruments have been used
to measure the degree of integration (Kraay, Loayza, Serven, & Ventura, 2005; Lane
& Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2007). There is, however, no consensus on the most appro-
priate measure (Chinn & Ito, 2008). In this chapter, we follow ? (?), by using capital
flows-to-GDP to measure the extent of financial integration amongst countries i and
k. Essentially, we endeavor to measure the extent of capital movements between
countries. Hence, the larger the value of FIikt, the higher the degree of financial
integration between country i and country k.
We refer to the measure of financial integration used in this chapter as the baseline
financial integration. This measure captures the actual participation of a country
in the capital market. The measure is constructed as:
FIikt =
(
CFit
GDPit
)
+
(
CFkt
GDPkt
)
(3.17)
where Flikt represents financial integration between country i and country k at time
t = 1, 2..., T CFit and CFkt are sum of of financial flows ( inflows and outflows) in
countries i and k, respectively.
Trade Integration/Itensity index: The trade intensity/or integration index
measures the extent to which countries transact with each other. The index is con-
structed as a total trade (i.e. sum of imports and exports) between country i and
country k. Ceteris paribus, if exports increase and imports decrease by the same
magnitude then the index does not change, but if either imports or export/or both
increase then the index would also rise by the same magnitude. Hence, a higher
index implies a large degree of trade intensity. Following Otto et al. (2001) and De
Haan et al. (2008), trade intensity is approximated as:
TIikt =
∑ Xikt +Mikt
Yit
+
∑ Xkit +Mkit
Ykt
(3.18)
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where Xit measures exports from country i to country k, Mikt represents imports
from k to country i, and vice versa, and Yt denotes GDP. This bilateral trade in-
tensity index (equation 3.18) is standard in the literature, and therefore, permits us
to compare our findings with existing international studies (Imbs, 2004; Frankel et
al., 1997).
3.5 Empirical Findings and Discussion
To estimate the influence of trade integration, financial integration, monetary policy
similarity, fiscal policy similarity, and exogenous shocks, proxied by oil prices, on
business cycles synchronisation, a generalized method of moments (discussed in the
previous section) is employed. More precisely, we use GMM to estimate the rela-
tionship implied in equation 3.13.
As pointed out earlier, the effect of trade on business cycles comovemcnt is not
unambiguous. It could either be negative or positive. If the ”specialisation effect” of
Krugman dominates, it is expected that the sign on the coefficient (θ) measuring the
effect of trade in equation 3.13 will be negative. However, if the ”demand effect/or
cndogencity effect” is dominant then, the sign will be positive (Lee and Azali, 2010).
Hence, the object of interest is the significance and the sign of the coefficient. The
systems GMM estimations of equation 3.13 are presented in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Generalised Method of Moments’ Estimates
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Yikt−1 0.367*** 0.341***
(0.013) (0.027)
Trade Integration 0.224** 0.079***
(0.032) (0.063)
Financial Integration -0.753***
(0.098)
Monetary Policy similarity 0.055***
(0.023)
Fiscal Policy convergence 0.455***
(0.185)
Real oil prices -0.506***
(0.212)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) -4.98 -4.24
[0.000] [0.000]
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 1.26 1.60
[0.206] [0.109]
Hansen Test 65.83 54.76
[1.000] [1.000]
***, ** represents 1% and 10%
levels of significance. In (•) are standard errors and in [•] are p-values
As a baseline, equation 3.13 is estimated, with only trade integration/intensity
TIikt and lagged business cycles synchronisation Yikt−1, as regressors. This is in line
with the pioneering work of Frankel and Rose (1998). The resulting estimates are
reported in Table 3.1, model 1.
As shown in model 1, Table 3.1, the coefficient (θ) measuring the sensitivity of
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business cycles synchronisation Yikt to trade intensity is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at 1 percent. This implies that there exists a positive relationship between
trade intensity and busine,s cycles synchronisation in SADC. Therefore, an increase
in trade integration may bolbier business cycles synchronisation in the region. The
findings of the benchmark model lend support to the cndogeneity hypothesis of
Frankel and Rose (1998).
However, results from the baseline model reported in Table 3.1 model 1, may be
misleading. Duval et al. (2016) show that models with trade as the only regressor
may yield inconsistent results. This is because the model may he incorrectly speci-
fied or some other important variables may have been omitted (Flandreau & Mau-
rel, 2005). Consistent with this, Silvestre and Mendonça (2007) demonstrate that
a model which subsumes only trade as an exogenous variable tend to have limited
power in explaining variations in business cycles synchronisation. The benchmark
model is, therefore, expanded (see Table 3.1) to include other potential determi-
nants2 of business cycles synchronisation.
Model 2 in Table 3.1 reports the findings from the extended model. Despite
adding other variables namely, financial integration (FIikt), monetary policy similar-
ity (MPSikt), fiscal policy convergence (FPikt) and real oil prices (OPt), the coeffi-
cient (θ) on trade integration remains positive and statistically significant. However,
the magnitude of the influence of trade on business cycles synchronisation becomes
smaller once other factors such as financial integration are taken into account (see
Table 3.1). More precisely, we show that once other variables are accounted for, a
1 percent increase in trade intensity only improves business cycles synchronisation
by 0.079 percent, and this coefficient is comparable to that of Kose and Yi (2006).
Kose and Yi (2006) find that an increase in bilateral trade is associated with approx-
imately 0.06 percent increase in output synchronisation. In line with Frankel and
2See Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) for a list of robust determinants of business cycles’ syn-
chronisation
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Rose (1998), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Imbs (2006) and Cerqueira and Martins
(2009) the study results show that countries that trade more with each other tend
to have greater synchronisation of their business cycles. This implies that removal
of trade restrictions will result to a higher degree of synchronisation since increased
levels of trade will permit easy transmission of demand shocks across countries (Kose
and Yi, 2006). In contrast to Kose et al. (2003) or Duval et al. (2016) who find
that the positive link between trade and business cycle mmovements is limited to
industrial countries, we demonstrate that the relationship holds even in developing
countries (See, Calderon et al., 2007).
The study findings suggest that SADC must strive to strengthen trade ties
amongst member countries. Indeed, initiatives to reinforce trade relations in SADC
are in place. For example, a SADC free trade area (FTA) was established in 2008.
However, countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles are
not part of the FTA. If countries that remain outside the free trade area could join,
the scope of intra-SADC trade may be expanded thus reinforcing business cycle
comovements. This is supported by Shin and Sohn (2006), who argue that liberal-
ization of trade is often associated with increased trade integration among countries.
As previously pointed out, implementation of the SADC trade protocol has been
slow. For example, since 2004, Malawi fell behind with the process of phasing down
the tariffs. However, in 2010, the country started a tariff restructuring exercise to
bring into line its tariff schedule to both the COMESA and SADC tariff regimes.
Ensuring that countries that are lagging behind with tariff phase-downs accelerate
the proces.5 could possibly result to intensified business cycles cohesion in the SADC
region. This is in line with Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2015) who showed that
a reduction of tariffs tend to result to higher trade amongst countries. This concurs
with Carrere (2006). He finds that regional trade agreements prompted a significant
rise in trade among member states.
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In addition, these results have far-reaching implications for the proposed SADC
monetary union. As argued by Frankel and Rose (1997), if trade exerts a positive
influence on business cycle comovements, then even a country that is not suitable
ex-ante to join a monetary union, can be justified ex-post due to the resulting busi-
ness cycle coherence. Overall, our estimates support the view that increased trade
integration, in the context of SADC, is associated with intensified business cycles
comovement and therefore, can reduce the costs of relinquishing national monetary
policies.
As pointed out earlier, the effect of financial integration on the extent to which
business cycles are synchronised is less clear-cut. Both theoretical and empirical re-
sults often conflict each other. Hence, the finding of this study could either be neg-
ative, or positive; depending on whether financial integration encourages economic
agents to ’risk share’ in which case the effect would be positive, and consequently
the sign on the coefficient (ϕ) for financial integration (FIikt) would be positive
(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2003), and negative if the ’specialisation effect’ of Obstfeld
(1994) is dominant (Schiavo, 2008).
Consistent with the view that financial integration and business cycles synchro-
nisation are inversely related, the coefficient (ϕ) indicating the influence of financial
integration on business cycles synchronisation is negative, and statistically signifi-
cant at 1 percent level (See Table 3.1 Model 2). Thus, there exists a negative re-
lationship between financial integration and business cycles synchronisation. These
findings are inconsistent with lmbs (2004) and Kose et al. (2003) who find that
financially integrated countries tend to be highly synchronised. The study findings
suggest that a high degree of cross-country financial integration tends to weaken
business cycles synchronisation. Moreover, the results are in contrast with Bekaert
and Harvey (1995) who argued that the perpetual financial openness has signifi-
cantly contributed towards more integrated economies. Our findings suggest that
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the observed increase in the degree of economic integration is explained by other
factors beyond financial integration.
The observed relationship between financial integration and business cycles syn-
chronisation is in line with Obstfeld (1994). He postulates that a higher degree
of financial integration results to high production and specialisation, and therefore
induces industry-specific shocks, which then translate into country-specific shocks,
and consequently, de-synchronization (Schiavo, 2008). Furthermore, the observed
negative relationship could be explained by the idea that financial flows are tied
to business cycles (Kaminsky, Reinhart, & Végh, 2004). Put differently, financial
flows are procyclical in nature, such that agents tend to pull their investment from
countries experiencing economic downturns to countries experiencing booms. Sim-
ply put, better performing countries attract more financial inflows, and therefore,
resulting to decoupling business cycles (Backus et al., 1992).
It is often argued that business cycles comovement has increased overtime (Kalemli-
Ozcan et al., 2013). A plethora.of mechanisms such as common external shock.,
proxied by oil prices for instance, have been argued to be behind the observed in-
crease in business cycles comovement (Burstein, Kurz, & Tesar, 2008). If this thesis
holds, the coefficient (ρ) measuring the sensitivity of business cycles comovement to
oil prices (OPt) ought to have a positive sign.
Contrary to our expectation, the coefficient (ρ) capturing the effect of oil prices to
business cycles comovcmcnt is negative and statistically significant at 1 percent level
(sec Table 3.1). This suggests that oil price changes result in asynchronous business
cycles. This finding is inconsistent with Moneta and Ruffer (2009), who find that
oil prices have a positive impact on business cycles comovement. We argue that
the observed desynchronizing effect of oil prices may be attributed to the fact that
some countries in the SADC region arc net oil exporters (i.e. Angola & Democratic
Republic of Congo), and others arc net oil importers (that is, Botswana, Lesotho,
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Madagascar. Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambiquc, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). We, therefore, argue that real oil
prices have different implications on business cycles across SADC member states,
depending on whether a country is a net oil exporter/or importer. Indeed, studies
examining the relationship between oil prices and economic activity suggest that
the response differs depending on whether a cotmtry imports or exports oil (Lardic
& Mignon, 2008; Nzimande & Msomi, 2016; Hamilton, 1983; Jiménez-Rodŕıguez &
Sánchez, 2005).
while monetary policy and fiscal coordination arc argued to entail some benefits,
such as credibility, their effect on business cycles coherence is, however tmclear, it
is contingent of the type of distmbanccs that drive oscillations (Martincus & Moli-
nari, 2007). Consequently, if fiscal/or monetary policies arc a source of business
cycles themselves, then macroeconomic policy coordination ,vould result to busi-
ness cycles synchronisation. In this case, the coefficients measuring the influence
of macro- economic policy convergence/or similarity, that is, fiscal policy conver-
gence (ω) and monetary policy similarity (δ), would have positive signs. Hovever, if
macroeconomic policy discrepancies can be traced back to asymmetric disturbances,
then policy convergence would lead to reduced business cycles synchronisation. The
coefficients, therefore, would be negative.
The parameter (δ) indicating the relationship between monetary policy similarity
and business cycles synchronisation is positive and statistically significant at 1 per-
cent level (see Table 3.1). This finding implies that monetary policy similarity
exerts a positive influence on business cycles synchronisation. The results concur
with the existing literature (see Frankel and Rose, 1998; etto et al., 2001, amongst
others). These findings have far-reaching policy implications for the SADC region.
They suggest that monetary policies should be coordinated in order to strengthen
the extent of synchronisation of business cycles (Sethapramote, 2015). In line with
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our findings, Flood and Rose (2010), show that countries that arc targeting inflation
tend to be synchronised than countries that arc not targeting inflation. Additionally,
monetary policy coordination will not only work to ensure strengthened business
cycles comovcmcnt, but will also ensure that colmtrics without monetary policy
credibility import credibility from countries with credible central banks (Tavlas,
1994).
Although there arc no established theoretical linkages between business cycle co-
movcmcnts and fiscal convergence, empirical studies have suggested a positive link
between the two variables (Lukmanova & Tondl, 2017; Artis, Fidrmuc, & Scharler,
2008). Indeed, om results show that there is a positive association between fiscal
policy convergence and business cycle synchronisation in SADC (Sec Table 3.1).
More precisely, the coefficient (ω) capt ming the sensitiveness of business cycles
synchronisation to fiscal policy convergence is positive and statistically significant
at 5 percent level (see Table 3.1 ). These findings are consistent with Darvas and
Szapary (2008) and Artis et al. (2008). Countries in a monetary union are not
only connected by a ’single currency’, but trade relations as well. As such a fiscal
stimuli (contraction) in one country may stimulate (dampen) exports in other coun-
tries, and thus business cycles comovement (Degiannakis, Duffy, Filis, & Livada,
2016). The findings of this study are inconsistent with Sethapramote (2015), who
found no evidence supporting that fiscal policy similarity enhances business cycles
synchronisation.
These results are in line with the view that in a monetary union, fiscal policy must
be countercyclical, rather than ’procyclical’ (Fatas and Mihov, 2003). In line with
this, Carmignani and Laurenceson (2013) argue that coordination of fiscal policies
could result in synchronized business cycles. Therefore, we suggest that fiscal policy
restrictions be imposed across SADC member countries, and that fiscal policies be
coordinated across the region. Lukmanova and Tondl (2017) hold a similar view in
a study of the Eurozone. They suggest that a buoyant common economic control
is crucial for the survival of the trading bloc. Overall, our findings show that the
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SADC convergence criteria should give rise to further coupling effects because of
convergent fiscal policies.
Subsequent to discussing the findings of the study and their implications, we
employ the specification tests of by Arellano and Bond ( 1991) and advanced by
Arellano and Bover (1995). The tests are used to validate the instruments in our
GMM estimation. These test results are reported in the lower panel of Table 3.1.
The Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation is used to test whether second-order
serial correlation exists in the first differenced residuals. The null hypothesis tested
is that there is no serial correlation. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it is concluded
that there is second-order serial correlation and the GMM estimator is inconsistent.
In addition to the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), we use Hansen’s J-test to examine
the null hypothesis of validity of the instruments. Rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates that the instruments are not valid. The study fails to reject both null hy-
pothesis in both the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), and the Hansen’s J-test for the
validity of instruments (See Table 3.1). This implies that there is no second-order
serial correlation, and that our instruments are valid across different specifications.
3.6 Robustness Check
In this section, we use Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) to corroborate the find-
ings of the GMM estimation (see Table 3.1). The 3SLS combines the features of
simultaneous equations techniques, and control for possible endogeneity. It com-
bines intuitions from Instrumental Variable (IV) and Generalized Least Squares
(GLS) procedures, attaining consistency over instrumentation and efficiency from
appropriate weighting in the variance-covariance matrix. The 3SLS subsumes the
following steps: (i) estimate each equation exploiting Two-Stage Least Squares, and
recover the covariance matrix of the equations errors, and thereafter, (ii) implement
a type of GLS estimation on the stacked system, utilizing the covariance matrix
from the initial step.
The trade equation is instrumented by gravity variables namely, common lan-
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guage, distance, population, and GDP per capita. Furthermore, in order to ensure
the correctness of the impact of financial integration we use the baseline measure of
financial integration (Equation 3.17) which we will refer to as the de facto, hereafter,
and the de jure measure of financial integration.
In contrast to the de facto financial integration index which measures the actual
amount of cross-border movements, the de jure financial integration index is centered
on the easiness of regulations and restraints, including capital mobility controls.
We estimate Three Stage Least Squares in order to corroborate the findings ob-
tained from a single equation GMM. More precisely, we estimate Three-Stage Least
Squares to assess the cndogeneity of business cycles’ synchronisation. The estimates
of the 3SLS are reported in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) Estimates
Column 1: 3SLS: De facto finance Column 2: 3SLS De jure finance
Business Cycles’ Synchronisation
Variable Coefficient std errors Variable Coefficient std errors
Trade integration 0.482*** 0.080 Trade integration 0.415*** 0.067
Financial integration -0.292* 0.167 Financial integration -0.997*** 0.380
Monetary policy sim. 0.045 0.033 Monetary policy sim. 0.017 0.027
Fiscal policy conv. 0.401* 0.216 Fiscal policy conv. 0.376* 0.197
Oil prices -0.181*** 0.225 Oil prices -0.300*** 0.206
Trade
Yikt−1 0.065*** 0.020 Yikt−1 0.044** 0.018
Distance -1.493*** 0.237 Distance -1.702*** 0.217
Population 0.537*** 0.158 Population -0.176 0.128
GDP per capita -0.555*** 0.112 GDP per capita -0.759*** 0.996
Common language 1.515*** 0.255 Common language 1.461*** 0.235
In Table 3.2 columns 1 and 2 demonstrate whether, and how the factors pointed
out earlier affect business cycles synchronisation. Column 1 and column 2 confirms
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the large and statistically significant effect of trade intensity (θ) in accounting for
Yikt in equation 3.13. In Table 3.2, columns 1 and 2, the coefficient measuring the
effect of financial integration both the de-facto and the de-jure have negative signs
and are statistically significant at 10 percent and 1 percent, respectively. This,
therefore, confirms the findings from GMM estimates (Sec Table 3.1) that financial
integration and business cycles synchronisation are adversely related. This is irre-
spective of whether a de jure or de facto measure of nancial integration is used (see
Table 3.2). Moreover, it is shown that intensification of intra-SADC trade as mea-
sured by (TIikt) tends to bolster business cycles synchronisation. Overall, Table 3.2
shows that trade integration (T likt), fiscal policy convergence (FPikt), and monetary
policy similarity (MPikt) all exert sanguine and statistically significant effect on the
degree of business cycles synchronisation, which lends support to the endogeneity
hypothesis.
Consistent with the existing literature all our gravity variables exert a significant
effect on trade (Chaney, 2008) (see Table 3.2). We show that the distance between
two countries has adverse influence on trade while population, GDP per capita, and
the use of common language significantly improve trade amongst countries. More
precisely, we show that pairs of countries with relatively higher GDP per capita tend
to trade more with each other. In addition, countries with higher population also
tend to trade more with each other. Furthermore, the use of common language is
associated with the easiness of doing business between any two cmmtries involved.
Hence, using a common language results to improved trading relations between coun-
tries. Most importantly, we show that business cycles synchronisation significantly
stimulate trade amongst com1tries. Put differently, the higher the degree of business
cycle comovement, the higher is the degree of trade integration amid countries. Ta-
ble 3.2 shows that a 10% increase in the degree of business cycles comovement has
a stimulating effect on trade integration ranging between 0.4% and 0.65%.
Overall, our findings suggest that business cycles synchronisation is indeed en-
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dogenous, and not irrevocably fixed. it is found that trade indeed exerts a sanguine
impact on the extent to which business cycles are synchronised(Rose & Engel, 2002;
Rose & Van Wincoop, 2001). Furthermore, monetary and fiscal policy coordination
(Carl, 2017), in line with existing studies (Abbott et al., 2008; Alesina et al., 2002;
Artis & Hoffmann, 2008; Babetskii, 2005), are found to exert a positive and statisti-
cally significant influence on the extent to which economies are synchronised. This,
therefore, implies that indeed business cycles synchronisation is an ex-post rather
than an ex-ante phenomena (Frankel and Rose, 1998). In line with this, Massmann
and Mitchell (2005) and Camacho et al. (2006) show that the establishment of
EMU strengthened business cycles comovement in the Euro bloc. Our findings, and
the evidence from the Eurowne (Furceri, 2009; Correia et al., 2013), therefore, bode
well for the efficacious operation of a single monetary policy in SADC. In contrast to
studies that have taken a myopic view that a monetary union in SADC would not be
optimal and would be disastrous because business cycles are not synchronised (See,
Kabundi & Loots, 2007; Zerihun et al., 2014), we argue that SADC can establish a
monetary union even if business cycles are not synchronised; synchronisation will be
justified ex-post. Consistent with our argument, Willett, Permpoon, and Wihlborg
(2010) contend that if the endogeneity conjecture does hold, then the conventional
ex-ante OCA criteria, ought to be applied less stringently. If a country comes close,
but does not fully meet the criteria ex-ante, it should proceed and join the monetary
union as the odds that it would fulfil the criteria ex-post are high.
3.7 Summary and Conclusion
The study investigates the factors influencing the degree of business cycles’ synchro-
nisation in the SADC region, using data for the period 1994-2014. More precisely,
we investigate how trade integration, financial integration, monetary policy simi-
larity, fiscal policy convergence, and global exogenous shocks proxied by oil prices,
affect business cycles comovemcnt in SADC. In line with Frankel and Rose (1998)
we confirm that business cycles comovement is endogenous, and thus the observed
93
lower level of synchronisation in SADC are not irrevocably fixed. In contrast to
Krugman and Venables (1996), we discover that intensifying trade results is more
in synchronous business cycles. In addition, all other variables, apart from oil prices
and financial integration, have a positive impact on business cycle synchronisation.
The adverse effect of financial integration on business cycles is in line with the
predictions of ’ risk sharing’ theory. The risk sharing theory suggests that finan-
cial integration will induce industrial specialisation across the regions or cow1tries
leading to asymmetric shocks, thus decoupling business cycles. Furthermore, the
negative influence of financial integration on business cycle synchronisation could
be explained by the procyclical behaviour of financial movements . With regards to
oil prices, we argue that their decoupling effect can be explained by the fact that
some com1trics in the region are net oil exporters while others are net oil importers.
Furthermore, we show that fiscal policy convergence and monetary policy similarity
have a positive impact on business cycle comovcmcnts. Thus, the SADC convergence
criteria should give rise to increased synchronisation due to convergent fiscal poli-
cies and similar monetary policies . Overall, we conclude that indeed business cycle
synchronisation is not irrevocably fixed, and is endogenous (Frankel & Rose, 1998).
Thus, consistent with Flandreau and Maurel (2005) we recommend establishment
of a SADC monetary union that is relatively independent of the attained degree of
business cycle synchronicity. These findings corroborate several studies that have
shown that a monetary union could be established even if countries’ business cycles
are not synchronised ex-ante because they can become more synchronised ex-post
(Flandreau and Maurel, 2005; Furceri and Karras, 2008; Frankel and Rose, 1998;
Lee and Azali, 2010).
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Chapter 4
Fiscal Policy Sustainability in the
SADC Area
4.1 Introduction
In the aftermath the 2008/09 financial crisis, most economies witnessed unprece-
dented levels of public debts and deficits. This was bemuse, during this period,
economies experienced downturns, and governments across the globe resorted to ex-
pansionary fiscal policies in order to avert the recession (Polito & Wickens, 2012).
This is, and continues to be more prominent in developing countries, where the
capacity to raise more revenues is constrained by persistent low levels of economic
growth (Schick, 2005; Auerbach, 2016). Commentators often argue that the explo-
sion of public debt/or deficits in developing economies could partly be attributed to
sharp dwindling commodity prices, and excessive currency depreciations.
Since the Southern African Development Communitis (SADC) Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU), which outlines convergence criteria for its member states,
came into effect in 2002, prudent management of public debt and deficits became
of primary concern. The MoU stipulates a convergence criteria that defines of tol-
erable levels of public debts and deficits as being at 60 percent as share of GDP
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and 3 percent as a share of GDP, in that order. These convergence criteria were
aimed at paving a way for the envisioned SADC monetary union, which was initially
proposed for implementation in 2016, to be followed by a single currency in 2018.
Although determination to cut public debt in preparation for the SADC monetary
union resulted to significant reductions in public deficits, and in better management
of public indebtness, nearly, all SADC member states (since 2008) have witnessed
significant increases in government debts, and deficits.
In 2015, for example, Angolan public debt was registered at 65.5 percent of GDP,
a significant increase from 40.75 percent in 2014. Furthermore, public debt in the
country was estimated at 71.8 percent in 2016 (11.8 percentage points higher than
the 60 percent targeted debt). Observers of this trend argue that declines in oil
prices, coupled by depreciation of the Angolan Kwanza played a significant role in
accelerating public debt in the country. Approximately, 9.5 percent of the Angolan
public debt is deno1ninated in foreign currency. Accordingly, a currency deprecia-
tion tends to inflate the value of the country’s public debt.
In Malawi, debt-to-GDP was estimated at 55 percent in 2013, reaching 61 percent
in 2015, and further increasing to 63 percent in 2017. South Africa’s debt, on the
other hand, was estimated at 31.5 percent in the 2009 /10 fiscal year, 5.5 percentage
points higher than the previous year, 2008/2009. In the year, 2010/11, the country’s
debt was approximated to 35.1 percent, rising to 49.4 percent in 2015/2016. In the
year 2016/2017, debt to GDP ratio in South Africa was estimated at 50.97 percent,
and was forecasted to reach 52.9 percent in 2017/2018. This increase in public debt
appears to be a region wide phenomenon.
Within a space of five years, Lesotho witnessed a 100 percent increase in pub-
lic debt. More precisely, debt increased from Lesotho Maloti (LSL) 7 000 million
in 2011/12 to LSL 14 158 million in the 2015/16 financial year. In the fiscal year
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2011/12, Lesotho’s public debt was estimated at 37.56 percent of GDP, rising to 5.
75 percent in 2014/15, and reaching to 53.87 percent in 2015/2016 fiscal year.
We are of the view that, owing to the escalating public debt/or deficits, fiscal
policy may have been susceptible to become unsustainable. The persistently rising
levels of public debt have serious consequences for the envisaged monetary union
in SADC. As pointed out in the literature, countries taking part in a monetary
union automatically forgo control over their monetary policy tools (Masson & Tay-
lor, 1993). As a result, the only policy recourse accessible at a national level is
fiscal policy. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure that fiscal policy is sustainable,
so that it would be accessible when it is needed. Put differently, unsustainable
fiscal policy may neither be a mechanism nor an effective tool for tackling macroe-
conomic disturbances (Greiner, Koeller, & Semmler, 2007), hence threatening the
stability of a monetary union. In addition, Masson and Taylor (1993) argue that
governments with unsustainable debt levels may find it challenging to borrow at
reasonable costs/or servke their debt, which in turn may bumper their economic
growth (Westerlnnd and Prohl, 2010). The difficulty to service debt will exert pres-
sure on the central bank to monetise/or create money to finance the deficits, and
subsequently, jeopardise the credibility of the central bank, hence, risking the sta-
bility of the union.
It is important to have a clear view of the severity of the problem in the SADC.
This requires determining whether the current fiscal in the region is sustainable.
Vve do this by investigating whether SADC countries have taken/or are taking
corrective measures to control the(Lusinyan & Thornton, 2009) rising public debt.
More precisely, we evaluate whether or not governments in SADC have stabilised
policies by increasing revenues following the observed increases in debt. To the best
of our knowledge this is the first study to examine sustainability of fiscal policies
in SADC. This could partly be attributed to unavailability of the necessary data.
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The few studies that exists, apply the traditional time-series tests to the relatively
short-time series (See for example, Lusinyan & Thornton, 2009; Baharumshah, Jib-
rilla, Sirag, Ali, & Muhammad, 2016). We apply panel techniques in order to get
around the issue of data limitations. Moreover, whilst there is no single fiscal policy
in SADC, a panel sustainability analysis of government finances has to be viewed as
significant in the context of SADC countries wanting to pursue a common and sound
fiscal policy behaviour within the MoU framework. Potential cross-country interde-
pendencies can be envisioned in the run-up to SADC monetary union. Claeys (2007)
stresses the importance of dependencies acmss countries when evaluating sustain-
ability of fiscal policies. He further argues that studying each national fiscal policy
in the presence of such cross-country interdependencies turn out to be less insightful
(Also see, Alagidede and Tweneboah, 2015). Hence, overall sustainability of fiscal
policies is warranted, especially in a monetary union (Claeys, 2007). Therefore, in
this study, we test the overall sustainability of fiscal policies in SADC.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
There exists a large strand of the literature addressing the question of srn,1:ainability,
however, there is no unanimity on how to best measure fiscal position, or how to
determine if it is sustainable without intervention (Polito and Wickens, 2012). How-
ever, it is customary in the literature to assess fiscal policy sustainability through the
present value budget (or Borrowing) constraint (PVBC) (Afonso, 2005; Arghyrou &
Luintel, 2007; Baharumshah, Soon, & Lau, 2017; Polito & Wickens, 2012). Hence,
this st,udy also relies on the PVBC to appraise the sustainability of fiscal policy in
the SADC bloc. To derive the PVBC, we present government budget constraint for
country i = 1, 2, ..., N at time t = 1, 2, ..., T .
Eit = (1 + rit)Bit−1 = Tit +4Bit (4.1)
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where Eit = (Git + Hit) is a sum of goverment expenditures on public goods (Git),
and household transfers (Hit), rit represents nominal interest rate on bonds issued
at time period t−1, Tit denotes government reveues at time period t, and Bit are
government bonds issued at time period t.The left-hand side of equation 4.1 repre-
sent government expenditures in the current period, and the right-hand side of the
same equation shows government revenues.
It is implicitly assumed that public expenditures are financed through tax rev-
enues, and issuance of new government debt (R. J. Barro, 1979; Daniel & Shiampta-
nis, 2013). In addition, it is assumed that central banks are highly independent, and
therefore, we rule out the possibility that government can use seignorage revenues
to finance debts/or deficits (See also, Fincke & Greiner, 2011).
Generally, equation 4.1 is expressed as a ratio of GDP. Hence, in equation 4.2,
the budget constraint in equation 4.1 is re-written as a ratio of GDP:
git = (1 + θ)dit−1 = xit + dit (4.2)
where git = Eit/Yit is government expenditure expressed as a ratio of GDP, Yit,
xit = Tit/Yit are government revenues as a proportion of GDP, dit = Bit/Yit denotes
public debt as a share of GDP, and θ =
(1 + rit)
(1 + ρ)(1 + πit)− 1
is an ouput-growth-
adjusted real rate on government bonds.
Re-arraning equation 4.2, and recursively solving for posthumous periods, we obtain
the present value budget constraint:
dit = −Ξt
∞∑
s=1
hit+s∏T
j=1(1 + θit+j)
+ Ξt lim
T→∞
dt+T
(1 + θit+j)
(4.3)
where Ξt denotes expectations conditional on the information available at time pe-
riod t, hit+s = git−xit repre..sents primary government deficit/surplus as a share of
GDP. If and when the Present Value Budget Constraint (PVBC) is satisfied, it is
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inferred that fiscal policy is sustainable. If the PVBC is fulfilled then fiscal policy is
said to be Ricardian; meaning that an increase in government expenditure prompts
an increase in taxes corresponding to the present value of debt (Seater, 1993). How-
ever, if PVBC is not satisfied the fiscal policy is said to be Non-Ricardian, in which
case, the government has to alter either public expenditure or revenues.
If the discounted present value of du tends to zero in the limit, fiscal policy
is said to be sustainable. Technically, this translates into a No-Ponzi scheme/or
Transversality condition:
Ξt lim
T→∞
dt+T
(1 + θit+j)
= 0 (4.4)
which implies
dit = −Ξt
∞∑
s=1
hit+s∏T
j=1(1 + θit+j)
(4.5)
As long as equations 4.4 and 4.5 are not desecrated, it implies that government
cannot engage in ’rational Ponzi-Games’ that is, government cannot perpetually
roll over principal and interest repayments nor can they be financed by issuing new
debt (Macdonald, 1992; Haug, 1991).
4.3 Literature Review
In the literature, there are two approaches which are generally applied to evaluate
whether the PVBC is satisfied or not: stationarity tests, namely, unit root and
cointegration techniques, and Bohn’s structural test. In the former econometric
approaches, equation 4.5 is generally the null hypothesis to be tested. The heuristic
exercise was conducted by Hamilton (1986), in the United States covering the period
of 1960-84. Contrast to other studies, they used real debt and real deficits (not as ra-
tios of GDP). Moreover, they presume that real debt and real deficits are stationary,
and that the interest rate is white noise. They derive the alternative hypothesis by
assuming that:
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Ξt lim
T→∞
dt+T
(1 + θit+j)
= A > 0 (4.6)
which implies that a certain amounts of government purchases need never be paid
for with taxes. Thus, the null hypothesis is given by:
dit = −Ξ
∞∑
s=1
(1 + θ)−shit+s + A0(1 + θ)
−t (4.7)
The hypothesis that PVBC holds is satisfied, if and only if, A0 = 0 in equation 4. 7.
They find that fiscal policy is fully compatible with the PVBC. Hence, fiscal policy
in the U.S. for the period under consideration was Ricardian. Wilcox (1989) ex-
tends the work of Hamilton and Flavin (1986), by supposing non-stationary interest
rate, and permitting for arbitrary violations of the budget constraint. In contrast to
Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Wilcox (1989) found that fiscal policy was incompatible
with intertemporal budget constraint in the United States. Haug (1991) finds that
whilst primary surplus and the stock of government debt are non-stationary, resid-
uals from cointegrating regression of the same variables are stationary. Therefore,
he concludes that fiscal policy is harmonious with the intertemporal budget con-
straint (IBC) in the U.S. In agreement with Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Kremers
(1989) finds that fiscal policy in the U.S. is consistent with the PVBC constraint;
and is, therefore, entirely harmonious with the contention that investors rationally
presume the budget to be balanced in present value terms. Unlike other studies
(For example, Ehrhart & Llorca, 2008; Green, Holmes, & Kowalski, 2001), Gabriel
and Sangduan (2010) use Horvath and Watson (1995) cointegration test, which
they argue to be more efficient relative to conventional cointegration tests. They
demonstrate the evidence for cointegration between government revenues and ex-
penditures for all countries included in the sample, and conclude that Bahamas,
Finland, France, South Africa1 Thailand, and the United States, are all compatible
with govermnent intertemporal budget constraint. These findings are in harmony
with those of S. Ahmed and Rogers (1995) , in which they examined sustainability
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of fiscal policy for United Kingdom, and the U.S. Ahmed and Rogers (1995) found
overwhelming evidence for debt sustainability in both countries.
Papadopoulos and Sidiropoulos (1999) evaluate the sustainability of fiscal pol-
icy for selected European countries1. They test for stationarity of public debt and
deficits, and cointegration between the two variables. In so doing, they permit
for structural breaks by using Gregory and Hansen (1996) and Zivot and Andrews
(1992) tests. They find that fiscal policies in Greece, Portugal, and Spain arc on
a sustainable path. However, they fail to find evidence favouring sustainability in
Italy and Belgium. Evaluating cointegration between government expenditures for
emerging emnomies, Kalyoncu (2005) finds that whilst South Korea, and Turkey sat-
isfy govennnent intertcmporal budget constraint, albeit only the weak form, South
Africa, Philippines, and Mexico pursue an unsustainable fiscal policy. This implies
that in the long-run, these countries would require painful adjustments, either tax
increases or expenditure cuts, in order to restore sustainability of their fiscal policies.
In previous studies, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Ireland have been found not to
satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint (See for example Makrydakis, Tzavalis,
& Balfoussias, 1999; Corsetti & Roubini, 1991). Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) re-
evaluate the sustainability of public debt for these economies. In contrast to previous
studies, the study permits for both structural breaks and nonlinearities. Arghyrou
amd Luintel (2007) find evidence of multiple structural shifts, and nonlinear adjust-
ments. They also find fiscal policies to be sustainable for countries included in the
sample. The study concludes that the failure to obtain evidence supporting debt
sustainability could be attributed to the inability to take structural shifts and non-
linearities into account (Arghyrou and Luintel, 2007). Focussing on EMU member
states2 that either have violated the Maastricht treaty or have high debt as a share
of GDP, Greiner et al. (2007) provide evidence that fiscal policies in these countries
1Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
2Those countries are Italy, which had a high debt-to-GDP ratio, France, Portugal, and Germany
which all violated the treaty
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are sustainable despi te violation of the Maastricht treaty. This, therefore, implies
that the ceiling imposed in the EMU/ or in the proposed SADC monetary union
may not necessarily imply that debt will be sustainable/or unsustainable if not sat-
isfied (Arghyrou and Luintel, 2007; Greiner et al., 2007). Thus, the sustainability
of fiscal policy is an important heuristic task (Greiner ct al., 2007). In line with
this, Afonso (2005) explores the sustainability of fiscal policy in Europe by evaluat-
ing cointegration between government revenues and expenditures. The author finds
that whilst debt-to-GDP has stabilised, fiscal policies, with few exceptions, in the
Euro area appear to be on an unsustainable path. Consequently, the governments
in the EU are running a risk of becoming highly indebted, and as a result painful
adjustments in the long-term may be inevitable (Afonso, 2005; Caporale, 1995).
Similar results are documented by Afonso and Rault (2010). The authors evaluate
the sustainability of public finances in the EU-15 using both cointegration and unit
root tests. They find that while public finance sustainability appear to be problem-
atic in some countries, fiscal policy was sustainable in the panel of EU-15. Claeys
(2007) demonstrates that, overall, fiscal policies are sustainable in the EU, albeit
national experiences vary significantly. Consistent with this, Westerlund and Prohl
(2010) show that indeed the hypothesis of fiscal sustainability cannot be rejected
for OECD countries.
Exploring sustainability of fiscal policies for Latin American countries, Alagid-
ede and Tweneboah (2015), find that the intertemporal budget constraint is adhered
to. Bravo and Silvestre (2002) evaluate cointegration between government revenues
and expenditure for eleven European Union member countries for the period of
1960- 2000. They argue that if cointegration of public revenues and expenditures,
as argued by Trehan and Walsh (1988), is a sufficient condition for sustainability of
public debt, then their findings imply that debt, for the period under consideration,
was only sustainable in five countries, namely Austria, France, Germany, Nether-
lands, and United Kingdom. Moreover, they demonstrate that Belgium, Denmark,
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Ireland, Italy, and Finland were incompatible with the intertemporal budget con-
straint. Bajo-Rubio, Dı́az-Roldán, and Esteve (2009) also find that whilst other
EMU member states satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint, Finland does not.
Thus, its fiscal policy is unsustainable. Fincke and Greiner (2010) examine the
sustainability of public debts in developing countries, namely Botswana. Costa
Rica, Panama, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Tunisia. The impetus for concentrating
on developing countries is that whilst there exists an enormous amount of research
concerning fiscal policy sustainability, the focus is usually limited to developed coun-
tries. Yet, developing countries have proved to be the most vulnerable to debt crises
as evidenced in 1980s and 1990s. They find that fiscal policies, for the period un-
der consideration, were sustainable for countries considered with the exception of
Panama. This is despite the increasing levels of public debt to GDP.
Using conventional methods of evaluating sustainability, that is, unit roots/or
cointegration tests, most studies fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in
government debt; implying that debt grows boundlessly. Bohn (1998) argues that
failing to find evidence to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root does not necessar-
ily imply that fiscal policies are unsustainable, or debt grows boundlessly. Moreover,
requiring the debt-income ratio to be stationary for fiscal policy sustainability is an
unnecessary condition (Bohn, 2007). He further argues that it is difficult to detect
mean-reversion in debt-GDP ratio, because it is generally bounced by a number of
shocks such as, fluctuations in output growth. Consequently, he suggests obtaining
a direct signal for counteractive measures by evaluating the response of primary
surplus to changes in debt. A sanguine response demonstrates that government is
taking corrective actions by either reducing non-interest expenditure or increasing
revenues (Mendoza & Ostry, 2008). This is all that is required to infer that fiscal
policies arc sustainable (Bohn, 2007).
Using Bohn’s approach and a large sample size, Mauro, Romeu, Binder, and
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Zaman (2015), observe that when the sample is constrained to include only up to
the pre-2008 crisis, most advanced economies adhered to intertemporal budget con-
straint. However, when data is extended beyond the 2008 financial crisis, most
advanced economies disobeyed the intertemporal budget constraint. Fincke and
Greiner (2012) evaluate the sustainability of public debt for a set of European coun-
tries. They find that primary surpluses positively react to changes in government
debt for all countries included in the sample; implying that fiscal policies are on a
sustainable path for the period under consideration. Furthermore, they examine if
deficits inclusive of interest repayments are stationary. This is to corroborate the
findings of the fiscal policy reaction function. They find that deficits inclusive of
interest rates are stationary, thus fiscal policies are indeed sustainable. Mendoza
and Ostry (2008) consider a sample of both industrial and emerging countries to
evaluate the sustainability of fiscal policies using the model-based approach, that
is, the Bohn reaction function. They find that primary balances react positively to
changes in public debt. Accordingly, they conclude that fiscal policies are sustain-
able for both industrial and emerging countries.
Overall, although there exists a plethora of studies examining the sustainability
of fiscal policies, the focus tends to be skewed towards developed countries (Afonso
& Jalles, 2016; Arghyrou & Luintel, 2007; Auerbach, 2016; Feve, Henin, et al.,
2000). Thus, developing countries which are argued to be more susceptible to debt
crises (Fincke and Greiner, 2010) tend to be overlooked. The few studies which
look into developing countries often present contradicting results(Ghatak & Sánchez-
Fung, 2007; Fincke & Greiner, 2010), and concentrate in Asian, and Latin American
economies, thereby, neglecting African economics (Alagidedc and Twencboah, 2015).
The contradicting results in empirical studies could be ascribed to the use of different
econometric techniques, and the assumptions made about the discounting factor
(Caporale, 1995; Alagidede & Tweneboah, 2015). Moreover, the biasness towards
developed could be attributed to difficulties in obtaining data, and reliability issues
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where the data arc available (Lusinyan and Thornton, 2009). Lastly, most of the
studies tend to concentrate on individual countries, and this is argued to be less
insightful given the interdependencies across countries (Claeys, 2007), especially
in regional economic communities (RECs); and fails to account for cross-country
dependencies could yield misleading results (Banerjee, 1999).
4.4 Methodology and Data
4.4.1 Data
We evaluate the sustainability of fiscal policy in the panel of fifteen SADC countries
over the period of 2000 to 2016. The data for all countries, except for South Africa
arc taken from the World Development Indicators World Bank database, World Eco-
nomic Outlook International Monetary Fund (IMF) database; and South Africa’s
data are collected from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). The reason why
South African data is collected from a different source (i.e. SARB) is because it inco-
sistenly available from the World Development Indicators (i.e. it has several gaps).
The sample consists of all SADC member states, that is, Angola, Botswana, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
The series subsumes general goverment public debt, government expenditures, gross
domestic product (GDP), and government revenues.
4.4.2 Univariate Analysis: Ng and Perron Unit Roots Test
Unit root testing has become a standard practice for macroeconomic analysis (Perron
& Ng, 1996), and the generally used approach is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
due to Dickey and Fuller (1979), advanced by Said and Dickey (1984); and the
Phillips and Perron unit root test. Ng and Perron (2001) caution that inferences
based on these traditional procedures could be misleading, and should therefore be
treated with caution. This is due to two main misgivings raised in the literature.
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First, these approaches generally have limited power in cases where the data gen-
erating process subsumes a moving average root near unity (DeJong, Nankervis,
Savin, & Whiteman, 1992). Second, when the autoregressive polynomial of the
first differenced series consists of a large negative root, the tests tend to suffer from
size distortions (Schwert, 1987; Perron & Ng, 1996). Failing to take these concerns
into account could result into incorrect rejection of the unit root hypothesis (Ng
& Perron, 2001). Therefore, Ng and Perron (2001) develop new procedures which
circumvent these issues.
The following data generating process is assumed:
yt = dt + εt (4.8)
where εt = αεt−1 + εt, E(ε
2
0) < ∞, εt = δ(L)et =
∑∞
j=0 δjet−j with
∑∞
j=0 j|δj| < ∞
and et ∼ i.i.d(0, σ2e). The non-normalised sprectral density at frequency zero of εt is
given by σ2 = σ2eδ(1)
2. Moreover, dt =
′ zt where zt is a set of deterministic elements.
Ng and perron (2001) test the following null hypothesis:
H0 : α = 1
against the alternative hypothesis that:
H1 : α < 1
using three M3 (that is, MZα,MZt and MSB) which are defined as follows:
MZα =
(
(T−1y2T − s2AR)2T−2
T∑
t=1
y2t−1
)
(4.9)
MSB =
(
T−2
T∑
t=1
y2t−1/s
2
AR
)1/2
(4.10)
3See, Perron and Ng (2006) for properties of the tests.
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MZt = MZα ×MSB (4.11)
where s2AR is an estimate of the spectral density of εt at zero frequency which is
given by:
s2AR =
α̂2k(
1− ˆβ(1)
)2 (4.12)
where β̂(1) and α̂2k are given by
∑k
i=1 β̂ and (T − K)−1
∑T
t=k+1 êik, respectively.
Perron and Ng (1996) suggest adapting local unity generalised least squares de-
trending process in order to improve the power of the M tests. Furthermore, Ng
and Perron (2001) consider two modified feasible point optimal tests given by:
p = 0 : MPGLST =
(
c̄2T 2
T∑
t=1
ỹ2t−1 + (1− c̄T−1ỹ2t
)
/s2AR (4.13)
p = 1 : MPGLST =
(
c̄2T 2
T∑
t=1
ỹ2t−1 + (1− c̄T−1ỹ2t
)
/s2AR (4.14)
In addition to these tests, Ng and Perron (2001) argue that the truncation lag
selected by the Akaike criterion tends to be very small and they therefore, propose
a modified Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) given by:
MAIC(k) =
(
lnσ̂2k +
2(τT (k) + k
T − kmax
)
(4.15)
with τT = σ̂
2
k
)−1
β̂0
∑T
t=kmax+1
σ̂2k = (T − kmax)−1
∑T
t=kmax
ê2tk.
4.4.3 Panel Data Analysis
4.4.3.1 Cross-Country Interdependencies
Although panel data analysis offers numerous advantage over time-series, it is not
without challenges which, if not taken into account, can significantly distort the
results (Baltagi & Pesaran, 2007). For instance, countries have become more con-
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nected than ever before, and thus neglecting those interdependencies could yield
misleading/or incorrect inferences. As a consequence, scholars have migrated from
the ’first generation unit root tests’ which do not account for cross-sectional de-
pendence (Im, Pesaran, & Shin, 2003; Levin, Lin, & Chu, 2002), to the ’second
generation unit root tests’ which acknowledge or rather allow for cross-sectional de-
pendencies (Y. Chang, 2002; Pesaran, 2007; Choi, 2001; Bai & Ng, 2004; Moon &
Perron, 2004).
Accordingly, in order to ensure that we employ correct instruments, and avoid
issues related to cross-sectional interdependency, we commence by ascertaining the
presence of cross-sectional dependence or absence thereof in the data. This exercise
is in line with O’Connell (1998) who argues that using a panel unit root test which
do not take into account the presence of cross-sectional dependence, even if it is
present, will lead to false rejection of the null hypothesis that a series has a unit
root.
We use several tests in order to check for cross-sectional dependence. The
Breusch and Pagan (1980) test is centered on the squared average pairwise cor-
relation of the residuals. The test uses the following LM statistic:
CDlm = T
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρ̂ij (4.16)
where ρij denotes the sample estimate of the pairwise correlation of residuals. ρij is
given by:
ρij = ρji =
∑T
t=1
eitejt(∑T
t=1 e
2
it
)1/2(∑T
t=1 e
2
jt
)1/2 (4.17)
The Breusch and Pagan Llvf test is only applicable when cross-section dimension
(N) is smaller vis-a-vis the time-series dimension (T ). Therefore, when N > T the
test suffers from size distortions. Consequently, Pesaran (2004) develops a new set
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of tests wl1ich are based on the average of pairwise correlation coefficients of the
residuals from individual ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The Pesaran
(2004) tests are applicable to heterogeneous dynamics panels and are robust to
structural breaks. The test developed by Pesaran is given by:
CDlms =
√
1
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
(
T ρ̂2ji − 1
)
(4.18)
The LM statistic presented in equation 4.18 is a scaled version of equation 4.17.
Pesaran (2004) argues that equation 4.18 can be utilised to assess cross-sectional
dependence even if N →∞ and T →∞. However, the above test is likely to show
significant size distortions for N → ∞ and a small T . These shortcomings call for
new tests. Hence Pesaran (2004) develops a test which is centered on the pairwise
correlation coefficients as opposed to their squares as in the LM test:
CD =
√
2T
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρ̂2ij (4.19)
Finally, we use a procedure developed by Pesaran, Ullah, and Yamagata (2008)
which they argue to be consistent even in cases where the CD test is not. The
adjusted LM statistics is given by:
CDadj =
√
2T
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
(T − k)ρ̂2ij − µT ij
υT ij
(4.20)
In Table 4.1 we present the findings from different tests of cross-sectional depen-
dence. All tests indicate that the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence
is rejected, except for Pesaran CD test which fails to reject the null hypothesis of
no cross-sectional dependence in government expenditure.
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Table 4.1: Cross-Sectionally Dependence Tests Results
Government Expenditure Government Revenues
Test Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
Breusch-Pagan LM 300.188 0.000*** 305.598*** 0.000***
Pesaran Scale LM 20.383 0.000*** 20.854 0.000***
Bias-Corrected Scaled LM 20.153 0.000*** 20.624 0.000***
Pesaran CD 2.399 0.016** 0.689 0.490
NB: ***,** denotes 1% & 5% levels of
significance, accordingly.
As pointed out by Pesaran et al. (2008), that in some cases the CD test is incon-
sistent, we rely on the bias-corrected cross-sectional dependence test which rejects
the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence. Hence, our remits suggest that
there is cross-sectional dependence among/in; and, therefore, using tests which do
not account for cross-country interdependencies would be inappropriate. Accord-
ingly, in the subsequent section, we provide a concise description of the second
generation tests which would be employed in this study.
4.4.3.2 Panel Unit Roots Test: Pesaran (2007)
The issue of unit roots in macroeconomics variables has long been studied. Ac-
cordingly, there exists a number of techniques through which the presence of a
unit root (both in time-series and panel data) could be detected (Breitung, 2002;
Choi, 2001; J. Lee & Strazicich, 2003; Maddala & Wu, 1999; Phillips & Perron,
1988). However, the caveat of most unit root techniques, particularly, panel unit
root tests is that they presume that individual time-series are cross-sectional in-
dependent (Pesaran, 2007). Issues associated with the supposition that series are
cross-sectional independent have already been pointed out in the preceding sections.
As shown in Table 4.1, the application of first generation panel unit root tests would
be inappropriate for this study. Therefore, in this study we use a panel unit root test
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developed by Pesaran (2007) which takes cross-sectional dependence into account:
4yit = αi + φyit−1 + δiεt + εit i = 1, .., N t = 1, ..., T (4.21)
where εt and εit are the unobserved common effects, and individual error term,
accordingly. The null hypothesis to be tested is expressed as follows:
H0 : φi = 0 ∀i
against the possibly heterogeneous alternatives,
H1 : φi < 0, i = 1, ..., N1; φi = i = N1 + 1, N1 + 2, ..., N
It is assumed that εit are independently identically distributed across cross-sectional
units and time, N(0, σ2). Moreover, it is assumed that εit is not serially correlated,
and it has zero mean and constant variance, σ2ε . Lastly, εit, εit and δi are assumed to
be independently distributed for all cross-sectional units. Pesaran (2007), therefore,
bases the test of a unit root hypothesis on the t-ratio of OLS estimate of bi(b̂i) in
the following cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF) regression:
4yit = αi + biyit−1 + ciȳt−1 + di4ȳt + eit (4.22)
where ȳt = N
−1yjt. The t-ratio is therefore given by:
ti(N, T ) =
4y′iM̄wyi−1
σ̄2i(y′i−1M̄wyi−1)
1/2
(4.23)
where4yi = (4yi1, ...,4yiT )′, yi−1 = (yi0, ..., yiT−1)′, M̄w = IT−W̄ (W̄ ′W̄ )−1W̄ ′ W̄ =
(τ,4ȳ, ȳ−1), τ(1, 1, ...1)′, 4ȳ = (4ȳ1, ...,4ȳT )′, ȳ−1 = (ȳ0, ..., ȳT−1)′, σ2i =
4y′iMiw4yi
T − 4
, Miw =
It −Gi(G′iGi)′ and G′i = (yi−1, W̄ ).
4.4.4 Panel Cointegration: Westrlund (2007) Procedure
There is a large strand of the literature scrutinizing the long-run linkages amongst
economic variables. According to Westerlund (2007), such literature has taken two
broad categories. The first category is based on the null hypothesis of cointegration
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(See for example McCoskey & Kao, 1998). While the socond category is based on
the null hypothesis of no cointegration (Kao, 1999; Pedroni, 1999). Most of these
tests are based on Engle and Granger (1987) procedures. The challenge with Engle
and Granger based procedures is that they often fail to find cointegration between
economic variables, even if economic theorems strongly suggest the existence of long-
run cointegration. Westerlund and Prohl (2010), Westerlund (2007) and Alagidede
and Tweneboah (2015) contend that the reason for the failure of Engle-Granger
based tests could be due to the imposition of a common factor limitation. Simply
put, the Engle-Grange based tests impose that the long-run cointegrating vector for
the variables in levels must be identical to the short-run adjustment process in the
first differences.
Due to the limitations of cointegration tests based on the Engle-Granger pro-
cedure, Westerlund (2007) propose four tests which are based on structural as op-
posed to residual dynamics. These tests do not impose the common factor restric-
tion (Alagidede & Tweneboah, 2015). Moreover, the cointegration tests proposed
by Westerlund (2007) are general enough to accommodate individual peculiarities,
for example, individual-specific short-run dynamics, trend, and heterogeneities in
the slope parameters, as well as cross-sectional dependency.
The error correction based test of Westerlund (2007) assumes the following data
generating process:
4yit = β′idt + αi(yit−1 − δ′ixit−1) +
pi∑
j=1
αij4yit−1 +
pi∑
j=−qi
υij4xit−j + εit (4.24)
where t = 1, ..., T and i = 1, ..., N denotes the time-series and cross-sectional units,
in that order. dt contains deterministic terms of which there are three possible cases:
d = 0, d = 1 and d = 1, t. The first case refers to cases in which 4yit is generated
with no deterministic terms, while in the second case 4yit is generated with only a
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constant term, and in the third case, 4yit is generated with trend and the constant
terms.
equation 4.24 can be rewritten as:
4yit = β′idt + αi
(
yit−1 −Ψ′ixit−1 +
pi∑
j=1
αij4yit−j +
pi∑
j=−qi
υij4xit−j + εit
)
(4.25)
where Ψ′i = −αiδ′i. The parameter αi determines the rate at which the system
yit−1 − δ′ixit−1 reverts back to equilibrium following a shock. For cointegration to
exist the parameter αi must be less than zero, suggeiting that following a shock the
system returns back to equilibrimn. However, if αi equals to zero, then there is no
cointegration, and therefore, the system does not go back to equilibrimn following
a shock.
The null hypothesis is therefore stated as:
H0 : αi = 0
The alternative hypothesis is contingent on the assumption made about the ho-
mogeneity of αi. Westerlund (2007) proposed four tests of which two are panel mean
tests and the other two are group mean tests. The group mean do not constrain αi
be identical accross the members of the panel, therefore, permitting the alternative
hypothesis to differ accross panel members (that is, H1 : αi < 0 for some members
of the panel); while the panel mean test requires αi to be homogenous accross the
members of the panel. Accordingly the alternative hypothesis is H1 : αi < 0 for all
cross-sectional units.
4.4.5 Estimating Bohn’s Reaction Function
Although the literature has not yet come up with a universally accepted measure/
or approach to assess fiscal sustainability, other approaches such as the Bohn (1998)
have gained broader acceptance. The Bohn (1998) approach is based on time series
regression of primary surplus and government debt. In this study, we employ the
fiscal policy reaction approach of Bohn (1998) which has attracted a lot of attention.
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The approach tests how government’s primary surplus relative to GDP reacts to
changes in public debt relative to GDP. If the reaction is sanguine and statistically
significant then fiscal policy is said to be sustainable. This approach has a good
economic intuition: if government runs into debt today, it has to run surpluses in
forthcoming periods in order to meet today’s obligations, and consequently remain
sustainable (Fincke & Greiner, 2011). In order to obtain fiscal reaction functions we
estimate equation 4.26 using various dynamic panel estimators:
xit = αit + δitgit + φ
TZit + εit (4.26)
where xit represents government revenues relative to GDP, αit are individual coun-
try intercepts, git denotes goverment outlays as a share of GDP, Zit is a vector of
additional variables which influence goverment revenues, and eu are individual error
terms which are assumed to be i.i.d N(0, σ2).
Concerning variables included in Zit we follow a standard strategy in the litera-
ture (Sec, Bohn, 1998; Fincke and Greiner, 2011). The choice of these variables is
stirred by Barro’s tax smoothing hypothesis. The hypothesis contends that public
deficits ought to be used only to keep tax rates constant over the state of nature, and
overtime (Bohn, 1995). Consequently, normal expenditures should be financed by
regular revenues, and deficits provide a windbreak against unanticipated government
purchases. Therefore, we include a business cycle variable (or output gap), Y varit
which captures fluctuations in public revenues. This is computed by decomposing
output into it circular and cyclical components, using the Hodrick-Prescott-Filter
(H-P-Filter). If output is below its normal level, taxes will proportionately fall with
the decline in output. On the one hand, if output rises above its normal level then
revenues will proportionately increase with output. So, it is anticipated that the
coefficient accounting for the effect of output deviations from trend will have a pos-
itive sign, that is, φit > 0. In addition, deviations of government purchases from
the trend will also affect revenues. Similar to business cycles, we utilize government
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expenditure deviations from trend, Gvarit also computed using the H-P-Filter.
In order to avoid potential endogeneity issues in our model, we use lagged gov-
ernment expendituregit−1 in our estimation. Therefore, equation 4.26 can be written
as:
xit = αit + δitgit−1 + φ
TZit + εit (4.27)
In order to estimate the fiscal policy reaction function, we resort to Panel Mean
Group, Mean Group, and the Dynamic Fixed Effect (discussed in lengthy below).
These techniques would permit us to approximate the reaction coefficient, δit in
equation 4.27, both in the short and the long-run.
The application of panel data has become standard practice in modern macroeco-
nomics. As a consequence, a number of techniques have been developed to estimate,
and deal with apparent issues in panel data (Pesaran & Smith, 1995). As argued
by Pesaran and Smith (1995) there are four techniques of getting the average effect
between endogenous variables and explanatory variables, especially when the sample
size is sufficient to run individual regressions:
• Estimating different regressions for each member of the panel, and averaging
the resulting coefficients. This is known as the mean group estimator.
• Merging data by constraining slopes to be identical across all members, while
permitting for fixed effects or arbitrary intercepts, and estimating pooled re-
gressions.
• Ireating panel data as a time-series data-by averaging data over members, and
estimating aggregate time-series regression.
• Averaging data overtime, and estimating a cross-section regression on group
means.
According to Pesaran and Smith (1995) all four procedures yield consistent and
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unbiased estimates of coefficient means for static models, but the same is not true
for dynamic models. Pesaran and Smith (1995) demonstrate that the group mean
estimator is reliable for large N and T , while the pooled and aggregate estimators
are not reliable when used in a dynamic model, even when N and T are large, and
the biases could be sizeable.
The most coimnonly used procedure is the Mean Group which is argued to yield
consistent estimates of the average of the parameters (Pesaran and Smith, 1995).
However, the Mean Group (MG) ignores the fact that some parameters may be
identical across the panel. The other estimator which is commonly used Ls the
pooled estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), which allows for intercepts to be
heterogeneous, while other parameters are constrained to be homogeneous (Pesaran
& Smith, 1995; Pesaran, Shin, & Smith, 1999). However, in the literature it has
been demonstrated that the supposition of common slopes is inappropriate (Phillips
& Moon, 2000; Phillips & Sul, 2003; Im et al., 2003), hence, rendering the pooled
estimator less useful.
Pesaran et al. (1999) developed a model referred to as the Pooled Mean Group
(Asghar, Qureshi, & Nadeem, 2015), which is in-between the pooled estimator and
the MG estimator. Their model permits for heterogeneity in the short-run param-
eters, intercepts, and error variances, but constrains the long-run coefficients to be
identical.
This is consistent with economic theory, because in most cases long-run rela-
tionships are expected to be the same, owing to solvency conditions amongst other
things (Pesaran et al., 1999). Their model assumes the following data generating
process:
yit =
p∑
j=1
αijyit−j +
q∑
j=0
β′ijXit−j + εi + εit (4.28)
where i = 1, 2..., N and t = 1, 2..., T . Xit is a (Kx1) vector of endogenous variables,
εi denotes fixed effects, while αit are coefficients of the lagged endogenous variables,
βij, and are (K×1) coefficient vectors. It should be noted that other fixed regressors
such as seasonal dummies could be included in 4.28, but for demonstration purposes,
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such regressors are not included.
The advantage of the Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lags Model (P-ARDL) is
that it does not necessarily require a balanced panel, although T must be sufficient
to estimate the model for each member country. If the variables under consideration
are I(1) and are cointegrated then the error term is I(0). A crucial feature of cointe-
grated variables is their response to any deviation from long-run equilibria (Asghar
et al., 2015). This characteristic supposes an error correction path of the variables.
Therefore, equation 4.28 could be re-parameterized into an error correction model
given by:
4yit = θiyit−1 + ϑiXit +
p−1∑
j=1
α∗ij4yit−j +
q−1∑
j=0
β∗ij4Xit−j + δ′Dt + eit (4.29)
θ = −
(
1 −
∑p
j=1 αij
)
, ϑ =
∑q
j=0 βij, α
∗
ij =
∑p
m=j+1 αim and β
∗
ij = −
∑q
m=j+1 βim,
with j = 1, 2, ..., p− 1, j = 1, 2, ..., q, i = 1, 2, ..., N
Stacking series observation for each group, equation 4.29 can be expressed as:
4yit = θiyit−1 +Xiϑ+
p−1∑
j=1
α∗ij4yit−j +
q−1∑
j=0
β∗ij4Xit−j + εil + εi (4.30)
where i = 1, 2, ..., N , yi = (yi1, ..., yiT )
′ is a (T × 1) vector of observations on the
endogenous variables for the ith member country, Xi = (Xi1, ..., XiT )
′ is a (T × k)
matrix of observations on the exogenous variables which are time-variant and are
different across member rountries, and l = (1, ..., 1)′ is a (T×1) vector of ls,. yi−j and
Xi−j are j period lagged values of yi and Xi, respectively, 4Xi = Xi−Xi−1, 4yi =
yi − yi−j and εi = (εi1, ..., εiT )′.
The choice of P-ARDL is driven by a number of advantages relative to conventional
cointegration testing procedures, such as the one of Engle and Granger (1987) and
Johansen (1991). Firstly, the ARDL procedure does not require variables to be
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integrated of the same order. It can take both I(l) and I(0) variables (Duasa, 2007;
Kutu et al., 2016; Ozturk & Acaravci, 2010; Pesaran et al., 1999). Therefore, pre-
testing to examine the order of integration is not obligatory. Secondly, the ARDL
procedure remains robust even with small sample size (Acaravci and Ozturk, 2010;
Kutu and Ngalawa, 2016; Duasa, 2007). In our case i.e. in the African context,
where data availability is an issue, Panel ARDL is even more interesting.
4.4.6 Panel Granger Causality: Government Revenues and
Expenditures
Lastly, this section evaluate the relationship between government revenues and
expenditures. Understanding the nature of the relationship between these variables
have both theoretical and policy significance. Moreover, understanding the direc-
tion of the relationship between government revenues and expenditures is highly
important for governments wanting to curb or keep budget deficits in check. Hence,
we investigate Granger causality between government revenues and expenditures
using an approach developed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). The model offers
advantage over other competing models in a sense that it allows for some degree of
heterogeneity across countries, in terms of both the autoregressive parameter δ
(k)
i
and the coefficients slope, β
(k)
i (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001; Holtz-Eakin et
al., 1988). Imposing the homogeneity of coefficients could result to misleading con-
clusions (Dumitrescu and Hurlin, 2012; Pesaran and Smith, 1995). While we allow
for heterogeneity in the AR parameter and slope coefficients, it is assumed that
these are constant over time. The model is specified as follows:
yit = αi +
k∑
k=1
δ
(k)
i yit−k +
k∑
k=1
β
(k)
i xit−k + eit (4.31)
where y and x are stationary variables of interest observed for N member states
of the SADC region for T periods while K ∈ N .β = (β(k)i , ..., β
(k)
i )
′. In contrast
to Emirmahmutoglu and Kose (2011), this model supposes that the lag length is
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identical across member countries of the panel. Moreover, the initial conditions
(yi−k, ..., yi0) and (xi−k, ..., xi0) are known and observable. It is further presumed
that for each member of the panel i = 1, ..., N residual are i.i.d N(0, σ2ei), and
E(eit, ejs) = 0, ∀(t, s).
4.5 Results and Discussion
4.5.1 Testing the Transversality Condition: Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Unit Roots Test
In the first step, stationarity properties of individual time series, public debt as a
ratio of GDP, are examined. We employ the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.
This exercise is conducted in order to compare/or streamline our findings with other
btudies. The number of lags is chosen by Schwarz information criterion. The results
are reported in Table 4.2. We employ the test for unit roots on public debt for
individual countries.
This follows , who contend that difference stationarity of public debt is a suffi-
cient condition for intertemporal budget constraint. If debt is difference stationary,
it implies that equation 4.4 holds. Bergman (2001) argues that sustainability is
satisfied as long as debt is integrated of any finite order. In addition, the author
argues that this is a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability.
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Table 4.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Roots Test: Public Debt
Country t-statistic p-value
Angola -6.903*** 0.000
DRC -5.362*** 0.003
Lesotho -9.444*** 0.000
Madagascar -4.499*** 0.008
Malawi -5.460*** 0.004
Mauritius -4.719** 0.011
Mozambique -4.685** 0.012
Namibia -7.243*** 0.000
Seychelles -4.953*** 0.003
Tanzania -8.913*** 0.000
Zambia -4.761*** 0.009
Zimbabwe -4.383** 0.031
***,**, denotes 1% & 5% significance levels, respectively.
Note: Botswana and Swaziland are omitted due to data limitations
The test results, in Table 4.2, depict that public debt is difference stationary
for all countries included in the sample. The findings in Table 4.2 suggest that
equation 4.4 does hold, and therefore, debt does not explode for countries included
in the sample. Put differently, the findings reported in the Table 4.2 signify that
governments do not resort to Ponzi-Schemes, that is, systematic financing of old
growing public debt by issuing new debt (Flood and Garber, 1980). Unit root
tests are generally known for their limited power in small samples, and on this
ground, Caporale (1995) cautions that this test could be misleading. Therefore,
its results should be treated cautiously. Hence, in the subsequent steps, we check
alternative sustainability conditions; which require that government expenditure be
cointegrated with government revenues.
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4.5.2 Ng and Perron Unit Roots and Johansen Cointegra-
tion Test Results
In this section, we present the univariate unit root results. More precisely, the Ng
and Perron (2001) unit root test is applied to assess the presence/or absence of unit
roots in public expenditures and revenues for the period under consideration. The
findings from this exercise are reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The tests are applied
on the log of government revenues and expenditures as a share of GDP in levels,
and in first differences, with a constant, and constant and a trend in the unit root
test equations.
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Table 4.3: Ng and Perron (2001) Unit Roots Test Results: Government Revenues
(share of GDP)
MZα MZt MSB MPT
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend No Trend Trend No Trend Trend
ANG -6.238[0] -7.649[0] -1.324[0] -1.730[0] 0.212[0] 0.226[0] 5.125[0] 13.324[0]
BWT 1.355[0] -12.051[3] 1.308[4] -2.444[3] 0.965[4] 0.202[3] 69437[4] 7.613[3]
DRC -7.961[5] -11.166[5] -1.981[5] -2.340[5] 0.248[5] 0.209[5] 3.129[5] 8.271[5]
LSO -3.597[0] -9.758[0] -1.325[0] -2.007[0] 0.368[0] 0.205[0] 6.808[0] 10.165[0]
MGD -9.973[0] -11.290[0] -2.231[0] -2.360[0] 0.223[0] 0.209[0] 2.464[0] 8.149[0]
MWI -3.104[0] -3.878[0] -1.232[0] -1.340[0] 0.396[0] 0.345[0] 7.861[0] 22.768[0]
MAU -4.238[0] -6.228[0] -1.255[0] -1.650[0] 0.296[0] 0.264[0] 6.026[0] 14.547[0]
MUS -4.149[0] 10.605[0] -1.330[0] -2.92[0] 0.320[0] 0.216[0] 6.037[0] 8.643[0]
NMB -18.450[1] -18.331[1] -3.007[1] -3.026[1] 0.163[1] 0.165[1] 1.433[1] 4.974[1]
SYC -3.301[0] 6.612[0] -1.238[0] -1.809[0] 0.375[0] 0.274[0] 7.375[0] 13.803[0]
ZAR -2.688[0] -24.793[1] -0.841[0] -3.508[1] 0.313[0] 0.141[1] 8.024[0] 3.749[1]
SWZ -4.906[0] -24.540[0] -1.526[0] -3.432[1] 0.311[0] 0.139[1] 5.084[0] 4.128[1]
TZA -3.559[1] -5.801[1] -1.309[1] -1.653[1] 0.367[1] 0.284[1] 6.877[1] 15.604[1]
ZMB -12.506[0] -12.508[0] 2.490[0] -2.495[0] 0.199[0] 1.999[0] 1.998[0] 7.311[0]
ZWE -4.631[0] -10.615[1] -1.512[0] -2.303[1] 0.326[0] 0.216[1] 5.309[0] 8.586[1]
Critical Values
1% -13.800 -23.800 -2.580 -3.420 0.174 0.143 1.780 4.030
5% 8.100 17.300 -1.980 -2.910 0.233 0.168 3.170 5.480
10% -5.700 -14.200 -1.620 -2.620 0.275 0.185 4.450 6.670
As shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the modified versions of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and Phillips and Perron (PP) tests, that is, MZα and MZt have test
statistics which are larger than the critical values, regardless of whether the unit
roots equation includes the trend component or not. Hence, the null hypothesis
of a unit roots government revenues and expenditures for all SADC member states
cannot be rejected.
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Table 4.4: Ng and Perron (2001) Unit Roots Test Results: Government Revenue
(share of GDP)
MZα MZt MSB MPT
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend No Trend Trend No Trend Trend
ANG -6.238[0] -7.649[0] -1.324[0] -1.730[0] 0.212[0] 0.226[0] 5.125[0] 12.324[0]
BWT 1.355[4] -12.051[3] 1.308[4] -2.444[3] 0.965[4] 0.202[3] 69.437[4] 7.613[3]
DRC -7.961[5] -11.166[5] -1.981[5] -2.340[5] 0.248[5] 0.209[5] 3.129[5] 8.271[5]
LSO -3.597[0] -9.758[0] -1.325[0] -2.007[0] 0.368[0] 0.205[0] 6.808[0] 10.165[0]
MDG -9.973[0] -11.290[0] -2.231[0] -2.360[0] 0.223[0] 0.209[0] 2.464[0] 8.149[0]
MWI -3.104[0] -3.878[0] -1.232[0] -1.340[0] 0.396[0] 0.345[0] 7.861[0] 22.768[0]
MAU -4.238[0] -6.228[0] -1.255[0] -1.650[0] 0.296[0] 0.264[0] 6.026[0] 14.547[0]
MUS -4.149[0] -10.605[0] -1.330[0] -2.92[0] 0.320[0] 0.216[0] 6.037[0] 8.643[0]
NMB -18.450[1] =18.331[1] -3.007[1] -3.026[1] 0.163[1] 0.165[1] 1.433[1] 4.978[1]
SYC -3.301[0] -6.602[0] -1.238[0] -1.809[0] 0.375[0] 0.274[0] 7.375[0] 13.803[0]
ZAR -2.688[0] -24.793[1] 0.841[0] -3.508[1] 0.313[0] 0.141[1] 8.024[0] 3.749[1]
SWZ -4.906[0] -24.540[1] -1.526[0] -3.432[1] 0.311[0] 0.139[1] 5.084[0] 4.128[1]
TZA -3.559[1] -5.801[0] -1.309[1] -1.653[0] 0.367[1] 0.248[0] 6.877[1] 15.604[0]
ZMB -12.506[0] -12.508[0] -2.490[0] -2.495[0] 0.199[0] 1.99[0] 1.988[0] 7.311[0]
ZWE -4.631[0] -10.615[1] -1.512[0] -2.303[1] 0.326[0] 0.216[1] 5.309[0] 8.586[1]
Critical Values
1% -13.800 -23.800 -2.580 -3.420 0.174 0.143 1.780 4.030
5% -8.100 17.300 -1.980 -2.910 0.233 0.168 3.170 5.480
10% 5.700 -14.200 -1.620 -2.620 0.275 0.185 4.450 6.670
The findings of the modified versions of the ADF and the PP are corroborated
by the findings of the MSP and MPT tests, shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Both
the MSB and MPT tests have test statistics which are greater than critical values.
Therefore, overall, the null hypothesis of a unit root in both government revenues
and expenditures cannot be rejected. This implies that government revenues and
expenditures grow boundlessly overtime, and arbitrary disturbances have enduring
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effects on the variables (Alagidede & Tweneboah, 2015).
Table 4.5: Ng and Perron (2001) Unit Roots Test Results: Government Expenditures
(share of GDP) First Differences
MZα MZt MSB MPT
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend No Trend Trend No Trend Trend
ANG -7.189[0] -6.76-[0] -1.873[0] -1.814[0] 0.260[0] 0.268[0] 3.482[0] 13.481[0]
BWT -23.231[8] -1.830[0] -3.399[8] -0.951[0] 0.146[8] 0.519[0] 1.083[8] 49.395[0]
DRC -5.559[0] -5.993[0] -1.311[0] -1.532[0] 0.235[0] 0.255[0] 5.229[0] 14.856[0]
LSO -6.044[0] -5.972[0] -1.721[0] -1.725[0] 0.284[0] 0.288[0] 4.101[0] 15.252[0]
MDG -7.453[0] -7.446[0] -1.918[0] -1.917[0] 0.257[0] 0.257[0] 3.327[0] 12.254[0]
MWI -2.034[2] -8.101[2] -0.774[2] -2.986[2] 0.380[2] 0.245[2] 9.894[2] 11.322[2]
MAU -7.242[0] -7.184[0] -1.861[0] -1.870[0] 0.256[0] 0.260[0] 3.520[0] 12.706[0]
NMB -7.407[0] -7.465[0] -1.774[0] -1.669[0] 0.239[0] 0.223[0] 3.796[0] 12.557[0]
SYC -6.185[0] -32.735[2] -1.032[0] -4.032[2] 0.268[0] 0.123[2] 4.249[0] 2.856[2]
ZAR -18.870[1] -19.710[1] -3.060[1] -3.122[1] 0.162[1] 0.158[1] 1.335[1] 4.716[1]
SWZ -7.472[0] -7.464[0] -1.857[0] -1.879[0] 0.248[0] 0.251[0] 3.528[0] 12.281[0]
TZA -6.788[0] -23.334[1] -1.734[0] -3.701[1] 0.255[0] 0.126[1] 3.944[0] 3.796[1]
ZMB -1.748[1] 2.357[1] -0.875[1] -0.371[1] 0.362[1] 0.371[1] 9.994[1] 29.909[1]
ZWE -2.737[0] -2.606[0] -0.520[0] -0.762[0] -0.224[0] 0.233[0] 8.431[0] 11.362[0]
Critical Values
1% -13.800 -23.800 -2.580 -3.420 0.174 0.143 1.780 4.030
5% -8.100 17.300 -1.980 -2.910 0.233 0.168 3.170 5.480
10% 5.700 -14.200 -1.620 -2.620 0.275 0.185 4.450 6.670
While government revenues and expenditures are shown to be non-stationary in
levels (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4), it shown that their first differences are integrated of
order zero, I(0), that is, stationary (See Tables 4.6 and 4.5 ).
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Table 4.6: Ng and Perron (2001) Unit Roots Test Results: Government Revenues
(share of GDP): First Differences
MZα MZt MSB MPT
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend No Trend Trend No Trend Trend
ANG -7.371[0] -7.057[0] -1.893[0] -1.859[0] 0.256[0] 0.263[0] 3.412[0] 12.925[0]
BWT -6.001[0] -1.914[0] -1.701[0] -0.968[0] 0.283[0] 0.505[0] 4.16[0] 46.908[0]
DRC -6.454[0] -5.985[0] -1.477[0] -1.553[0] -.228[0] 0.359[0] 4.691[0] 14.908[0]
LSO -7.262[0] -6.850[0] -1.734[0] -1.753[0] 0.238[0] 0.256[0] 3.920[0] 13.331[0]
MDG -5.928[1] -5.907[1] -1.704[1] -1.705[1] 0.287[0] 0.288[1] 4.181[1] 15.398[1]
MWI -2.034[2] -8.101[2] -0.774[2] -2.986[2] 0.380[2] 0.245[2] 9.894[2] 11.322[2]
MAU -6.569[0] -6.834[0] -1.676[0] -1.782[0] 0.255[0] 0.260[0] 4.139[0] 13.350[0]
MUS -6.820[0] -6.859[0] -1.676[0] -1.712[0] 0.245[0] 0.249[0] 0.245[0] 13.329[0]
NMB -6.917[0] -7.017[0] -1.689[0] -1.651[0] 0.244[0] 0.235[0] 4.070[0] 13.120[0]
SYC -1.748[3] -0.913[3] -0.815[3] 0.570[3] 0.466[3] 0.624[3] 12.236[3] 74.984[3]
ZAR -7.178[0] -7.182[0] -1.877[0] -1.882[0] 0.261[0] 0.262[0] 3.468[0] 12.699[0]
SWZ -7.498[0] -7.420[0] -1.892[0] -1.902[0] 0.252[0] 0.256[0] 14.290[0] 12.311[0]
TZA -7.469[0] -6.866[0] -1.835[0] -1.641[0] 0.245[0] 0.239[0] 3.601[0] 13.341[0]
TZA -7.469[0] -6.866[0] -1.835[0] -1.641[0] 0.245[0] 0.239[0] 3.601[0] 13.341[0]
ZMB -5.640 -5.637[0] -1.678[0] -1.678[0] 0.297[0] 0.297[0] 4.345[0] 16.161[0]
ZWE -5.767[0] -1.506[0] -1.520[0] -1.762[0] 0.274[0] 0.267[0] 4.251[0] 13.441[0]
Critical Values
1% -13.800 -23.800 -2.580 -3.420 0.174 0.143 1.780 4.030
5% -8.100 -17.300 -1.980 -2.910 0.233 0.168 3.170 5.480
10% 5.700 -14.200 -1.620 -2.620 0.275 0.185 4.450 6.670
Given that government revenues and public expenditures are integrated of order
one, I(1) (Refer to Tables 4.6 and 4.5 ), we proceed to evaluate the cointegration be-
tween government expenditures and government revenues. Cointegration is assessed
using equation 4.5. Evidence of cointegration would imply that fiscal policies are
sustainable. The use of cointegrating relationship implied in equation 4.5 to assess
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countries’ adherence to intertemporal budget constraint is not peculiar to this study,
but has become a standard practice in the literature (Goyal, Khundrakpam, & Ray,
2004; Hakkio & Rush, 1991; Kia, 2008). Existence of cointegration between gov-
ernment revenues and government expenditures is generally treated as an indication
that fiscal policies are sustainable (Kia, 2008).
The tests proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1991), are
employed to evaluate the presence of cointegration as implied by equation 4.3. The
Johansen test for cointegration consists of two tests: the trace test (λtrace) and the
maximum eigenvalue (λmax). The former tests the null hypothesis that there exists
r cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis of n cointegrating vectors,
whereas the latter tests the null hypothesis of r against the alternative hypothesis
of r+ 1 cointegrating vectors (Christodoulakis et al., 1995). In Table 4.7, we report
the findings from these tests.
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Table 4.7: Johansen Cointegration Test Results
Country Hypothesis Statistic P-value Cointegration
Angola r = 0 33.004 0.005*** Yes
Botswana r = 0 22.187 0.004*** Yes
Congo D. Rep. r = 0 34.788 0.003*** Yes
Lesotho r = 0 18.480 0.312 No
Madagascar r = 0 17.231 0.397 No
Malawi r = 0 24.053 0.073* Yes
Mauritius r = 0 14.577 0.609 No
Mozambique r = 0 22.703 0.126 No
Namibia r = 0 24.703 0.069* Yes
Seychelles r = 0 23.465 0.096* Yes
South Africa r = 0 30.043 0.014** Yes
Swaziland r = 0 26.670 0.039** Yes
Tanzania r = 0 22.762 0.116 No
Zambia r = 0 20.735 0.190 No
Zimbabwe r = 0 39.170 0.000*** Yes
In the case of Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, and
Zambia, the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. Therefore, our
findings suggest that revenues and expenditure do not share a permanent stochastic
trend, thus casting doubts on the sustainability of budget deficits in these countries.
Furthermore, we find evidence of cointegration between revenue and expenditure in
the case of all other members of the SADC with the exception of the aforementioned
countries. If cointegration between government revenues and expenditures is an ad-
equate condition for sustainability of fiscal policies, then fiscal policies can be said
to be sustainable in SADC with the exception of Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.
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As pointed out in Bohn (2007) results based on unit roots or cointegration anal-
ysis ought not be treated as a conclusive proof for the sustainability or unsustain-
ability of fiscal policy. These results could be misleading on numerous grounds
(Bohn, 1998, 2007). First, most cointegration techniques, including Johansen pro-
cedures, are based on the supposition of a strict-unit root (Jansson & Moreira,
2006; Cavanagh, Elliott, & Stock, 1995), which cannot be easily justified both on
economic and theoretical grounds (Cavanagh et al., 1995). Conversely, modelling
time series as integrated while it is not (near-integrated) could lead to erroneous con-
clusions regarding the cointegrating rank of the system (Elliott, 1998; Hjalmarsson
& Österholm, 2010). Hjalmarsson and Österholm (2010) demonstrate that impos-
ing strict unit roots (i.e. disregarding the near unit roots) could risk concluding
a false relationship between unrelated variables. Therefore, they suggest that the
findings of Johansen’s procedures should be cautiously interpreted. In addition,
several other studies have examined properties of the Johansen cointegration proce-
dures. Virtually all studies tend to find that these procedures are more likely to yield
false cointegration under various circumstances (See, Cheung & Lai, 1993; Gonzalo,
1994; Cavaliere, Rahbek, & Taylor, 2010). In line with this strand of the literature,
Gabriel and Sangduan (2010) failed to find evidence of cointegration when Johansen
procedures are used but they find evidence for cointegration when the Horvath and
Watson (1995) cointegration test is used. Consequently, they conclude that conven-
tional cointegration procedures tend to over-reject the null hypothesis of cointegra-
tion. Second, Bohn (2007) argue that unit roots/or cointegration are unnecessarily
restrictive requirements for sustainability. Generally, for intertemporal government
budget constraints to hold, public debt is necessitated to be difference stationary,
and government revenues and expenditures to be cointegrated (See, Trehan & Walsh,
1988; Quintos, 1995).Bohn (2007) demonstrates that the intertemporal government
budget is satisfied even if government revenues and expenditures are not cointe-
grated; and if public debt is stationary after any determinate number of differencing
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exercises, then the budget constraint is fulfilled4. Lastly, time-series unit roots and
cointegration tests are known for their limited power to reject the null hypothesis
of a unit roots (Westerlund & Prohl, 2010). Consequently, time-series analysis may
not be suitable for this study given data limitations. Hence, in the following section
we employ panel data in order to verify the findings of the time-series data.
4.5.3 Panel Analysis
4.5.3.1 Panel Unit Roots Test: Pesaran (2007)
In Table 4.8, we present Pesaran (2007) unit roots test stati¡itics for government
revenues and government expenditures in both levels and first differences. Consistent
with the time-series results (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4), Table 4.8 suggests that non-
stationarity cannot be rejected at all conventional levels of significance, for both
government revenues and government expenditures. This is because the absolute
value of the cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) test statistic is smaller than
the critical value of -2.43.
Table 4.8: Pesaran 2007 Panel Unit Root Test
Levels First Differences
Government Revenues
CIPS CIPS
t-statistic -2.068 -4.609***
Government Expenditures
t-statistic -1.833 -4.617***
*** represents 1% level of significance.
However, when variables are differenced once, stationarity cannot be rejected at
1% level significance. Therefore, the Pesaran (2007) unit root test implies that both
variables, in levels, are integrated of order one I(l) whereas, the first differences are
integrated of order zero I(0).
4See Bohn (2007) for a detailed discussion on this subject
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4.5.3.2 Panel Cointegration Analysis: Westrlund (2007)
Having established the order of integration between government revenues and expen-
ditures, we proceed to evaluating cointegration between these variables. In Table
4.9, the calculated values of the Westrlund panel cointegration statistics are reported
alongside with bootstrapped p-vah1es (robust p-values) based on 400 imitations.
The null hypothesis of no cointegration, with asymptotic p-values, is rejected for Gt
at 1 percent level of significance; and also for Pt (that is, when ρi is assumed to be
homogenous) the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at 1 percent level of
significance.
Table 4.9: Westerlund (2007) Panel Cointegration Test
Statistic Value Z-value P-value Robust P-value
Gt -5.358 -14.591 0.000*** 0.000***
Gα -20.887 -13.012 0.000*** 0.000***
Pt -16.549 -12.663 0.000*** 0.000***
Pt -19.267 -21.825 0.000*** 0.000***
*** denotes 1% level of significance
Similarly, with bootstrapped P -values the null hypothesis of no cointegration is
always rejected, irrespective of whether ρi is constrained to he homogeneous or not
(See Table 4.9). Therefore, it is inferred that there is a long-run association between
government revenues and expenditures. Put differently, while government revenues
and expenditures can wander apart in the short-run, in the long-run they will always
revert back to equilibrium. These results are in line with Lusinyan and Thornton
(2009), that pointed out that fiscal policies are on a sustainable path in the case of
South Africa.
While panel cointegration test results suggest that fiscal policies are sustainable
in the region, such results, as pointed in preceding sections cannot be relied upon.
Therefore, in order to substantiate cointegration analysis, fiscal policy reaction func-
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tions are therefore estimated in the following section.
4.5.4 Bohn’s Fiscal Reaction Function: Dynamic Panel Anal-
ysis
In figure 4.1, we depict an unconditional scatterplot for government revenues and
expenditures in SADC. The figure portrays a clear positive relationship between
government revenues and expenditures in the region. The depicted relationship is
not, however, a conclusive proof of the existence of a positive relationship between
revenues and expenditures in SADC countries; but it does provide support for priori
expectations.
Figure 4.1: Scatterplot for Public Revenues versus Government Expenditures in
SADC
Relying on Bolm’s reaction function approach, in this section we apply Panel
Mean Group, Mean Group, and the Dynamic Fixed Effects outlined earlier, to for-
mally evaluate fiscal policy sustainability in SADC. Our approaches allow us to
evaluate both the short and long-nm behaviour of fiscal policy. Although fiscal pol-
icy sustainability is a long-nm phenomena, in this study, short-run analysis of fiscal
policy sustainability is also included. The impetus to include short nm analysis is be-
cause of expectations. Economic agents use the short-run ( or current information)
to form expectations about long-run behaviour of government. Hence, coefficients
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obtained in the short-run could be a best approximation of the long-run coefficients.
Consequently, estimations attained in the short-run could be used to infer agents’
expectations regarding the future path of fiscal policy (Tiwari et al., 2012). Addi-
tionally, Payne, Mohammadi, and Cak (2008) argue that evaluating the short-run
association between public outlays and revenues could shed some additional insight
on the adjustment of budgetary process as well as the correction towards the long-
run. Therefore, short-run and long-run estimates ought to corroborate each other.
In Table 4.10 column 1 estimates from a Panel Mean Group which imposes no
restrictions on the short-run parameters, but constrains long-run parameters to be
identical across groups are present,ed. In line with theoretical predictions, it is
shown that the enor correction term (ECT) is negative and statistically significant
at 1 percent level of significance. This implies the existence of a steady and con-
verging association between public revenues aud expenditures. While our findings
suggest the existence of a converging relationship between revenues and expendi-
tures, the speed of convergence is low. The magnitude of the ECT suggests that
only about 28 percent of disequilibrium are corrected in one year, thus, it takes
approximately 4 years to fully restore equilibrium. When the Mean Group (MG) es-
timator, which unlike the PMG estimator imposes no restrictions on both the short
and the long-run parameters is applied, the speed with which budgetary disequilib-
rium are corrected changes (becomes relatively faster). This agrees with Pesaran
et al. (1999), who demonstrated that in the MG the adjustment process tends to
be relatively quick compared to PMG. In contrast to PMG estimates, Table 4.10,
demonstrates that, in the MG, approximately 33 percent of the discquilibrimn is
corrected in a single year; therefore, it takes roughly 3 years for disequilibrium to
be completely eliminated. The error correction term is statistically significant at 1
percent level. The significance of the error correction term not only shows the speed
at which deviations to equilibrium are corrected, but corroborates the cointegration
results as well. It suggests that indeed public revenues and expenditures are coin-
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tegrated. Moreover, it demonstrates that this model, that is, the error correction
model, is a good representation of the data.
Consistent with a priori theoretical expectations, the coefficient on output gap
(Y varit) is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent level (see Table 4.10).
This shows that government revenues are procyclical (Enomoto, Erickson, & Ghosh,
1992), such that when output is above its normal level, revenues relative to GDP
are increasing, and revenues relative to GDP are decreasing when output is below it
normal level. This finding is consistent irrespective of whether we impose constraints
on the short-run parameters (PMG), or relax the assumption that short-run param-
eters are homogenous across panel members (MG). In addition, to PMG and MG
estimators, a dynamic fixed effect (DFE) which restrains all slope coefficients (both
short and long-run) and error variances to be identical is estimated. The findings of
the DFE corroborate those obtained using PMG and MG. in Table 4.10, it is shown
that there exists a positive and statistically significant relationship between public
revenues and the output gap.
Theoretical predictions suggest that there is an adverse relationship between
government revenues and unexpected changes in government expenditures (Barro,
1979). In line with this prediction, across all estimations in Table 4.10, the co-
efficient capturing unexpected changes in government expenditures, Gvarit has a
negative sign, and is statistically significant at 1 percent level; implying that there
exists a negative relationship between government revenues and unexpected public
expenditures.
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Table 4.10: Dynamic Panel Estimates
Variables PMG MG Hausman test DFE
Error Correction Term -0.276*** -0.333*** -0.209***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.043)
Long-Run Coefficients
Govt Expenditure 0.815*** 0.669*** H0 : PMG 0.776***
Short-Run Coefficients H1 : MG
Gov Expenditure 0.229** 0.227** Chi− SquareStatistic 0.476***
(0.103) (0.193) [0.433] (0.065)
Gvarit -0.639*** -0.419*** -0.222***
(0.117) (0.132) (0.096)
Y varit 0.634*** 0.630** 0.308***
(0.402) (0.445) (0.395)
No. of cross-sections 12 12 12
Obs. 312 312 312
As pointed out earlier, short-run estimates, at least in theory, are a mirror image
of what should be expected in the long-run. Hence, there should be some consistency
between the short-run and long-run estimates. Theoretically, if the initial govern-
ment debt is positive, bit > 0, then government should, in the subsequent period,
run a surplus so that it repays its debt. Conversely, it is expected that an increase
in government outlays should be followed by an increase in revenues in order to en-
sure sustainability of fiscal policy. In Table 4.10, we demonstrate that government
revenues react positively to changes in government expenditures in the short-run.
The coefficient is statistically significant across all estimators. This is in line with
the Ricardian equivalence of Barro (1979) which suggests that an increase in public
expenditure financed through borrowing will prompt great future tax liabilities for
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the public (Payne et al., 2008).
Consistent with the short-run estimates, Table 4.10 shows that there exibhits a
positive and statistically significant relationship between government revenues and
expenditures in the long-run. This implies that following an increase in public ex-
penditures, governments tend to take corrective action by raising more revenues in
the subsequent periods. According to Bohn (1998), finding a positive response of
revenues to changes in public expenditures is sufficient to infer the sustainability of
government debt. In line with this argument, we infer that SADC member states
have been pursuing sustainable fiscal policies for the period under consideration.
Although government revenues sanguinely react to government expenditure changes
in the short-run, the short-run responses are smaller relative to the long-run esti-
mates (See, Table 4.10). It is postulated that the reason why revenues positively
react to changes in government expenditures in the short-run, however marginal, is
to signal to economic agents that government is committed to maintaining a sus-
tainable debt path. Moreover, government is not compelled to raise more revenues
in the shortrun, since they can finance deficits by issuing new debt (Makrydakis et
al., 1999). However, this behaviour cannot be continued in the long-run, because if
it is continued, it raises suspicions about governments ability to service/ or manage
its debt (Chen, 2014). Hence, long-run coefficients are relatively large.
In the literature, it is argued that when the response of government revenues to
changes in public expenditures is less than unity, fiscal policy is ’weakly sustainable.
This suggests that public expenditures tend to grow faster than revenues. Accord-
ing to this assertion, fiscal policies in the SADC region could be said to be weakly
sustainable given that the long-run coefficient is positive, but less than unity (sec
Table 4.10). It would be surprising to find anything beyond ’weak sustainability’
i.e. strong sustainability. We argue this because taxes arc distortionary in nature.
The distortionary nature of taxes implie,s an upper bound on the amount of taxes
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that could be levied (Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2013; Barro, 1979). The upper limit
on the value of taxes, therefore, implies an upper bound on the amount of revenues
relative to GDP that could be raised, which may not necessarily be in harmony
with expenditure growth (Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2013). In addition to the upper
bound implied by the Laffer curve, the ability to raise more revenues through taxes
is constrained by political will. Daniel and Shiamptanis (2013) contend that there
is an upper bound on the country’s willingness to tax itself. Consequently, an upper
limit on the amount of revenues that could be generated. Hence, if indeed these
limits hold then strong version of sustainability could be hardly observed in the real
world. Hence, all that would be required to infer sustainability would be a positive
response as suggested by Bohn (1998).
Mendoza and Ostry (2008) provide an internsting perspective concerning the inter-
pretation of the coefficient linking government revenues and expenditures. They
argue that a large value does not imply that fiscal policies are strongly sustainable
or not. If δit is large, it implies that an increase in debt/or expenditures of a given
magnitude requires a strong conditional response of primary surplus/ or revenues.
Our estimated coefficient ranges between 0.667 and 0.8. This does not mean that
fiscal policies are more sustainable in SADC, but rather this reflect financial market
conditions facing these countries. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient reveals
frictions in asset markets that arc more ubiquitous for developing economies, and
the uncertain environment that they face. In line with this, C. Arellano (2008) and
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) show that the risk of default in emerging economies is
relatively high, and these economies are persistently faced with a riskier economic
environment (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006); which is why a stronger conditional
response is necessary for them (Mendoza and Ostry, 2008).
These results, however, should be treated cautiously on various grounds. Al-
though we find that government revenues positively react to changes in government
debt, it does not imply that government will maintain the same behaviour over an
infinite horizon. In line with this argument, Claeys (2007) argues that after gaining
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entry into EMU, most countries started accumulating excessive debts, and incur-
ring large deficits (exceeding the targeted deficits). Thus, the observed discipline in
SADC could be driven by the impetus to enter into the proposed monetary union,
and may thereafter be discontinued.
4.5.5 Panel Granger Causality: Government Revenues-Expenditures
Nexus
It is common in the fiscal policy sustainability literature to explore causality between
government revenue and government expenditure (Li, 2001). Knowledge about the
direction is not just an academic exercise, but has potent policy implications for ad-
dressing budget imbalance problems (Ram, 1988; T. Chang, Liu, & Caudill, 2002).
The literature suggests three likely directions of causality between government rev-
enue and expenditure. The spend-tax hypothesis suggests that increased govern-
ment expenditure induces an increase in government revenues (T. Chang et al.,
2002). Inferring that the causality runs from government expenditures to govern-
ment revenues (W. Anderson, Wallace, & Warner, 1986). The tax-spend hypothesis
supported by Friedman (1978) suggests that changes in government taxes bring
changes in government expenditure. Therefore, decisions about expenditures are
made after taxes have been decided; implying a unidirectional causality running
from government revenues to govermnent expenditures (Buchanan, Wagner, et al.,
1978). Overall, this proposition proclaims that government cannot deal with in-
creasing government deficits by increasing taxes. This is argued in an article by
Friedman (1978) in which he points out that an increase in taxes does not reduce
deficits but results into increased expenditure. Lastly, the fiscal synchronisation
hypothesis suggests that revenues and expenditures are adjusted simultaneously
(Meltzer & Richard, 1981). Therefore, the direction of causality is bidirectional.
Hasan and Lincoln (1997) explore the direction of causality between government
expenditure and government revenue in the United Kingdom. Their results lend
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support to the fiscal synchronisation hypothesis. Similar evidence is documented by
Kollias and Makrydakis (2000) in Greece and Ireland. In the case of Spain and Por-
tugal, Kollias and Makrydakis (2000) document evidence supporting the tax-spend
hypothesis, and spend-tax hypothesis, respectively.
Several studies have been carried out on this subject in Africa. For instance, Eita
and Mbazima (2008) investigate causality between government expenditure and rev-
enue in Namibia. They find evidence supporting the tax-spend hypothesis. Similar
results are reported by Narayan and Narayan (2006) in Mauritius. Wolde-Rufael
(2008) contradicts the findings of Narayan and Narayan (2006). They find evidence
in support of the fiscal synchronisation hypothesis in Mauritius, Swaziland, and Zim-
babwe, while in Botswana, Burundi, and Rwanda they find no evidence of causality.
In Nigeria, Mali, Zambia, Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya, they find evidence in support
of the tax-spend hypothesis, and in Burkina Faso, they find evidence supporting
the spend-tax hypothesis.Nyamongo, Sichei, and Schoeman (2007) find evidence of
fiscal synchronisation hypothesis in South Africa. Baharumshah et al. (2016) find
similar evidence in South Africa, and thus conclude expenditure decisions are not
made in isolation to revenues. These findings are at odds with those of T. Chang
et al. (2002) who found evidence in support of the spend-tax hypothesis in South
Africa. AbuAl-Foul and Baghestani (2004) lend support to the tax-spend hypothesis
in Egypt, while they find evidence of fiscal synchronisation in Jordan. Gounder,
Narayan, and Prasad (2007) find evidence in support of the fiscal synchronisation
hypothesis in Fiji. In line with this, (Cheng, 1999) find evidence of fiscal policy
synchronicity in the case of Chile, Panama, Brazil and Peru, while in Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Paraguay, he finds evidence lending support to
the tax-spend hypothesis.
Equation 4.31 is applied to estimate Granger non-causality between government
revenues and expenditures in SADC. The findings are reported in Table 4.11. As
shown in Table 4.11, the null hypothesis that government revenues (expenditures)
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do not Granger cause government expenditures ( revenues) is rejected at 1 percent
level of significance. The findings of the study therefore, suggests that there exists
a bidirectional causality between government revenues and public expenditures.
Table 4.11: Durmitrescu and Hurlin 2012: Panel Granger Causality Test Results
GR⇒ GE GE ⇒ GR
W-bar 23.43 28.57
Z-bar 15.21 19.97
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
Z-bar-tilde 2.07 2.97
[0.038]*** [0.003]***
***, **, & * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance,
respectively. Reported in [.] are p-values.
This study therefore, lends support to the fiscal policy synchronisation hypoth-
esis, which implies that decisions about government revenues and expenditures are
jointly made Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The findings of this study have far-
reaching policy implications. They indicate that governments cannot address the
issue of perpetual debt/ or deficit by simply cutting back on government expendi-
tures, or raising revenues without considering the interdependence between public
revenues and expenditures, because if the interdependence is ignored, such policy
action would yield an ambiguous effect on the fiscal position (Wolde-Rufael, 2008).
These findings are appealing for the envisioned SADC monetary union. They imply
that governments in member states do not make spending (revenue) decisions in iso-
lation to revenue (spending) decisions. Therefore, in the long-run one would expect
that debt (or deficits) will always be on a sustainable path. This is consistent with
some studies conducted at a country-level which found evidence for fiscal synchro-
nisation in some African countries (See, Baharumshah ct al., 2016; Wolde-Rufael,
2008).
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4.6 Summary and Conclusion
Despite its significance, the sustainability of fiscal policy in SADC member coun-
tries is one of the least investigated issues. The fiscal framework imposing the
sustainability and maintenance of government finance in SADC member states was
implemented in the SADC Memorandum of Understanding which came into effect
in 2001. The goal of this study was to investigate fiscal policy sustainability in a
panel of SADC countries.
The study presents the first endeavour to address the fiscal policy sustainabil-
ity hypothesis within a panel framework in the SADC countries using cointegration
between public revenues and expenditures. The applied techniques have numerous
advantages relative to univariate analysis used in the heuristic literature (Lusinyan
and Thornton, 2009). First, they allow us to take into account the possible interde-
pendencies among countries. Second, they permit us to eschew the power distortions
of the traditional unit root and cointegration test resulting from the use of small
sample size. Third, since public revenues and expenditures are cointegrated, we also
apply dynamic panel estimators in order to assess both, the long- and short-run
reactions of government revenues to changes in public expenditures.
Three main points emerge from the analysis undertaken. First, we employ the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to assess time-series properties of public debt. Our
analysis reveals that debt is difference stationary for all countries included in the
sample. Walsh (1991) argue that stationarity of public debt is a sufficient condition
for the sustainability of public debt. Therefore, we conclude that public debt in
SADC are sustainable.
Secondly, using Westrlund (2007)’s cointegration test, we find evidence in favour
of the sustainability hypothesis in the SADC area; and we demonstrate that pub-
lic revenues and expenditures are cointegrated over the period under consideration.
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Exploring country-by-country, we find that government revenues and expenditures
are cointegrated for Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi,
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. These results are con-
sistent with findings from other empirical studies. For the other countries included
in the study, we fail to find evidence for cointegration. We argue that country-
by-country analyses may be spurious because of their failure to take cross-country
interdependencies into accowit. Therefore, they must be treated with caution.
Thirdly, using Bohn ’s reaction function we find that government revenues posi-
tively, and significantly react to changes in public outlays. According to Bohn (1998)
this is sufficient to infer sustainability of fiscal policies. Hence, we conclude that fis-
cal policies in the SADC region are on a sustainable path. These findings arc further
corroborated by the error correction term which is negative and statistically signif-
icant, hence, implying that in the long-run revenues will always adjust to restore
equilibrium/or sustainability. Additionally, we evaluated causality between revenues
and public expenditures. Our findings reveal that there exists a bidirectional causal-
ity between public receipts and outlays. The in1plication is that governments do
not make spending (revenue) decisions in isolation to revenues (spending) decisions.
Thus, in the long-run, expenditures and revenues are expected to always comove.
In summary, our findings show that although country experiences differ, overall
fiscal policies are on a sustainable path in the region. This is despite the surge
in public debt in the region. In conclusion, in order to ensure fiscal sustainability
over an infinite horizon, SADC member states should adhere to the public debts
and deficits’ limits outlined in the SADC Memorandum of Understanding. More-
over, given that between the bi-directional causality between government revenues
and expenditures, any policy that aims to reduce deficits by either cutting expen-
ditures/or increasing revenues without taking into account the interdependencies
could yield ambigious outcome.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusions
This study is separated into three distinct but related topics in the macro-monetary
economics of SADC. A high degree of business cycles comovement is generally viewed
as a neccesary requirement for optimum use of a common monetary policy (Soares
et al., 2011). The use of a single monetary policy cannot be optimal if business cy-
cles are asymmetric among union member states (Soares et al., 2011). For example,
while contractionary monetary policy helps curb inflationary pressures in booming
countries, it exarccbatcs downturns/or hinders economic growth in countries with
economic downturns (Eickmeier & Breitung, 2006). As such, knowledge about the
extent to which business cycles are synchronised is nccccsary for countries seeking
to launch a monetary union (Soares et al., 2011). Hence, the first part of the study
(Chapter 2), assesses business cycles’ synchronisation in the SADC region which
envisages to establish a monetary union. Using annual data covering the period
1980-2014, we employ a Baxter and King (1999) filter to isolate the cyclical com-
ponent of GDP (growth deviations) from the circular component. We thereafter
employ a dynamic factor model a la Forni et al. (2005) to evaluate the share of
variations in business cycles that is explained by common shocks relative to the
share that is explained by country-specific shocks. If business cycles are driven by
common shocks then policy coordination is warranted. However, if business cycles
are driven by country-specific shocks, then the use of a common policy would be
counterproductive.
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Important findings emerged from our analysis. Our findings reveal that regional
and country-specific shocks are important for some countries, but not for all. More
precisely, we find that regional common shocks explain most within-country business
cycles statistics in the case of Botswana, Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malawi,
South Africa, Swaziland, and Tanzania. The implication of this finding is that
a shared monetary policy in these countries could be considered. Moreover, our
analysis show that country-specific shocks play little or no significant role in ex-
plaining within-country business cycles in most countries included in the sample.In
Malawi, it was discovered that both regional and country-specific shocks are impor-
tant in explaining business cycles statistics whereas, in Seychelles, only idiosyncratic
shocks are essential for explaining the within-country business cycles statistics. The
important message from our findings is that, based only on the business cycles’ syn-
chronicity condition, a monetary union which subsumes all SADC member states
would not be optimal, and would result into macroeconomic instabilities in the re-
gion.
In the second part of the study (Chapter 3), we used a generalised method of
moments to investigate the endogeneity hypothesis in SADC. Using data covering
the period of 1994-2014, we investigated the role of trade integration/or intensity, fi
nancial integration, macroeconomic policy similarity (fiscal policy convergence and
monetary policy similarity), and exogenous global factors (proxicd by real oil prices)
on the extent to which business cycles arc synchronised across SADC member states.
Important findings emerge from the study. We demonstrate that trade integration
exerts positive and a statistically significant influence on business cycles’ synchroni-
sation, suggesting that intensifying trade integration in the SADC area could holster
business cycles’ comovement. we show that macroeconomic policy similarity tends
to holster business cycles synchronisation. More precisely, our findings demonstrate
that both monetary policy and fiscal policy similarity have positive and statistically
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significant effects on the degree of business cycles synchronisation. The implication
of these findings is that policy coordination ( or uniform macroeconomic policies)
could intensify the business cycles synchronisation in the SADC area. Therefore, it
is imperative that SADC member states should put more effort towards harmonis-
ing their macroeconomic policies. This could be done by ensuring that all member
states adhere to the prescriptions of the Memorandum of Understanding.
Another important finding derives from the behavior of financial flows. The
study reveals that financial integration has a dampening effect on business cycles
synchronisation. The implication of this finding is that financial flows as predicted
by theory, follow returns differential, consequently resulting to asynchronous busi-
ness cycles. Moreover, the study unearthed that oil prices also have a decoupling
effect. We argue that this is because SADC consists of both net oil importers, and
exporters, hence oil price changes have different effects depending on whether a
country is a net importer, or exporter of oil. It is shown in the literature that an
oil price increase generally has a negative impact on oil importers, but a positive
impact on exporters (See for example, Lardic & Mignon, 2008; Nzimande & Msomi,
2016).
To ensure that a single monetary policy is suitable for all member states, business
cycles synchronisation is necessary. However, in the event of asymmetric business
cycles ( due to country-specific disturbances/ or common shocks with asymmetric
impact on individual countries) national fiscal policies play a significant role in sta-
bilising the macroeconomy (Degiannakis et al., 2016). As such, it is paramount that
national fiscal policies are sustainable. Unsustainable fiscal policies may neither be
a mechanism nor an effective tool for tackling macroeconomic disturbances (Greiner
et al., 2007), thereby threatening the stability of a monetary union. Against this
background, the third part of the study (Chapter 4) investigated the sustainability
of fiscal policies in the SADC region using Bohn’s (1998) reaction function approach.
145
Dynamic panel techniques, that is, a pooled Mean Group, Mean Group, and a dy-
namic fixed effects, are used to estimate fiscal policy reaction functions (the response
of government revenues following an increase in government expenditures). In line
with the tax smoothing hypothesis, we include a variable which captures the effect
of business cycles on fiscal policy, that is, output gap; and a variable capturing the
effect of temporary deviations on government expenditures. We demonstrate that
output gap has a positive effect on government revenues, signifying that govern-
ment revenues are procyclical. When output is above its normal level, government
revenues tend to increase, but decrease when output is below its normal level. Fur-
thermore, we show that there exists an adverse relationship between temporary
government deviations and its revenues, implying that unexpected changes in gov-
ernment expenditures negatively affect revenues.
Another important finding of the study is that there exist a positive and sig-
nicant relationship betweem government revenues and expenditures. According to
Bohn (1998) a positive response is sufficient to infer that fiscal policy is sustain-
able. Hence, we infer that SADC fiscal policies are sustainable for the period under
consideration. These findings are corroborated by the error correction tenn which is
negative and statistically significant, impyling a steady and converging relationship
between government revenues and expenditures. To verify these results, we esti-
mate Granger causality between government revenues and expenditures. We find
that there exists a bidirectional Granger causality between government revenues
and expenditures. This implies that expenditure (revenue) decisions are not done in
isolation to revenue ( expenditure) decisions. Therefore, revenues and expenditures
cannot wander far apart, and thus fiscal policy will always be on a sustainable path.
In summary, we conclude that a monetary union comprising of selected mem-
bers of the SADC bloc could be feasible, assuming that other requirements for a
monetary union are satisfied. More precisely, we contend that a monetary union
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consisting of Botswana, Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Tan-
zania, South Africa, and Swaziland can be optimally established. Our findings
suggest that within-country business cycles statistics in these countries are signifi-
cantly explained by common/or regional shocks. This implies that, for this group
of countries, a common monetary policy could be used to deal with business cycles
without destabilising the envisaged monetary union.
Although business cycles are not synchronised in SADC, the study further demon-
strates that business cycles synchronisation is not irrevocably fixed, and is endoge-
nous to other factors, such as trade, and macroeconomic policy similarity. This,
as conteded by Frankel and Rose (1998), suggests that business cycles synchroni-
sation could be justified ex-post rather than ex-ante of a monetary union. Thus
business cycle synchronisation is not a necessary prerequisite for a monetary union.
Consequently, provided that other preconditions of a monetary union are met, a
monetary union (subsuming all SADC member states) could be established. Lastly,
in the event of asymmetric disturbances, thereby, cushioning the union against po-
tential conflicts over the preferred monetary policy conduct.
The findings of the study, especially in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, have in-depth
implications. Firstly, they signify that fiscal policy stance is an essential stabilisa-
tion tool in a currency union. For fiscal policy to play this role when needed, it is
imperative that it is sustainable, therefore, fiscal policy restraints are necessary to
ensure sustainability. However, the design of fiscal policy restraints ought not to
hamper fiscal policy from playing this role when necessary, while preventing fiscal
policy induced business cycles’ decoupling.
Based on our analysis, we recommend that SADC authorities should take sound
policy measures aimed at boosting intra-regional trade such as, ensuring that all
member states fully liberalise intra-SADC trade, and also tightening the stringent
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rules of origin; and strenghtening macroeconomic policy coordination in order to
intensify economic convergence.
The study has several limitations. Firstly, the study as whole only concentrates
on two aspects of a monetary union, that is fiscal and monetary policy, thereby
neglecting other aspects such as political integration. Hence, the study is unable
to onclude whether a monetary union would be feasible in SADC or not. This,
study, however, provides a benchmark for future studies. Thus, we recommend
that future studies should endeavor to ponder other aspects of a monetary union.
Secondly, the second part of the study (Chapter 2) is likely to be improved upon
by including a global common factor, thus allowing one to see if business cycles
synchronisation is driven by regional or global common shocks. Thus, inclusion of
a global common component may yield an important insight. Thirdly, the study
was constrained by the availability of data, hence a number of important variables
such as industry similarity were not included. Moreover, data limitation made it
impossible to distinguish between intra- and inter-trade, thereby compelling us to
rely on the total trade. Frankel and Rose (1998) postulate that it would be far useful
to have a more disaggregated evidence on the composition of inter-industry and
intra-industry parts. This view is supported by Fidrmuc (2004) among others. In his
study, Fidrmuc (2004) demonstrate that inter-industry trade is not as important as
intra-industry trade in explaining business cycles comovcment. However, in SADC,
disaggregated data is not collated for the period under investigation. Thus, we used
aggregated data as in Frankel and Rose (1998) and Tawadros (2008).
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Palaşcă, S., Enea, S.-F., Jaba, E., & Ţigănaş, C. (2014). Is trade a vector of
business cycles synchronization? a fuzzy cluster approach of globalization.
Procedia Economics and Finance, 15 , 247–253.
Panopoulou, E., & Pantelidis, T. (2016). The fisher effect in the presence of time-
varying coefficients. Computational Statistics & Data Analysis , 100 , 495–511.
Papadopoulos, A. P., & Sidiropoulos, M. G. (1999). The sustainability of fiscal
policies in the european union. International Advances in Economic Research,
5 (3), 289–307.
Payne, J. E., Mohammadi, H., & Cak, M. (2008). Turkish budget deficit sustainabil-
ity and the revenue-expenditure nexus. Applied Economics , 40 (7), 823–830.
Pedroni, P. (1999). Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels
with multiple regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and statistics , 61 (S1),
653–670.
Perron, P., & Ng, S. (1996). Useful modifications to some unit root tests with de-
pendent errors and their local asymptotic properties. The Review of Economic
Studies , 63 (3), 435–463.
Pesaran, M. H. (2004). General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in
panels.
Pesaran, M. H. (2007). A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross-section
dependence. Journal of applied econometrics , 22 (2), 265–312.
173
Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., & Smith, R. P. (1999). Pooled mean group estimation of
dynamic heterogeneous panels. Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, 94 (446), 621–634.
Pesaran, M. H., & Smith, R. (1995). Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic
heterogeneous panels. Journal of econometrics , 68 (1), 79–113.
Pesaran, M. H., Ullah, A., & Yamagata, T. (2008). A bias-adjusted lm test of error
cross-section independence. The Econometrics Journal , 11 (1), 105–127.
Phillips, P. C., & Moon, H. R. (2000). Nonstationary panel data analysis: an
overview of some recent developments. Econometric Reviews , 19 (3), 263–286.
Phillips, P. C., & Perron, P. (1988). Testing for a unit root in time series regression.
Biometrika, 75 (2), 335–346.
Phillips, P. C., & Sul, D. (2003). Dynamic panel estimation and homogeneity testing
under cross section dependence. The Econometrics Journal , 6 (1), 217–259.
Polito, V., & Wickens, M. (2012). A model-based indicator of the fiscal stance.
European Economic Review , 56 (3), 526–551.
Quah, D., & Sargent, T. J. (1993). A dynamic index model for large cross sections.
In Business cycles, indicators and forecasting (pp. 285–310). University of
Chicago Press.
Quintos, C. E. (1995). Sustainability of the deficit process with structural shifts.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics , 13 (4), 409–417.
Ram, R. (1988). Additional evidence on causality between government revenue and
government expenditure. Southern Economic Journal , 763–769.
Ravn, M. O., & Uhlig, H. (2002). On adjusting the hodrick-prescott filter for the
frequency of observations. Review of economics and statistics , 84 (2), 371–376.
Rodden, J., & Wibbels, E. (2010). Fiscal decentralization and the business cycle:
An empirical study of seven federations. Economics & Politics , 22 (1), 37–67.
Rose, A. K., & Engel, C. (2002). Currency unions and international integration.
Journal of Money, Credit & Banking , 34 (4), 1067–1090.
Rose, A. K., & Van Wincoop, E. (2001). National money as a barrier to international
174
trade: The real case for currency union. American Economic Review , 91 (2),
386–390.
Rossouw, J. (2006). An analysis of macro-economic convergence in sadc 1. South
African Journal of Economics , 74 (3), 382–390.
Said, S. E., & Dickey, D. A. (1984). Testing for unit roots in autoregressive-moving
average models of unknown order. Biometrika, 71 (3), 599–607.
Schiavo, S. (2008). Financial integration, gdp correlation and the endogeneity of
optimum currency areas. Economica, 75 (297), 168–189.
Schick, A. (2005). Sustainable budget policy. OECD Journal on Budgeting , 5 (1),
107–126.
Schwert, G. W. (1987). Effects of model specification on tests for unit roots in
macroeconomic data. Journal of Monetary Economics , 20 (1), 73–103.
Seater, J. J. (1993). Ricardian equivalence. Journal of economic literature, 31 (1),
142–190.
Sethapramote, Y. (2015). Synchronization of business cycles and economic policy
linkages in asean. Journal of Asian Economics , 39 , 126–136.
Seymen, A. (2012). Euro area business cycles. OECD Journal: Journal of Business
Cycle Measurement and Analysis , 2012 (1), 1–31.
Shea, J. (1995). Myopia, liquidity constraints, and aggregate consumption: a simple
test. Journal of money, credit and banking , 27 (3), 798–805.
Shin, K., & Sohn, C.-H. (2006). Trade and financial integration in east asia: effects
on co-movements. World Economy , 29 (12), 1649–1669.
Shin, K., & Wang, Y. (2003). Trade integration and business cycle synchronization
in east asia. Asian Economic Papers , 2 (3), 1–20.
Shin, K., & Wang, Y. (2005). The impact of trade integration on business cycle
co-movements in europe. Review of World Economics , 141 (1), 104–123.
Silvestre, J., & Mendonça, A. (2007). The endogeneity of optimum currency areas
criteria: Some evidence from the european union and portugal. International
Advances in Economic Research, 13 (1), 1–18.
175
Soares, M. J., et al. (2011). Business cycle synchronization and the euro: A wavelet
analysis. Journal of Macroeconomics , 33 (3), 477–489.
Stock, J. H., & Watson, M. (2011). Dynamic factor models. Oxford handbook on
economic forecasting .
Stock, J. H., & Watson, M. W. (2002). Forecasting using principal components from
a large number of predictors. Journal of the American statistical association,
97 (460), 1167–1179.
Tavlas, G. S. (1994). The theory of monetary integration. Open economies review ,
5 (2), 211–230.
Tavlas, G. S. (2009a). The benefits and costs of monetary union in southern africa:
A critical survey of the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys , 23 (1), 1–43.
Tavlas, G. S. (2009b). Optimum-currency-area paradoxes. Review of International
Economics , 17 (3), 536–551.
Tawadros, G. B. (2008). The endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria:
an application to asean. International Economic Journal , 22 (3), 335–343.
Tipoy, C. K. (2015). Real convergence using tar panel unit root tests: an application
to southern african development community (Tech. Rep.).
Tiwari, A. K., et al. (2012). Debt sustainability in india: Empirical evidence
estimating time-varying parameters. Economics Bulletin, 32 (2), 1133–1141.
Trehan, B., & Walsh, C. E. (1988). Common trends, the government’s budget con-
straint, and revenue smoothing. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control ,
12 (2-3), 425–444.
Vieira, C., & Vieira, I. (2012). Assessing the endogeneity of oca conditions in emu.
The Manchester School , 80 , 77–91.
Vieira, C., & Vieira, I. (2013). Monetary integration in eastern and southern africa:
choosing a currency peg for comesa. South African Journal of Economics ,
81 (3), 356–372.
Von Hagen, J., & Neumann, M. J. (1994). Real exchange rates within and between
currency areas: how far away is emu? The Review of Economics and Statistics ,
176
236–244.
Watson, M. W., & Engle, R. F. (1983). Alternative algorithms for the estimation
of dynamic factor, mimic and varying coefficient regression models. Journal
of Econometrics , 23 (3), 385–400.
Westerlund, J. (2007). Testing for error correction in panel data. Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and statistics , 69 (6), 709–748.
Westerlund, J., & Prohl, S. (2010). Panel cointegration tests of the sustainability
hypothesis in rich oecd countries. Applied Economics , 42 (11), 1355–1364.
Wilcox, D. W. (1989). The sustainability of government deficits: Implications of
the present-value borrowing constraint. Journal of Money, credit and Banking ,
21 (3), 291–306.
Willett, T. D., Permpoon, O., & Wihlborg, C. (2010). Endogenous oca analysis and
the early euro experience. The World Economy , 33 (7), 851–872.
Wolde-Rufael, Y. (2008). The revenue–expenditure nexus: The experience of 13
african countries. African Development Review , 20 (2), 273–283.
Yayo, M., & Asefa, S. (2016). International trade effects of regional economic
integration in africa: The case of the southern african development community
(sadc). International Journal of African Development , 3 (2), 6.
Zeldes, S. P. (1989). Consumption and liquidity constraints: an empirical investi-
gation. Journal of political economy , 97 (2), 305–346.
Zerihun, M. F., & Breitenbach, M. C. (2016). Nonlinear approaches in testing ppp:
Evidence from southern african development community. Economic Modelling ,
56 , 162–167.
Zerihun, M. F., Breitenbach, M. C., & Kemegue, F. (2014). A greek wedding
in sadc? testing for structural symmetry towards sadc monetary integration.
African Finance Journal , 16 (2), 16–33.
Zervoyianni, A., & Anastasiou, A. (2009). Convergence of shocks and trade in the
enlarged european union. The Journal of International Trade & Economic
Development , 18 (1), 79–114.
177
Zivot, E., & Andrews, D. W. K. (1992). Further evidence on the great crash, the
oil-price shock, and the unit-root hypothesis. Journal of business & economic
statistics , 10 (1), 251–270.
178
